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ABSTRACT

The Politics of Transformation:
and the Multinational
(May

Nigeria, OPEC,

Corporations

1984)

Isaac Chinedum Igweonwu, B.A., University of Kansas

M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts (Amherst)
M.P.A. Candidate, University of Massachusetts (Amherst)

Directed by Professor Eric Einhorn

The Politics of Transformation seeks to explore and critically

analyze the new politics and policies formulated, articulated
partly
and adopted by Nigeria's ruling and political elites and

out of demand made by academic intellectuals including

a

handful of

of government.
influential too level bureaucrats who run the machinery

Furthermore, the Politics of transformation examine

through critical

Countries (OPEC)
analysis the Organization of Petroleum Exnorting
1

its impact on the
"quiet revolution" in the world of global oil,

global

of international
economy and most importantly on the dynamics

relations.

Sovereignty and of
By focusing on the Doctrines of

examine specifically the
"Changing Circumstances," we explore and
oil comoanies and
changing relationship between international

systems analysis,
producer-governments within the frameworks of
tactics.
bargaining strategies and negotiation

The Politics of transformation therefore seeks to examine
for the purposes of restricting prevailing ideologies by looking
into the past while going beyond mere survival of that past, through

the creation of new forms and modes and the conscious presentation

of new demands based on

a

new era of national consciousness and

political management in

a

changing world.

In the

Nigerian context, the politics of transformation gave

birth to indigenization of "Migerianization" of the economy,

membership into the OPEC and the transnationalization of the society.
Studied within the framework of systems analysis, objectives and
goals seem rather haphazardly and limitedly successful and dependent
on the alliance between domestic and state actors on the one hand,

and foreign interests on the other.

The final outcome of this

interaction remains to be seen since structural arrangements

engendered by this process

is

not yet ossified.

In the final

analysis, however, indigenous control of the economy seem
goal

the

of Nigerian planners.

With regards to OPEC, the quiet revolution sought not only
to defend the posted price of oil

and goals of

of

a

a

then, it represents the vision

grouo of nations bound together for the accomplishment

stated goal.

Consequently, the dynamics of global oil is not

in
only based on economic terms, but fundamentally politically

nature.

The multinational oil companies are on the defensive and

to their rescue
no amount of game theoretic calculations can come

save

a

oil
deliberate inter-government intrusion in the global
vi

ndustry.

This study proceeds from that assumotion.

vi
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INTRODUCTION

Two decades ago after nationalists proclaimed Nigeria as independ-

ent nation, the nation's confidence in her ability to remain so has
fallen to a low ebb.

Despite the rapid economic and social

'development'

following independence, it dawned on Nigerian society that the cost of
this progress was a subtle form of dependence on external forces for

sustenance.

External dependence, long a baneful instrument of global

capitalist arrangement, was deemed more sinister, systematically

exploitative and structurally manipulative than formal colonialism.
Nigeria, a former British colony, was

a

victim of 'neocolonialism'

deeply rooted in her historical past and sustained by the logic of

structurally integrated global economy.

Like many other 'third world'

nations caught in this structural quagmire, Nigeria is struggling

for extrication.

Fundamental to success in this struggle was the

necessity for change of policy as well as for choice of policy
instrument.
The choice of policy instrument dates back to the period

of independence, however, policy choice was distorted by lack of

clear goal and clear perception of what the problem
is suppossed to achieve.

is and

a

what change

Although indigenizing the economy became

pivot around which the policy of change revolved, there was no
general agreement or consensus on how to achieve it.

Inconsistency

decision-making
and incoherence of policy marked the process of

during the civilian regime of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.
1

a

.

2

Credit is generally given to the successive military
regimes
of General Gowon and Olusegun Obasanjo (1967-1979) for
successfully

formulating and implementing

a

consistent and coherent program

designed to 'nigerianize' the economy.

Recognition also went to those

army of bureaucrats who made the program possible.

With the advent

of the military leadership, the struggle for the control of

investments in the country entered

a

new stage.

once held by foreign capital no longer exists.

The hegemonic position

Now a gradual

transformation of this position in favor of the government

mostly by political means.

is

reached

This struggle for supremacy and the

change in the balance of power engendered, how the government eventually
won and the impact of this on the nation is partly the subject matter
or general thesis of this work.
the argument that the predominant

Forming part of the thesis also is
posture of the Organization of

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) over the changing structure of
global oil

industry is fundamentally political in nature making it

necessary for consumer governments participation in global oil
negotiations
We boldly advance systemic reasons which serve as

a

basis for

the argument that a government-to-government approach in negotiations
on matters relating to the international oil

necessary and in the long run inevitable.

industry is indeed

We argue also that the era

of industry negotiation with producer governments is approaching

anachronism due in part to the changing structure of the oil industry
occasioned by the politics of transformation sweeping through
producer nations of the 'third world.'

The effects of this

3

transformation is already underway leading to
unprecendented 'unsettling
shift'

in the international

oil

industry.

As a dramatic illustration of this unsettling
shift, we give

examples of recent

'

mega -mergers

'

among oil majors pointing accurately

to the fact that oil wars which were largely fought in the oil

fields of Middle East and other third world producing regions

before the 1970s, now has been shifted to the home fronts of the
oil majors.

seriously

-

A major reason for this shift

-

one which should be taken

is the widespread producer nation displacement of oil

companies from their traditional activities of 'upstream' as well as
'downstream' operations around the world.

The oil crisis had indicated

the myth of the invulnerability of multinational oil corporations to

national sovereignty.

In 1973 for instance,

ninety three percent of

OPEC production or 27.9 million barrels per day went to oil majors
on a long term basis.

By 1979/1980, this dropped to around fifty

percent of OPEC exports and forty two percent of world oil trade.

Stripped mostly of their concessionaire reserves around the
world, the major oil companies are gobbling each other through megamergers.

Recent examples are

a

tip of the iceberg in an economic

activity which promises more intense concentration than either the
steel

industry or big automobile conglomerates.

depressed prices and declining reserves

-

all

Slack demands,

contributed to the

consuming desire of major oil companies to cannibalize each other
in order to achieve

reserves.

efficiency of production and control needed

Thus in February, 1984, Texaco completed its $10.1 billion

acquisition of Getty Oil Corporation, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group

4

announced a $5.2 billion purchase of the thirty percent of the Shell
Oil

Company that the Dutch Oil Group did not already own, and in March

of 1984, Mobil

announced to have plans of buying out Superior Oil

for $5.65 billion.
a

Standard Oil Company of California, (Chevron) made

hasty move and bought the Gulf Oil Corporation for $13.2 billion,

allegedly the biggest price tag in merger history.
One observation should, however, be remarked in the recent

wave of oil mega-mergers:

the big oil companies have begun to

'detect the whiff of death' and the only route out of the imminent

catastrophe is to retreat to home base, consolidate through merger
struggles what oil reserves remain in home territory and friendly
regions.

The fight among the oil companies has just begun; it will

be a bitter one pitting the strong against the weak.

We predict

that as the fight progresses, the smaller of 'independent' oil

companies will be swallowed,

a

high concentration of the oil industry

will ensue and government will be forced to intervene to restore

competition by directly negotiating with other producer governments
for access to crude production and sales.

Purpose

This study thus, is concerned with the new politics of trans-

formation as formulated and articulated by Nigeria's ruling and
political elites and partly out of the demands made by academic
bureaucrats
intellectuals including a handful of influential top level

who run the machinery of the state.

In addition, we examine through

Exporting Countries (OPEC)
critical analysis the Organization of Petroleum

5

'quiet revolution'

in the' world of global

oil, its impact on the

global economy, and most importantly, on the dynamics of
international

relations.

By focusing on the doctrines of sovereignty and doctrines

of 'changing circumstances,' we can explore and examine specifically
the changing relationship between international oil companies and

producer governments within the framework of bargaining strategies
and negotiation tactics and also within

a

political environment where

the necessity for change and choice is paramount and apparently define
the dynamics of international systems .international relations and
the law that govern them.

The politics of transformation therefore seeks to examine for
the purposes of restructuring prevailing ideologies by looking into
the past while going beyond mere survival of that past, through the

creation of new forms and modes and the conscious presentation of
new demands based on the satisfaction of the psychology of the new

Nigerian man of our times.
More concretely and specifically stated, the politics of

new era of national consciousness and

transformation ushered in

a

political management in

changing world.

a

It took several

forms and

can be understood within the framework of four fundamental systemic

transformations which include:

I.

Indigenization or 'Nigerianization' of the economy.

II.

Creation of the New Politics of Unity.

III.

Changing structure of international oil industry and of

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
IV.

The transnationalization of the society.

6

These policies borne of experience and vision should
be seen
in the context of change and

'progress'.

None has exemplified

an.d

captured the spirit of the times more than the indigenization
of
the economy.

Indigenization of the economy represents

a

milestone

and a major achievement in the onward march toward economic self-

determination.

Propelled into force with the 1972 and, later revised

(1976-77) indigenization decrees,

seeks to place

a

Nigerianization' of the economy

'

greater portion of economic control in the hands

of Nigerians while providing adequate incentives for foreign interests.

Concurrent to the policy of Nigerianization is

a

related policy

of transforming the 'classical dependent' state of the economy
into one of rapid industrialization.

Although Nigeria has been

grouped among the ranks of Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs)
or in Immanuel Wallersteins words

'

semi -perphery

'

such as Brazil,

Mexico, Iran and Hong Kong, the nation's industrialized base
remains weak, exposing a severe backwardness in manufacturing activity.
The import-substitution phase of the early 1960s, argues Terisa

Turner, should usefully be understood as 'accomodating' and complementing
foreign interest rather than as

a

serious effort at capital accumula-

tion and capitalist production (Terisa Turner and Peter Nore, "Oil
and Class Struggle, 1980).

Present industrial policy is aimed among

other pursuits, to correct deficient capitalist production through
the creation of sectoral industrial bases such as iron and steel

industry, petrochemical and agro-allied industry.
Nigeria's membership in the Organization of Petroleum and

Exporting Countries (OPEC) extended the opportunity as well to use

7

the activities of the organization in furtherance of stated
goals.

OPEC was simultaneously undergoing profound transformation in terms
of

philosophy and goals.

Within this organization, the politics of

transformation represents the 'quiet revolution' inspired by the
perfidy of major international oil companies in oil negotiations with

producer governments.

Gradual shift of producer governments positions

should thus not be seen as 'radical' but should be interpreted as

a

sensible and historical response to 'forces of reaction', exploitation
and imperialism.

It represents the ultimate desire, legitimized

and justified by lessons of history

-

past and present

-

for control

of a group of nations' economic and natural resources and finally

utilizing these resources as an effective tool for reshaping global
politics and for initiating the march towards a new international

economic order.
The lessons of history

-

past and present

-

as addressed in

this study concern economic as well as political and structural

debilitations associated with colonialism and neo-colonial ism.
The colonial authority through political subjugation and

sheer economic power had

a

monopoly over economic activity and the

processes of state capital accumulation.

Private indigenous capital

accumulation was consequently minimal and even discouraged.

Marketing boards were set up by the colonial state to appropriate
'peasant surplus' which were eventually transferred to the colonial
state.

The result was the underdevelopment of productive forces which

might have economically benefitted from this flight of capital to
the 'metropole'.

Control over the network of capital enabled

8

metropolitan interests to monopolize large scale commercial activity.
Commerce as distinct from productive industrialization was emphasized
by the colonial state thus underdeveloping the industrial process.

The rise of nationalism and the consequent shifts of power

within the Nigerian state after 1952 increased nationalist demands
for a share in the distributive trade and in the early 1970s for

coherent plan for rapid industrial development.
the position of British commercial

a

These demands weakened

capital and later of foreign

capital in general and opened up opportunities for local enterpreneurs.
Local

enterpreneurs, lacking finance capital and management

technology, were unable to compete effectively with foreign capital

which in the main continue

its dominance over economic production

and commercial activities.

Indigenization decrees of 1972, and later

1977, were designed to change this situation.

These decrees,

promulgated by the federal military government, sought to transfer
control over economic activities from foreign interests to Nigerians.

The process by which this goal is sought has been gradual
but deliberate, one in which the advantage lay in the gradual trans-

formation of

a

stated position and goal, in which the opponent's

moves were utilized first to paralyze and then destroy him.
a

It was

well
game whose greatness derived from the skills of its moves as

as from the inspiration of its origins.

It was a game deemed vital

and she was set to
to the success or failure of Nigeria as a nation

play it.
with
Nigeria, with an area of 356,667 square miles and

a

hundred million is
population estimated at between eighty to one
the wealthiest.
the most populous in Africa and potentially

The

9

vastness of its natural resources, particularly its oil reserves,
has made it one of the most economically powerful

and perhaps the most

influential nation on the continent.

Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960 and later in
1963 gained the status of
colonial rule.
in 1966,
In

a

republic, after a long spell of British

A military coup, led by

a

group of young Army Majors

abolished civil rule, killing several top civilian leaders.

1967, after a prolonged political

instability and turmoil,

accompanied by tumultous religious upheaval and tribal hatred, the
Ibo tribespeople from the defunct Eastern Region unsuccessfully sought

independence as Biafra.

Ibo secession led to a bitter and costly civil

war, which lasted for two and one half years with an estimated one

million lives lost.
General Yakubu Gowon,
to General

The nation was thereafter under military rule
a

-

from

Sandhurst Military School graduate (Britain)

Olusegun Obasanjo

-

a

period that lasted for thirteen years.

After the military interregnum, democracy was given

a

chance when in 1979, the military handed over power to civil authority,
and under the watchful eyes of the army boys, elections were held.
A northerner, Alhaji

Shehu Shagari

Nigeria (NPN), emerged victorious.

,

leading the National Party of
A second term for Shagari, amidst

accusations of unfair electoral victory, rampant corruption, economic
instability, ushered in the nation's fifth military intervention since
1960.

Major General Mohammed Buhart, forty ona,

a

career military

owned oil company
man, former oil commissioner and head of the State

regime as
in the mid-1970s, describing the civilian
took the reigns of government.

"inept and corrupt,"

10

Nigeria is rich in natural resources, particularly oil.

It is

primarily an agricultural nation, however, it imports about
$2 billion
worth of food every year.

As a newly industrializing nation,

industrialization is proceeding rapidly.

A member of OPEC, it depends

on petroleum exports for about ninety five percent of its foreign

exchange.

World oil surplus, an ever increasing population, bad

management and squandermania have all contributed huge foreign debts and
unstable economy.

Oil

revenues, which were $22.4 billion in 1980,

slumped to $9.6 billion in 1982 and even further in 1983.

Judging

from the continued slump in global oil demands, the financial situation

may get worse, aggravating the nation's balance of payment position.
Nigeria's foreign debt to banks around the world amounts to
about $9.2 billion, according to the Bank for International Settlements
in Basel,

Switzerland.

billion

moderate when compared to other developing nations,

-

The total debt, however, is approaching $15.0

particularly those of Latin America.

management and certainly

a

It will

take prudent economic

noticeable improvement in the sale of

crude oil for Nigeria to control its foreign debt.

In

pursuit of this,

the government wants an increase in the production quota set by OPEC
to two million barrels per day up from 1.3 million, the nation's

current limit.
With all these to battle, the new military government, as

with those that preceded it, are faced with

a

major task of redefining

national values and priorities, of creating the new Nigerian man

survivable under these conditions.
is

Thus, the politics of transformation

both psychological and historical; very much

a

product of our

11

times, of historical change and

a

matter of 'sensibility'.

The

inevitability cf this change has been conditioned extensively
by lesson?

of history and of concrete global experiences.

Methodology

A study of this nature requires that attention be paid to the

whole structure of the society and more specifically to its political
economy.

Thus, within the theoretical framework of systems analysis,

games theory, decision-making theory, and dependency

theory, the

political and economic fabric of the society as linked to global

economic system is examined for structural weaknesses or strengths.
We focus on systems analysis because

I

believe it is un-

questionably the most powerful and useful approach.

The objectives

of development and goals of national actors can be determined more

easily if we take into account the anatomy of society, which is
subject of systems analysis.

Thus it would be useful to combine

a
a

systems analysis approach with concepts of political economy based
on considerations of its most important components, namely productive

forces and production relations.
Systems analytic approach within

framework

a

descriptive and critical

will, we believe, shed more light on the anatomy of society

by (1) exploring the system of economic and political
(2), the interests of actors,

(3)

relationships,

power distribution and how actor

configuration and interactions affect objectives and goals of national

development and, (4) how in practical terms systemic processes are
translated into policy measures.
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We will as a matter of conceptual clarity and distinction
shy

away from the more general and often ambiguous treatment of
'systems
theory' prevalent in the social sciences.
can be readily identified.

Some of these treatments

For example, Gabriel Almond's definition

of systems as that system of interaction which performs the functions
of integration and adaptation, or David Easton's 'authoritative

allocation of values for

a

society' or Karl Deutsch's

respond effectively to demands' or on

a

'ability to

more general level

'requisite

functions' or 'systems maintenance' and 'input-out' analysis.^
For the purposes of this study, definitions such as these

suffer one common conceptual defect:

they are mechanistically

conceived, and having been borrowed from the 'hard' sciences such as

engineering and biological sciences are hurriedly translated into
social scientific tools of analysis with little success.
We argue instead that society cannot be conceived or under-

stood simply in mechanistic terms or as a machine with predictable

patterns of behavior, but as an organic entity:

fluid, dynamic,

unpredictable and composed of system of human relationships and system
of wants which could only be satisfied within the context of production
and production relations.

This view represents our definition of

systems analysis where society is organically viewed as
We do believe nevertheless, that social

a

'system.'

scientists can and should make

use of accepted hypothesis and models developed in the behavioral

and engineering sciences as long as this is done to enhance understanding.

Closely related to the theoretical insights of systems analysis,
to
we draw periodically from dependency and Marxist literature

explain the major argument on development and how this role
seeks to
resolve or in some instances exacerbate certain contradictions
endemic
in the society.

Thus the logic of this intervention should not be

seen as the promotion of the interests of

a

single class; rather it

should be seen and interpreted as the resolution of certain economic
and social forces.

In the Nigerian context and indeed in most contexts,

this logic is inherently faulty.

Why?

We give reasons in the chapters

that follow.

Particular attention was paid to the nation's oil industry
and how it negotiates with international oil companies on matters

concerning petroleum.

I

use conceptually relevent materials from

games theory in attempts to deepen understanding of negotiation

strategies, strategic behavior and strategic interaction of the
various actors engaged in the global oil industry.

The primary

concern here though, is the applicability of game theory to global
interaction.
game

It should be pointed out early enough that although

theoretic materials offered some thought-provoking insights

and analysis of the oil

industry, no attempt was made at mathematical

'solutions' of specific games because it seems that game theory is

not relevant to solutions of competitive behavior involving more than
two players.

Solutions would anyway be highly indeterminate due to

the highly political nature of global oil

industry.

Interviews with several officials of the State-owned National
Oil

Corporation

(NNPC) was conducted in Lagos with the view of

understanding through content analysis how decisions are made and who
makes them, for whom and why?

In this case,

Graham Allison's bureau-

provided
cratic and organizational models of decision-making process

an analytical

framework.

Bureaucratic wranglings" and bureaucratic

imperatives, it was found, dominate the decision process with the result
that policies arrived at were founded in consensus among the players.

Information materials of obvious consequence were picked up from the

British Petroleum Library in London; the Royal Dutch Shell Oil

Company Headquarters in Amsterdam, Holland and the Shell Development
Company in Houston, Texas.

Although research methodology relies heavily on systems
analysis, the imposition of descriptive and prescriptive technique
on the study generally seems obvious.

Descriptive analysis throws

light on the subject matter and leaves open the possibility of studying
in details the great linkages between actors and between issues.
In

addition, techniques such as these rescue areas which suffer

theoretical deficiencies.
For example, theoretical perspectives on Nigeria's political

economy are generally blurred.

These have not been sharpely focused

because efforts have largely been directed toward particular actors,
issues and toward certain sectors of the economy.

This study therefore

seeks to bring into clearer focus perspectives on Nigeria's political

economy while simultaneously recognizing the inevitable conceptual
difficulties which this entails.

One major conceptual limitation is

the inadequate interpretation of the role of the state in national

development, and the functional limitations of the state in
'mixed economy.'

a

Economic analysis has given the role of the state in

national development

a

narrow interpretation with the result that

and
state intervention is seen in such terms like welfare, growth

organ for expropriating generated surplus.

Conflict of interest among
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productive forces are thus hardly recognized.

This study makes

a

broad interpretation of the role of the state
as an agent of national

development, as well as

a

powerful organization responsible for

resolution of economic and social forces.
Finally, a major methodological limitation
on

a

study of this

type is the unreliability of data and certain information.

accept the fact that numbers used may probably be wrong.

We

This reflects

the widely held view that 'there is no accurate information
about

Nigeria,' and some vital information may simply be unavailable.

Limitations grievious as these may hamper the quality of any serious
work.

For purposes of organization convenience, this study is

divided into five parts, each reflecting
present and discuss.

In Part

I,

block of issues which they

As an academic dissertation, it was necessary

to present a theoretical

treated.

a

we

foundation of the issues which were subsequently
examine the debate on multinational corporations

within the system of transnational relations and the 'changing'
nature of the nation-state.

In

addition, we employ models representative

of three prevailing schools of thought on political economy:

Marxism (World system/dependency)

liberalism,

and economic nationalism for

enquiry and explanation on transnational activities and response from
nation-state.

Specifically, liberal thought attempt to understand why

multinational corporations go abroad, world system/dependency
approach examines the nature of the structural relationship between
actors in the international political and economic system and finally

economic nationalism describes the response from nation-states on

transnational behavior as they affect internal economic processes.

As

case study on national response, we examine the role of Nigerian
National Petroleum Company (NNPC) and several indigenization decrees

designed to 'nigerianize' the economy.

These models do not attempt to

offer comprehensive answers' to questions of transnational interactions
they do however assist us in understanding the issues.
Part
and producer-nation states.

II

dwells on the oil companies

Theoretical models of OPEC behavior

was presented although emphasis was on political models.

In addition,

negotiation strategies and institutional factors affecting the outcome
of negotiations are explored and analyzed. Part

II

also discusses the

state-owned Oil Corporation (NNPC) in the framework of the changing

structure of the global oil industry.

Part III seeks to explain

the nature of the impact of transnational ism on Nigerian society by

examining several economic policies and programs instituted to take
advantage or be taken advantage of, by transnational ization process.
Part IV takes

a

broad, comprehensive view, through conclusion, of

what the politics of transformation is all about.
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Part

I

CHAPTER

I

THE STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The problem with social sciences and political science in

particular, is its inability to come to grips with issues which
face it both on methodological and theoretical levels.

In the

study of international relations, the task has been compounded by
numerous approaches seeking attention, and rarely deviating from

what they profess.

The practice of any profession depends upon the

knowledge which it's members profess.

In

international relations,

this knowledge has been in disarray for lack of coherence, consistency

and precision.

The major task facing political scientists, and one

which demands immediate attention, is the need for coherent formulations of alternative methods, theory and its application in

a

rapidly

changing world.
The search for

occasioned

a

a

new paradigm for understanding global politics

massive interest in the study of transnational relations.

Subsequently, less reliance is made upon the traditional values of
power politics.

Currently, arguments rage on whether the power politics

theory (represented by the Realist School) which has dominated European
study of international relations since the peace treaties of Osnabruck
underand Munster in 1648 and American study since 1945 is adequate for

standing the existing international system.

As more and more events in

explain employing
the international system seemed hard to comprehend and
19
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the power polities' approach, attempts
were made to create comprehensive

alternative paradigms aimed at a holistic
view of the international
system.
The Realist School assumes intev
alia that states acting

"rationally" are the only actors whose behavior
is of consequence for
international politics.

Since this is so, therefore, states must be

interested mainly with gaining and maintaining
power.

However, recent

developments in the field of international relations
have proved that

while states continue to be the main actors in
the international system,
they are by no means the only significant
actors.
The purpose of this chapter then is two-fold:

the first is an

historical analysis of the rise of transnational relations,
including
the contending perspectives and approaches to the study
of it and

consequences of transnational processes on international relations.
The second purpose is

a

broad treatment of transnational corporations

on issues of economic growth and development in the so-called third

world.

This is done by surveying the different approaches to economic

growth and development.

Two major approaches deserve emphasis.

The first one is the "world-system/dependency" approach with its

emphasis on forces external to the nation-state.
the "modernization" approach.

The second one is

This approach places faith largely on

internal mechanisms for economic growth and development.

Treatment of these issues have never been devoid of emotional

attachment and content.

While some observers think transnational

corporations are "engines of development," others proclaim blatantly
they are "agents of imperialism."

On the whole, these judgments
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seem valid depending on the point of view
of the judge, emphasis ought
to be laid on national

context based on lessons derived from
history

and supported by events.

It is only fair to argue that
transnational

corporations aid in global development as well
as its impoverishment.
The issue is whether the benefits derived from
them outweigh the costs
or vice-versa.

This functional ambivalence, made worse by lack
of

precise definition of "transnational ism,

"

gave impetus to the contending

perspectives on the roles played by transnational actors in international
pol itics

Contending Perspectives and Approaches

Understanding contending perspectives and approaches to the
study of transnational relations requires firstly that one understand
the role of the nation-state in contemporary international political

system, secondly, the limits to such roles imposed by forces within and

without it, and finally, the roles played by "new forces" in the
international system.

Considering the role of nation-states in contemporary international
system with regards to transnational relations, it

is

necessary to

distinguish between what the power politics or (Realist) theory thinks
this role should be, and those who subscribe to

dependent world.

Although

a

a

theory of an inter-

brief mention of foundations upon which

power politics is based was made earlier in this chapter, it is

necessary to add that political realists assume that states are
coherent units and are dominant actors in world politics; that force
is a usable and effective instrument of policy coupled with the view

22

that

a

"hierarchy" of issues of world
politics in fact could be

arranged headed by questions of
military security.
However defined, political realism
assumes that in international politics, nations act in
their interest defined in terms
of
power, neglecting in the process
concern with motives and the concern
with ideological preferences. 1
Thus subjectively defined, the

concept of power defys limit to its
application because power has
no inherent limit.

of power:

This is a central

paradox to contemporary uses

for power to have meaning, it must
be limited, but power

by its definition has no inherent
limit.

Power in international

*

relations

has always obeyed limits imposed on it
be concrete

circumstances because the concern with motive
or ideological
preferences which are always necessary for any
international action
confronts countervailing balancing force.

That power has limits

depending on specific issues finds ample support

in history.

Those

who recently dreamed of world power now despair
of maintaining power
at home.

Defeat in Vietnam, economic stagnation and chaos, the

debacle in Iran and countless other failures produce

a

mood of

pessimism in super power America.
The international dimensions of the current malaise in the

international system cannot be attributed solely to an American failure

of strength.

The Soviet Union finds it currently difficult to feed

*

The definition of "power" in international relations suffers
from the multiplicity of meanings usually attached to it, and lacks
precise application.
Power in this study is used in the context of an
actor's ability to influence others and the system within which they
act.
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its teeming masses, and several

economic reforms aimed at controlling

economic activity prove largely

a

barren exercise.

To confound issues,

the U.S.S.R. finds herself embarrassingly bogged down in Afghanistan
and Poland.

These tragedies too cannot be attributed to

failure of nerve.

Rather,

history was presented

-

a

a

Soviet

bitter lesson, never before taught in

that power, to have meaning, must be limited!

As more international events seemed hard to explain using

power politics theory and as the classic paradigm of interstate

politics proved inadequate as

a

framework for understanding the

international system, efforts were made to develop alternative

paradigms which would take into account:

1.

The changing role of the nation-state in international politics

2.

The impact of such change

3.

Emergence of "new forces" in international politics.

in international

behavior

The changing role of the nation-state in international politics
can be fully understood through reference to its historical role.

The

nation-state has traditionally been the focus of international politics.
The ideal

type of international politics stresses two points:

First,

the field of action of politics lies in the area between the nation-

states; second, the actors involves are states.

However, international

politics of this sort have never existed purely in this form in the

history of international relations.

It existed in approximation in

the period extending from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century

when the foreign policies of great powers participating in the
international system was made by

a

handful of individuals.

Policies

mainly
were formulated in the name of the state, and their decisions
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reaches as reactions to external events and demands. 2

Non-state

actors were either non-existent or their influence in international

system largely ignored.
International system based on the above assumption formed
the foundation of eighteenth and nineteenth century European inter-

national relations.

A distinct feature of the nation-state during

this time was the legal

recognition of sovereignty accorded them.

That sovereignty was an important ingredient in the dynamics of

international system was recognized and glorified in the writings of
great political philosophers as Hobbes, Jean Bodin, Hegel, among
others.

Other international actors lacked sovereignty and thus were

deemed insignificant in international politics.
Historically, the nation-state has played discretely packaged
roles devoid of complex interrelations.

guarantee of "at least

a

Their main duty has been the

measure of protection."

The politically

basic unit is that which can afford its people protection and
security.

This, in turn, depends on the defensibi

1 i

ty of the unit.

3

Hence, the basis of nation-state system was "territoriality" of units

justified and legitimized by

a

sense of military preparedness,

"protectedness and impermeability."

Nation-states became "hard shell"

units, recognized others as such and strove to maintain territorial

integrity and independence.

extreme independence was

a

Intense nationalism butressed by

chief characteristic of the nation-state

system.
But instability and constant wars rendered the european

international system unworkable.

This was so even with the Peace of

Westphalia and the Congress of Vienna resulting in the formation of
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alliances and counteral 1 iances aimed at
restoration of the status quo.

a

balance of power and

Diplomacy was simple and straight

forward because the main actors were individuals acting on behalf of

their respective states.

Great diplomats of the period in the persons

of Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand were able to reach

a

negotiated settlement because they spoke the same language and the
art of diplomacy spared the complexities which characterized and
burden it today.

Restoration of the status quo sought by the various peace
treaties failed and the nation-state no longer played the dominant
part it once played in international politics

struggle between it and non-state actors.

as a result of competing

As the international

system

moved from one crisis to the other, as it experienced wars and economic
upheavals, it gave way to forces of transformation which radically

changed the nature of nation state and its role in the system.
these forces are nuclear technology (mentioned earlier).

In

Among

its far

reachinq implication, nuclear technology altered war and the nature of
it.

Other forces include

transnational ism with non-governmental

(NGOs)

and multinational organizations as the most important actors; complex

interdependence of nations threatening national autonomy, and finally
the twin forces of integration and functional ism.

Apparently,

aggregation of the above elements have threatened the nation-state as
a viable political

unit.

Nevertheless, the "obsolescence" theory does not pretend to

predict the demise of the nation-state nor does it bear

a

premonition

for "state-centric" catastrophe, rather, it seeks to explain the
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inadequacies of state centred framework in
predicting international
behavior. Nation states however, retain
essentially sovereign powers

which is, in the words of Stanley Hoffman,
the "stuff" with which
international politics is made.
But the nineteenth century witnessed developments
that fore-

shadowed a transition from sovereignty to "complex
interdependence,"
from "impermeability" to penetrability."

Permeability and penetrability

of national societies by transnational forces
render them dependent
no matter how powerful

a

society is, because to understand the role

of power in situations of interdependence, "sensitivity"
and

"vulnerability" of particular national societies have to be accounted
for.

4

Extreme nationalism and independence gave way to dependence

and interdependence; nations and statesmen began exploiting the

benefits of the situation because what was once thought as the self-

sufficient unit became dependent.

As a matter of fact, the meaning and

function of this basic protective unit, the sovereign nation-state
became doubtful
The impact of change regarding the role of nation-states in

international behavior is

a

source of contention between those who

see it as minimal and those who proclaim openly its demise.

For

instance, while attention is paid to the "inadequacy" of the "state-

centric" paradigm,

5

and the emergence of transnational society,

6

the realists gracefully conceding the complexities of modern

international politics, think the stuff of politics remain within
the confines of interstate interaction.

This assumption sets them apart from transnational theorists
who envision world politics as

a

complex web of political and economic
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interdependence.

Henry Kissinger, though deeply rooted
in classical

theory, has stated that the "traditional
agenda of international

affairs

-

balance of power, security of nations, no
longer define

our perils or possibilities....

Now we are entering into

a

new era.

The world has become interdependent in
economics, in communication, in
human aspirations.^
Finally, recent studies in transnational

relations frequently

assert that the concept of sovereignty is about
to become obsolete.
We are undergoing, in the words of Robert Strausz-Hupe,

revolution."

a

"systemic

Just as the medieval church-state was destined to pass,

the nation-state system is in turn bound to yield to
a different form
*
8
of organization.

This prognosis on the future of nation-states seems very

premature.

As part of this study,

I

reject it.

note the changing role of the nation-state in

a

Although we duly

world of complex-

interdependence, and the emergence of "new forces "

in

international

politics introducing changes in international behavior, it seems Nye
and Keohane's "world politics" paradigm captures the essence of

world in transition and therefore offers
tool

a

more useful analytical

and framework within which to study and understand international

politics.
at

a

a

This study follows this tradition.

conclusion until

a

However, we cannot arrive

thorough analysis of what transnational ism

is and what role they play in international

politics is carried out.

Transnational ism
Transnational theory presupposes the existence of
society,

a

a

transnational

"global village" which can be defined as a system of inter-

action in specific issues between societal actors in different systems
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taking into account the interdependent nature of
global relations.

Within each national system, policies of interactions
are decided upon
by non-governmental

elites and to

a

lesser degree by governmental actors.

These policies are pursued directly by social, economic
and political
forces in the participating societies.

The process of arriving at

decisions usually escape direct policy making organs of various
states
involved with the result that state's policy is sometimes undermined,

rendered chaotic and even threatened.
A general

theme running through transnational literature

foresees the gradual erosion of the nation-state as

a

political unit.

transnational

Foremost among the proponents of

a

coherent

society are Raymond Aron, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, Arnold
Wolfers, Karl Kaiser whose general ideas predicate on

a

global

society linked or intertwined by complex interdependence.

assumption follows from the fact that

a

This

transnational society can

exist between geographically separate societies and that it must be

understood functionally.

This means that the society is "circumscribed

by the issue areas" which are the object of transnational

interaction.

The dominance of nation-states in global affairs has never
been so menancingly challenged.

As Karl

out, the reality of international

Kaiser has correctly pointed

politics has never totally

corresponded to the model of exlusive state-to-state interaction.

9

Other important actors have always been part of the international
system.

For example, an influential international organization like

the Roman Catholic Church has its own territorial basis and pursues

independent foreign policies.

Today, international

"terrorist"
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organizations like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
and the
Red Brigade in Italy, though lacking autonomous territorial
basis,
on occasion conduct their own foreign policies.

Contemporary international politics strive to undermine the
primary role played by nation-states because of the struggle
between it
and other global actors.

These actors seek to secure as many or as

much of their preferences on various issues, relying on
means.

a

variety of

This is possible only because international and domestic politics

are interconnected and affect each other significantly. 10

Therefore, transnational i sm can hardly exist or even operate

legitimately in

a

global arena "dominated solely by nation-states" if

attempts are not made at functional separation of "issue-areas."
We cannot claim for instance that transnational actors such as multinational

corporations are participants in transnational games or

activities unless we differentiate them into functional areas such as
international management and economics, bureaucratization, the

politics of decision-making and so on.

Differentiation according to

issue areas creates the analytic framework necessary to study and

explain likely differences between the manifestations and between the
political consequences of transnational relations in various issues.

Secondly, in

a

world that is increasingly multidimensional and complex,

instruments of analysis must be refined accordingly.

Finally, the

restriction of the concept of transnational society to issue areas
should make it easier to examine the "prerequisite" for any transnational

interaction.

Although transnational

interactions have aroused considerable

interest in many quarters, and are subjects of intense analysis,

.

nevertheless, transnational relations remain
Despite

a

a
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terra incognita.*

plethora of definitions and writings, there remains much that

we do not know about transnational actors.

Indeed, the nature of trans-

national interactions have been confusing and eludes

interpretation.

a

common, precise

For example, Nye and Keohane argue that transnational

relations include the activities of transnational organizations, except

within their home states, and across state boundaries in which at least
one of the participants is not the agent of a government or an inter-

governmental organization.

11

The phrase "except within their home states"

fails to take into account the fact that most transnational organizations
also operate within their home states.

Obviously, it sounds

ridiculous for one to suggest that Exxon corporation (which

is a

transnational actor) or Royal Dutch Shell or Lockheed Corporation do not

operate within their home bases!
Nye and Keohane'

s

contention, however, is neither that trans-

nationals are new nor that they supersede interstate politics but that
they significantly affect interstate politics by altering and modifying
the choices open to nations and statesmen and the costs or consequences
to expect from adopting alternative sources of action.

A more sophisticated definition was offered by Samuel Huntington.

According to him,

organization

is

a

distinctive characteristic of the transnational

its broader-than-national

persDective with resDect

to the pursuit of highly specialized objectives through a central
1

optimizing strategy across national boundaries.

Professor Huntington

*The obscure and intractable nature of transnational relations
On what basis
renders them difficult for a framework of analysis.
should an interaction be seen as transnational? What are the criteria
concrete terms.
for definition? These are questions that need answering in
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then added that a transnational organization has
its own interest which

inheres in the organization and its function, which may
or may not be

closely related to the interest of national groups.

For example, in

the United States, there are far reaching arguments against
"multinational

corporations" policies and their effect on American labor.

Organized

labor has been far more critical of these policies than any other group.

According to other observers, the study of transnational
relations encompasses the study of international relations.

It focuses

on interactions among non-governmental entities as well as relations

among states and between states and non-governmental entities. 13

These definitions do not deny the fact that the major actors in
international politics remain the nation-state, but they seek to modify
such views by taking into account the role played by other non-state

actors with the primary purpose of enriching the study of understanding
of international behavior.
This study is particularly interested in transnational

corporations and lays emphasis on transnational oil corDorations

Transnational Corporations*
The spectacular and phenomenal rise of transnational corporations
in recent years has been a polemic and a subject of intense interest.

Primarily of American origin, these giant corporations have spread to
Europe and Japan and surprisingly to

a

handful of "emerging" nations.

Other terms include
This is the official U.N. designation.
Multinational
Multinational Corporation (MNC), "Cosmocorp",
Enterprises (MNE), global corporation, megafirm, supranational
corporation, international corporations and world company.
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In the simplest form, a transnational

corporation is any

corporation in which ownership, management,
production and sales activity
extend over more than one national
jurisdiction, but with
located decision making headquarters.

a

centrally

Essentially the transnational

corporation invests in several countries in
order to obtain access to
a

foreign market, to secure foreign sources of
raw material, or supply

and to take advantage of lower cost of
production or lower taxes.
The fact to bear in mind is that whenever
possible and when it fits

policy, investments usually are direct.

establishment of
foreign firm.

a

Direct investment is the

foreign branch or subsidiary or the takeover by

a

Whatever form it takes, the goal of the investment is

to have managerial control of a production unit or units in
a

foreign country.
Most important of all, the "parent" or headquarters operates
the whole enterprise in terms of a coordinted global strategy.

aspect of the operation:

Every

production, purchasing, marketing, research,

etc., are organized and managed by the parent in order to achieve its

long-term goal of corporate growth.

This power emanates from the

corporation's "unique" capacity to employ finance capital, technology and
highly specialized managerial knowledge to integrate production on

world wide scale.

a

14

This preliminary definition of transnational corporation does

not foreshadow the fact that formidable intellectual

problems arise

when serious analysis is done on issues raised by the acitivities of

these corporations.

Most of these issues are contentions and no

consensus exists regarding foreign investments and their implications
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for national

political economies.

The absence of consensus derives

largely from the fact that the
phenomenon under investigation enjoys
wide and multiple meanings and
interpretation; and therein lies the
intellectual crisis.

Transnational corporation is designated in
some quarters as
"key instruments for maximizing world
welfare," others see it as

"dangerous agents of imperialism."

conceived by Marxists.

The latter notion was undoubtedly

To quote Lenin:

"Imperialism is capitalism in

that phase of its development in which the
domination of monopolies
and finance-capital has established itself;
in which the export of
capital has acquired very great importance; in
which the division
15
of the world among international trusts has
begun."

Lenin's

definition of imperialism however seems unsatisfactory
because it
failes to account why non-capitalist nations such
as Russia engage in

imperialist adventures around the world.
Richard

E.

Ells defines "multinational"

corporations as

a

cross-border or transnational business organization or aggregate of
organizations that is characterized mainly by the disposal of its
managerial centers among several nations for purposes of overcoming the

barriers at the political frontiers of states. 16

Whether they are

agents of imperialism or engines of economic growth depend on the part
MNCs play in concrete historical situations and of course on their

activities in specific countries.

This study argues and submits that

on balance, MNCs are servants of imperialism.

Transnational corporation is only one part of the practical

answer to the problem of

a

viable world political economy.

It does not

assume to have ready-made answers to global problems, but its emergence
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is

a

clear response to new demands.

The demands are global in their

reach, hence the actors are huge and
global

in their operations.

But

in reality these corporations
in their present form and
dimension are

products of the international economic
system within which they operate.

Their basic strategy evolves in
response to the existing world
17
situation as well as to policies at national
level.

Why Do Corporations Go Abroad?

Transnational corporations go abroad for the benefits
of world
production.

Production on

a

global

scale is thought to be more

efficient by using the factors of production where
they are cheapest
and in this process, contribute to the economic
growth of host countries,

strengthening their balance of payments and raising their
18
employment.
These factors of production are numerous and the most frequently

mentioned are the following:

1)

Location and access to raw materials

2)

Foreign trade barriers

3)

Favorable tax laws

4)

Currency controls

5)

Cost differences between foreign and domestic production

6) A "combination of human skill."

These factors, however, do not explain adequately reasons why
good number of corporations go abroad.

In

a

order to understand better,

it is necessary to turn to the theoretical work carried out by

several economists and political scientists who have written on

transnational corporations.

perspectives is done.

In

doing so, examination of the contending
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There are at least two contending
economic perspectives or models
and four political models.

The economic models include:

1)

Economic and Technological lead position

2)

"Public Policy" position

The four political models are:

1)

Sovereignty-at-bay thesis

2)

Global

3)

The Imperialist argument and

4)

The Mercantilist position

Reach thesis

The Economic and Technological

Lead Position

This position rests on the assumption that transnational
corpora-

tions and direct investment abroad are products of the international

economic system within which they operate, and hence "necessary"

consequences of contemporary economic and technological developments.
First, direct investment is

response to the shrinkage of the world

a

due to technological advances in transporation and communication.

Second, direct investment is

a

response to the rise of economic

protectionism, i.e., the protection of domestic markets.
As stated earlier,

American creations.

transnational corporations are unique

These corporations tend to be large, are global

in scope and seek largely to exploit global

cheapest.

resources where they are

Richard J. Barber argues that American corporations, in

shifting production abroad and implementing

a

policy of supplying

foreign markets from overseas subsidiaries, shrewdly use their
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preponderant resources to gain dominant
positions abroad roughly

equivalent to those they occupy at home. 19
Most transnational corporations
tend to be large oligopolies.
Thus they enter or penetrate foreign
markets because they have

a

monopolistic advantage of factors of
production over lesser competitors.
These advantages may be one of several
factors such as technological
lead and superiority, managerial and financial
expertise or better

working arrangements with

a

host government.

But,

in general, monopoly

advantage rests mostly on oligopolistic arrangements
among corporations. 20
Moreover, monopoly advantage is manifest where
there is

degree of market concentration.

a

high

Frequently, these corporations are

dominant producers in the foreign market, thus their
activities could
be described as "aggressive behavior" and is primarily

associated with oligopoly and market concentration.

a

phenomenon

21

But the theory of international oligopoly does not explain why
a

corporation seeks to serve

a

particular market or sell particular

products through the establishment of
through exporting or licensing.
by Raymon Vernon explains.

a

local

subsidiary rather than

The "Product cycle model" developed

Essentially, the product-cycle theory

identifies three phases in the development of

a

product:

(a)

the

introductory phase; (b) the maturing phase; (c) the standardization
phase.
is
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The underlying determining factor in product cycle process

the supremacy and availability of particular technologies which

are suited to particular types of production.

Diffusion of these

technologies erode the corporate powers and technology lead of those

corporations which first invented them.

Therefore, if the American

corporation (usually identified with these inventions)

is

to

maintain its lead and profits on its
investments, it is argued they

?

must either establish foreign branches or
subsidiaries or else sell
its licence to a foreign corporation.

Foreign direct investment, understood in the
above terms, are

therefore, highly defensive in nature.

It is a commercial

the action of one corporation, and the nature
of

largely determines the decisions of another.

a

game where

particular market

Moreover, individual

corporations are likely to consider foreign investments
as important
23
forestalling tactics to cut off market preemption by
others.

Another economic theory which seeks to explain why
corporations
go abroad is the so-called "organic" theory of investment.
to the organic theory, the fundamental

According

motive of the corporation is

survival and under conditions of oligopolistic competition, the
one

pre-condition for survival is continued growth. 24

Continued growth

can be guaranteed only by an increasing share of the market.
law of corporate survival

in an oligopolistic market has been put

precisely well by Charles Kindleberger:
to markets.

If markets grow,

growing, it dies."
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This

"Direct investment is tied

the firm must grow... If the firms stops

Direct foreign investment is not only tied to

the overseas market, it is also

a

direct result of national policies.

The "Public Policy" Position

This second explanation is based on an entirely different set

of assumptions.

Whereas the first position sees transnational

corporations as the response to economic and technological forces, the
second position regards transnational corporations as
national

a

product of

policies, particularly tax laws and antitrust laws which
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encourage foreign rather than
domestic investment. 26
investment largely, therefore, is

a

Foreign direct

mechanism whereby corporations

seek to enhance their own growth
and profits at the behest and

assistance of their government.
tax liabilities are a critical

decision to invest abroad.

Tax avoidance and the minimization
of

factor in corporate strategy and
the

For example, American tax laws
intentionally

encourage oligopoly and the pursuit
of foreign investment as
strategy.

a

growth

A country which prides itself
on the principles of

"free enterprise" and competition,
encouraging oligopoly, formulating
tax laws which give impetus to
investment abroad, places her in

anomalous position.

a

highly

This contradiction which underlies
U.S. foreign

investment policies does not explain why
oligopolistic corporations
are allowed to operate abroad and
not at home.

Such policies are

based on economic as well as on political
grounds.

The Political Models
(1)

Sovereignty at Bay thesis.

This thesis argues that transnational corporations
have become

dominant over all nation states.

Developed by Professor Vernon,

sovereignty-at-bay thesis further argues that "sovereign states are
feeling naked."
financial

27

•

This is so because the great size, -the sheer

strength and the superior technology and managerial organization

of vast transnational enterprises set them beyond the effective
control of individual nation-states.

Obviously, sovereignty-at-bay thesis is largely based on an

underestimation of the power of national sovereignty and on exaggeration
of the powers of corporations.

The growth of transnational corporations

39

has coincided with a period of rapid
global

development

-

attainment

of independence and nationalism, growth in
the number of nation-states
and their importance, and the necessity of
economic interdependence.

Transnational corporations have subsequently fitted perfectly
this role
of forging and promoting economic interdependence
among nations.

However,

in contrast to the powerlessness of nation-states, 28
and in the event

of any dispute, it must be apparent to all concerned
that the sovereign

power of government is paramount.

In

Chapter

3

of Part

I,

I

argue that

despite the powers of transnational corporations, the nation-state
remains

a

supvema potestatis.

(2)

Global

Reach Interpretation

The position of this school

bay thesis.

Global

is much like that of sovereignty-at-

Reach posits that the structural transformation of

the world economy through the globalization of Big Business is under-

mining the power of the nation state to maintain economic and political

stability within its territory.

Global

Reach thesis bestirs contro-

versy for it overlooks also the powers that all governments have

-

soverei gnty

(3)

The Neoimperial ist Position

30

Neoimperial ist school argues that transnational companies,

aided by their respective governments, go abroad in order to acquire,

maintain and protect access to needed raw materials and foreign
markets.
did in

Using this position,
Chapter

I)

I

argue in Part III, Chapter

2

(as

I

that transnational oil companies go abroad

most importantly to secure access to resources and hence supply of
these resources to their global market.

(4)

Neomercantilist Interpretation

This school

sees the nation state as

unitary actor and

a

assumes that governments use the activities
of businesses abroad to

advance the interest of the states.
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Such interests are advanced by

manipulating economic arrangements whether or
not this

is at the expense

of others.

Transnational Corporations and Developing Nations
The debate over the desirability of transnational
corporations
in the development of the "third world" rages
on.

transnational enterprises result in

society concerned is

a

Whether or not

net gain over time to the

question of considerable interest and one that

a

has been the topic of intense controversy for several decades.

There are several reasons why transnational corporations operate
abroad, some of which

I

gave on earlier pages of this background study

However, the most important reason and indeed

business enterprise is that of profit.

abroad because of profit.

a

reason behind any

Transnational corporations go

The desire to maximize this profit globally

by combining factors of production wherever they are cheapest and

most efficient to do so led to what Lester Brown calls the

"internationalization of production."

Hence production of goods and

services is "international" when it combines factors of production from

more than one country.
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Traditionally, the third world has provided the metropolitan

governments as well as transnational corporations with
veritable source of raw materials.

a

vast and

The colonial system provided an

automatic mechanism by which the metropolitan government had or
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obtained preferential access to necessary raw materials.*

Preferential

access was partially closed with the dawn of independence
and sub-

sequently nationalism.

Independent third world countries asserted

their right to dispose of their natural resources the
way they saw fit.
Commercial arbitration, no matter how exploiting and
disadvantageous,
was more appealing and hence transnational corporations
filled the role

created deliberately by the metropolitan government, because

colonization was an international extension of domestic self-

sufficiency and its effectiveness depended upon the ability of the
home governments to get colonial companies to act in accordance with
its desires.

3d

Preferential access to raw materials and the need for commercial

dominance partially explain why transnational corporations engage in
business in the third world.
to them.

It was more of a managerial

challenge

The resources of the third world nations including the

raw materials and cheap labor, as well as the potential customer's

represented by their "expanding middle class" were crucial to the plans
of the global corporations.

35

On the part of third world governments

eager for rapid industrial and economic growth, the necessity for

permitting foreign investment into their country sometimes becomes
compel

1

ing.
It is a common knowledge that several

rich in natural

third world countries

resources simply do not have the financial, managerial

and the technological base for exploiting these resources.

Therefore,

*

touched on these issues in the opening chapters of this
I
For more on this, see consessions under the Colonial
system and under periods of commercial dominance, pp. 2-13.
study.
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in order to tap a potential

resource, these nations have resorted to

either one or all of the following basic methods:

1)

Invite foreign concessionaires to form local
subsidiaries and

thereby supply management and technology, capital
and markets;
2)

Undertake joint ventures in which foreign investors
supply

management and technology and markets as well as
the capital

-

portion of

a

with the remaining capital furnished by the

host country;
3)

Institute management contracts whereby experienced foreign

corporations offer management and technology only, and the
host supplies the capital and tries to market the product;
4)

Do without foreign participation entirely and furnish management

and technology, capital and markets itself. 36

When third world nations choose either options (1) or (2) or (3),
the remaining problem often becomes one of implementation.

However, it

is necessary also to recognize that there are bound to be conflicting

demands and divergencies between the developing nation and the foreign
investor.

The government controls the conditions under which rights

and concessions are awarded to exploit the country's natural wealth.
The corporation owns or controls capital, technology and expertise.
The government recognizes that there is

a

benefit derived from

the productive factors controlled by foreign investors

-

employment

and hence income to its people, appropriate technology or "technology

of choice," and revenue to the state.
cost involved.

There is also

a

recognition of

And from its side, the company sees it as giving up

productive factors as

a

cost in terms of foregone opportunities to
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use scarce capital, technology,
and expertise in alternative
ventures.
Each actor in this case is bent
on achieving or winning the
maximum

benefit in which the perceived
benefit outweigns costs.
The main contention, then, of
foreign investment is who gets

what and at what cost.

Such contentions feature prominently
in most

negotiations between foreign investors
and third world governments.
Precisely put, the question is

-

what will be the cost-to-benefit

(or conversely, the benefit-to-cost)
ratio that is simultaneously

acceptable to each agent?

Indeed, each actor theoretically wishes
to

obtain the most of maximum units of
benefits for

According to

a

study done by Robert

L.

a

given unit of cost.

Curry, Jr. and Donald Rothchild

on bargaining between African governments
and multination companies,

the ratio that emerges is strongly influenced
by the relative strength

of each agent's impatience and demand intensity. 37

Most third world governments are impatient when it comes
to

negotiating with transnational corporations and this

is

affect the government's ability to effectively conclude

likely to
a

transaction.

The competitive bidding for transnational corporations among
third

world countries defeats the need for
business transactions.

a

closer scrutiny of specific

However, there are

a

few developing countries

which are not ready to accept foreign investment

in

just any form.

The following statement, which forms part of the Charter of Algiers,

confirms this position:

"Private investment should be of permanent benefit to the
host developing country.
Subject to nationally-defined
priorities and within the framework of national development
plans." 38
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Libya provides

a

classic example of

a

developing nation which is not

ready for investments at any cost,*
however, others like Liberia

apparently accept foreign investments with
little or no strings attached.
For example, in the late 1940s,
Republican Steel began to mine ore with
a

concession that included no income tax,
no control over transfer

prices for the output and only

a

small

royalty per ton.

These concessions

were subsequently renegotiated. 39
It is necessary and important to point
out that foreign invest-

ment takes place between two fundamentally
assymetrical actors
governments and transnational corporations.

-

host

The imputation of assymetry

depends considerably on how one judges the strengths of
each actor.
Is

the host government more powerful because it
possesses "sovereignty"

over its resources?; or is the transnational corporation
more powerful
since it controls the technology, capital and management know-how

necessary for productive enterprise?

These questions can only be

answered in relation to particular cases.
However,

a

general assumption is that most developing nations

are "institutionally weak" and hence unable or incapable of dealing

effectively with foreign investors.

As Richard Barnet and Ronald

Muller observed, the lack of bargaining power of "underdeveloped"
countries is due to three major institutional weaknesses.
they argue is "antiquated governmental structures."

The first

National

laws,

according to this argument, are inadequate for collecting taxes,

controlling foreign business, or preventing the drain of capital.

A

In 1970 the Libyan government started negotiations with the oil
companies in the country for a higher posted price. When the companies
resisted (Occidental, Hunt) Libya ordered production cuts and
nationalized portions of several oil companies.
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second source of institutional weakness is lack
of strong labor
movement.

A third source that explains why global
corporation is

able to exert "such strong power in
underdeveloped countries" is the
lack of ineffective competition from
40
local business.

The first argument originating from "antiquated
government

structure" is indeed very tenuous.

State intervention in national

economies is not new; certainly not to most "developing"
nations.
However, pitting the overwhelming corporate power of
transnational

corporations against those of the state where both state and
local
private capitalist enterprise are weak is an ineffective,
frustrating
and often barren exercise.

Nevertheless, host governments reserve

the sovereign right either to indigenize or outrightly nationalize

foreign-owned investments, because "in fact

a

sovereign state, however

small, is more powerful than the multinational corporation doing

business in it."

4^

The second argument seems credible.

Host governments have

always provided "cheap labor" to work in the manufacturing and

extractive industries.

Over the years, labor in their negotiations

with management has been unable to articulate their desires and needs.
This situation is true to most developing countries.
to say that labor in these countries remains weak.

But this is not
For example,

labor unions in Nigeria are becoming stronger, wresting concessions

from management through government policies.

Foreign corporations

engaged in the development of petroleum resources are expected to
provide the requisite technology as well as to train and develop

Nigerian staff for all positions in the companies and for all types
of operations in the petroleum industry.
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Perhaps the most important argument of the three is
the lack of

competition from local enterprises.

Local

business has neither the

necessary capital nor the advanced technology to compete
effectively
with transnational corporations in most extractive and
manufacturing
sectors of the economy.

But when these factors of production

surprisingly generate locally, there usually is an economic
dysfunction
because the local economy is unevenly developed.

In

order to combat

certain shortages and structural dysfunction, attempts are not made
at
remedying the problem at the source, rather

recourse to importation

a

of manufactured goods (where necessary is made) thus perpetuating

dependence.
For example, in Nigeria, most liberal economic strategies

have been attempted to hasten industrialization, especially since the
late fifties.

Generous tax concessions for "pioneer industries" have

been decreed, relief from import duty for capital goods and raw

materials have been granted, and industrial estates, facilities, and
loan capital have been provided by the Government. 43

Despite all

these supports, there is widespread feeling of failure among concerned

segments of the country.

This is largely so because of the alliance

between the local and foreign investor

which neither creates the

necessary structural linkages within the economy nor would see local
Moreover, the dependent

initiatives backed by the government succeed.

nature of the economy cries out for local

initiatives because "all our

power plants, military hardware and ammunition, transport machinery,

railway equipment, iron and steel products, electrical and electronic
goods and many consumer goods are.

..

imported.

44
"

It can hardly be

*Detailed analysis of this alliance is made in Part IV, Chapter
of this study.

I

otherwise since foreign (especially trading)
corporations controlled
the bulk of the modern economy.

The dominance of foreign capital
and

interest over Nigeria's economy 45 is also
experienced by most other

developing nations, eliciting or begging
the question of whether such
interests are "machinery for growth and
development," or "agents of
imperial ism?"

Transnational Corporations and Development
The role of foreign private investment in development
is

acknowledged in the International Development Strategy for
the Second
United Nations Development Decade. 46

In the effort to reduce the gap

between the rich and poor nations, the General Assembly in
December of
1961

took a "historic" step towards coordinating the activities of

governments and international organizations.

Towards the goal, the

1960s was declared as the United Nations Development Decade; however

concrete achievements of the decade fell short of expectations.

Although

it recommended that industrialist nations help developing countries
in achieving by the end of 1960s an annual

growth rate of five percent,

and although it urged the former to move towards allocating one percent
of their national
reached.

incomes to the developing world, this goal was never

Subsequent target was changed to one percent of GNP of

industrialized world, but this also has been achieved only by

a

few

developed nations.
The plans and targets of

a

development decade, unlike an

international treaty, are not legally binding on governments even on
those who can afford it.

Thus the United States of America

donates

less than one percent of its GNP to developing world and programs.

48

Targets and plans of

principle

a

a

development decade represent in

"consensus on what governments believe to
be the most

appropriate course of action" for the decade
ahead in matters such as
the promotion of economic and social
advancement of all peoples.

Toward

this end, a "shared responsibility" by
nations throughout the

world is implied and has given birth to
resolutions such as the

establishment of the New International Economic Order
U.N.

General Assembly.

in

1974 by the

Designed to provide developing countries with

a

larger share of the benefits from global economic
growth this new

economic order to date has achieved but little.

The Third Development

Decade of the 1980s took cognizance of this shortfall, and
one of the

major tasks before the committee preparing the International
Development
Strategy for the 1980s has been to "set goals for structural and
institutional changes in the world economy."
The implications of United Nations Development Decade therefore,
is that it has cast the U.N.

in the role of a casuis sui generis, a

champion advocate of bridging the gap between rich and poor nations
and of encouraging international organizations such as the multinational

corporations for exploiting investment opportunities mutually beneficial
to them and the third worlds.

Towards this end, the United Nations

has extensively engaged in constructive arrangements whereby investors

and governments can fruitfully agree and cooperate as regards the
general conditions of foreign private investment.

These efforts

have not been on the whole successful both to the governments who

receive investments and the multinational corporations who seek

investment outlets because there are few areas of convergence.
general

In

terms, however, the gap between the rich and poor nations

-

a

gap which the U.N. seeks to narrow, keeps widening

-

a

result perhaps

of the activities and product of foreign private
investment?
Traditional theory holds that foreign private investment

contributes positively to development. 47

It is also assumed that

these investments carry with them advantages such as
capital,

technology, management and marketing skills to those
societies in need
of them.

Furthermore, deriving from these factors of production,
jobs

are created, additional

funds go to governments tax revenues, which

can be used for further development.

constraints, long

a

The chronic balance of payment

major fiscal problem in developing countries, are

eased by the infusion of foreign capital.

Developing nations undoubtedly

may benefit extensively from foreign investment, however, they also

express concerns on the effect of these on the economy as

a

whole.

Indeed, there is no concensus what effect multinationals have on

these countries'

interests

whether foreign investment stimulates

-

desirable development or simply exploits. 48
that these corporations are an integral
capital on a global

It is clear,

though,

part of the expansion of

scale, that they are merchants of the most ad-

vanced technology, but also the purveyors of overpriced obsolete

equipment; they are rapacious exploiters of raw material

s

and labor,

but also the major agents of profit repatriation and resource outflow.
As the Decade of Development draws to an end, and despite

dramatic economic growth in

a

few poor countries, it has become

abundantly clear that the gap between rich and poor throughout the
world was widening.
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It became evident that development strategies

pursued by "global corporations" contributed more to the worsening

of world poverty, unemployment and inequality than to their solution.

Global

ills became exacerbated because
of and due primarily to

the dismal

fact that global corporations
and developing countries
have

different, if not conflicting,
interests and needs, arising in
part
from the strategy of transnational
corporations creating conducive
global economic environment from which
profit could be maximized

regardless of who gets hurt.
In

recent years, such corporate strategies
and its contribution

to the development of poor countries
has been challenged. 50

According to opponents, multinationals take
out of developing countries
more than they put in, and thus, repatriation
of earnings usually

exceed infusions of new foreign capital hence
undermining balance-ofpayments.

Unemployment is increased because capital intensive

technology most suited to advanced developed economies
is introduced
rather than labor-intensive technology thought to be
more appropriate
for developing countries.

In addition,

opponents argue, these

corporations promoted unequal income distribution, because local
elites
strengthen their positions through alliances with foreign investors.
There is therefore an increasing awareness among most developing
third world countries that the transnational
corporation (with its limited

benefits) does not hold substantial answers to the question of national

economic development and growth.

Developing countries have found it

necessary to adopt various development strategies and since
discussion of these strategies to economic growth and development are
available elsewhere,

51

my attention is confined to

a

brief sketch

of the key issues.
Two broad approaches to economic growth and development in the

third world exist.

The first one is the "world-system/dependency"

51

approach with

emphasis on forces external to the
nation-state.

The

second is the "modernization" approach
emphasizing on internal
mechanisms.

These approaches have been analyzed in the
quantitative

as well as non-quantatiti ve comparative
52
literature
as providing

two competing hypothesis about the' impact
of foreign investment on

economic growth.
First, following the work of Baran
(1957), Frank (1967),

Galtung (1973), Emmanuel A. (1972) and others,
dependency approach
is generally taken to imply that foreign
investment in effect

depresses growth.

The core-periphery relationship 53 is considered

exploitative, in that profits are transferred back to the
core rather
than reinvested in the periphery; economic dependency
thereby

contributes to the underdevelopment of the periphery.

At the same

times, the external orientation of periphery economies encouraged
by

foreign investment is said to generate internal distortions 54 and

contradictions that retard growth.

This is

a

result of

"international

division of labor" and what Galtung has described as the "penetration"
and "fragmentation" of periphery economies by the metropolis.

Moreover,

Galtung argues that exports of "semi -processed" goods from the
developing countries suffer what he calls "blocking mechanisms" in the
hands of the developed.

This is akin to Emmanual Aghirri's "unequal

exchange" arising from the "imperialism of trade" when "hidden" transfer
of resources takes place when rich and poor nations trade together.
The difference in wage rates between them is the key factor in this

process of unequal exchange.

Growth and development is therefore

slower, more a response to global economic policies, than otherwise

might be in the developing countries.

T

U
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In sharp contrast,

the modernization approach, implies
that

foreign investment promotes growth by
providing external capital, which

either substitutes for or supplements
local capital.

It is the

presence rather than the origin of capital
that is considered important.

Verification of results on these two approaches
are mixed.
There has been no empirically verifiable
evidence or otherwise

available which points to issues of economic
growth and development and
why either approach should provide

a

useful

instrument toward growth.

The selection of either approach depends largely
on

experience.
to El

For example, in

a

a

nation's historical

case study survey .entitled

Dorado," and written by John Grimond, the choice of
development

path chosen by Kenya and Tanzania was made in "pursuit of
goal

"Two Routes

-

the transformation of their country

playgrounds into modern states.

a

clear

from imperial adventure

But, though they share this goal, they

do not share a strategy for reaching it." 55

Whether transnational corporations are "agents of imperialism"
depends

to a large extent on concrete national circumstances and

experience derived from history.

This judgment must be made taking

into account the overwhelming powers of corporations to conduct

autonomous strategies which are largely independent of national
jurisdiction, and the ethical predicament of accountability or lack of
it thereof to sovereign nations.

,

.
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Bergsten, Horst and Moran in American Multinational s and
American Interest (1978), argue that the central issue is the distribution of costs and benefits arising from such investments. The
issue of distribution has two dimensions:
distribution of the costs
and benefits (a) between home and host countries and (b) among groups,
especially labor and capital, within a country.
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See, Richard J. Barber, "Big, Bigger, Biggest
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As noted particularly by Charles Kindleberger and Stephen
Hymer, the American corporations and indeed other global corporations
tend to be large oligopolies.
For details, see, Charles Kindleberger,
American Business Abroad
(New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1969),
and, Stephen Hymer, Direct Foreign Investment and International Oliqopoly
(Mimeo), 1968.
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Most large corporations, especially those of American origin,
would rather serve particular foreign markets, or establish foreign
subsidiaries in order to market particular products than providing
licenses for its manufacture abroad or alternatively exporting such
products.
There is no consensus as to why this is so.
But it is
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cycle model."
For greater analysis and details, see, Raymond Vernon,
"International Investment and International Trade in the Product Life
Cycle," Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 80, 1966, pp. 190-207.
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Especially in the oil industry, the U.S. government
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it a policy to encourage foreign production
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protection from
antitrust prosecution to various oil companies.
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of Private Direct
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The Nigerian government, the context on which this study
dwells, presently employs option (2) and option (3).
None of the third
world nations, with possible exception of a few so-called newly
industrializing countries (NICs), as Brazil, Iran, India, Nigeria could
afford to adopt option (4).
Even then, the areas where this is the
case remain the soft industries where sophisticated technology may not
be needed.

These two important variables feature prominently in most
negotiations between host governments and transnational corporations,
and most often largely influence negotiating outcomes.
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For more on this study, see Robert L. Curry, Jr.,
and
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Governments
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Vol. 12, No. 2 (1974), pp. 173-189.
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by the Federal Government of Nigeria of the indigenization decrees of
1972 and 1977.
Indigenization exercise was ostensibly designed to
"free" the nation's economy from foreign control.
46
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The literature on dependency and neo-colonial ism is
extensive
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R.I. Rhodes ,ed., Imperialism and
Underdevelopment (New York, 1970); R. Owen and R. Suttcliffe,
eds.,
Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London: s.n.,
1972); A. Emmanuel,
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The
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For more comprehensive treatment, see Stephen Hymer,
"Multinational Corporations and the Law of Uneven Development," in
Charles
Kindleberger, ed., The International Corporation (A Symposium)
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970).
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For details, see John Grimond, "Two Routes to El Dorado:
Kenya and Tanzania," in The Economist March 11, 1978; Surveys 3, 7, 11,
17, 21, and 25.
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CHAPTER

II

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO

TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

The response to transnational
corporations is predicated on the

fact that they can be "at once effective
instruments of development and

sources of tensions of conflicts" arising
from their global activities.
In

order to comprehend this ambivalent role and
the nature of trans-

national activities, it is necessary to distinguish
clearly activities
in home governments,

in host countries and most importantly
between

developing and developed nations.

The pervasive criticisms of

transnational corporations usually is general in nature without

a

distinction as to what type of corporation, how it conducts its
business and where it does so.

This blanket accusation, in effect,

lumps corporate culprits as well as innocent ones in one basket, makinq
it extremely difficult to devise codes of conduct for transnational

activities.
tional

This study is interested mainly in international organiza-

response and also response from developing countries.
It

is

not only the presence of transnational corporations in

foreign countries, or even their size that generates debate among
critics and outright tension among nations around the world.

It

is

also the scope of their activities in the traditional business sector
as well

as other less conventional

affairs which includes intrusion

and meddling in host countries domestic politics.
59
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responsibility for myths and
emotionalism about the role of
U.S. based
transnational, corporations and
even those based abroad, must
be lodged
with the world business community
and their countries of origin
on one
hand, and the responsible organ
of the United Nations on the
other.
It will

be done on three counts:

1)

Ethical

2)

its accountability and

3)

its impact on developing countries.

posture and practices of transnational
corporations

This "ethical

1

posture and practices" has been

a

intense study both on humanitarian and
academic bases.

subject of

Caught in the

barrage of criticism from environmentalists,
consumer protectionists,

advocates demanding more social justice and
political leaders

in

emerging nations fanning the spirit of
nationalism, business spokesmen
have been hard pressed to articulate an
intelligible ethical stance
and formulate complementary set of
business practices.

Lack of

ethical standard and lack of accountability to
anyone (except of course
to their shareholders)

is a

direct result of the enormous powers of

these corporations to conduct autonomous strategies
which are largely

independent of national political oowers and are not
subject to control
from the point of the common good.

It

is

therefore possible that this

situation can lead to new forms of economic domination which has

repeatedly hunted developing countries since independence.
Many of the developing nations have only recently emerged from
colonial tutelage, only to discover that political

independence, to have

meaning, must be accompanied by economic independence because
political

independence alone was often accompanied by

a

more subtle form

of economic dependence, which
could be as binding as colonialism
itself,
Indeed, there is increasing
concern among the new nations, that
despite
their independence they perceive
themselves to have remained dependent
to industrialized world on
economic and financial

issues.

This concern

has increasingly been focused
around the role of large transnational

corporations in their economies.
These corporations usually are the
vehicles through which the

resources of developing countries,
particularly in the extractive
sector, are developed.

Thus, for Nigeria, oil has meant
intimate

relationship with Britain's British Petroleum
(BP) and Netherlands
Royal

Dutch Shell.

Copper in Chile has been synonymous with
Kennecott

and Anaconda; so also with the Anglo-American
corporation of South

Africa and the Roan Selection Trust in Zambia;
petroleum in Venezuela
has meant Shell and Creole;

Iran has been a close companion to the

major international oil companies known as the
"seven sisters" since
1954.

In West Africa,

American based Goodyear has dominated rubber

production in Liberia; and bauxite in Guyana and Jamaica
has been
identified with the Aluminum Company of Canada and the
Reynolds

Aluminum Company of the United States.

In

each case, however, most

of these less-developed countries (LDCs) inherited more
presence as
a

result of colonial experience; others provided attractive commercial

as well

as production opportunities.

Thus, the main characteristics of this relationship was

dependence on foreign capital with its systematic income drain from

dependent economies.
a

is

Moreover, as

a

consequence of this relationship,

developing country's economy became "disintegrated," that is, there
little or no interrelationship between the different productive
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sectors of the economy; integration
that exists, lay in the direction
of the international economy.
Such external outlook of developing

country's economy was not one which
political elites take pride in
However, this attitude could be
confusing and contradictory since the
same political elites forge a tightly
knit bond with foreign capital

which feed the international economic
superstructure.
The issue facing host nations is how
to deal or respond

effectively to the activities of transnational
corporations.

These

issues include compelling accusations and
attacks on transnational

corporations for transferring "inappropriate"
technologies which in

most cases are capital rather than labor
intensive, and which tend to
"discourage" backward or forward production
linkages, the displacement
of indigenous production capabilities, the
transfer of "inappropriate"

consumption patterns which drains scarce foreign
exchange, transfer
pricing and the minimization of taxes and finally
contributing to the

widening gap in income distribution.

The issue indeed is not simple

and has no simple answers because the phenomenon of
transnational

corporations largely remains
to understand them.

have been, to
to take,

a

a

terra incognita despite the efforts

Most importantly, developing nations

large degree, confounded as to what appropriate actions

because these corporations have been ill -defined and one

cannot take effective action on something not fully understood.
However, most developing nations see transnational corporations as
new forms of commercial colonization, or neo-colonial manifestation

adopted by industrialized countries to keep them in perpetual servitude.

Developing countries have therefore formulated
policies with regard to proposed actions.

a

number of

An analysis of the present

stage of imperialism underlies
each of these policies.

The crucial
question, therefore, relates
to the meaning of
transnational relations
question which received
attention in Chapter I of
this study.
Does

-

this phenomenon reflect
the evolution of capitalism
in its highest
stage as Lenin claimed, or
is it just a tool by
advanced capitalist

centres to dominante the world
and perpetuate such dominance?
Or
Perhaps, is it part of the
abstract discussions proclaiming
the

withering away of the state and
the establishment of

a

dominated and controlled by
transnational corporations?

world state
There is no

definitive answers to the above
questions despite numerous studies
done.
However, the efforts of further
research should be directed at
refining the conclusions reached by
earlier studies with the aim of

understanding the multifarious forms of
transnational relations.
The facts are there, and the major
aim of developing countries is to

understand these facts in order to change
reality (see the analysis
on Chapter

I

of this study).

The reality as seen by developing countries,
is not so much
the economic and social

injustice that come with transnational

activity; rather the reality is the inability
by developing countries
to participate meaningfully in controlling
their economic and social

future.

The injustice is the deprivation of the means
of control

by corporations, which are largely considered
alien, exploitative

and non-chalant to the needs of the underdeveloped.

The Doctrine of Sovereignty
A weapon deemed effective by most developing countries
for a

gradual

transformation of global economic reality was the principle of

a
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sovereignty over natural resources.*
sovereignty was

a

0n balance, the recourse
to

formidable advantage to nations
in their struggle

with the transnational corporation
over who should take charge of
economic processes within a nation's
jurisdiction.
Looked at

strategically, this doctrine proves
to be

a

response of last resort

by nations who see the struggle
between it and corporations as

a

losing

battle.

Once deemed

a

legal

recognition and

a

distinct feature of

nation-state, sovereignty has long overflown
such canalization.

It

confers on the state, not only political
supremacy on political issues

affecting it, but invariably on economic
issues as well.

Of course,

the dominant motive of these declarations
is not to deprive less

endowed states of the vital resources
necessary for survival; rather
the aim seems to be a strategy of
redistributing global wealth.
•The desire for

affected nations was

a

outright ownership of natural resources for
response arising from bitter and often

quarrelsome relationship between it and transnational
corporations in
whose hands were placed the responsibility of resource
production,

It is a doctrine which the majority of developing
countries
welcome with joy. Although this doctrine is only recommendatory
resolution and therefore lacks the force of law, the disturbing
factor is
the precedent it sets for future evolution of international
law.
As
proof of its formidable character, the doctrine of sovereignty
has found
expression in international forums and declarations.
For example, at
the Fourth Conference of Heads of State of Non-Aligned Countries,
held
in Algiers in 1973, the U.N. General Assembly Resolutions
1803 (XVII)
and 2158 (XXI) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (proposed
by Chile and supported by most developing countries); and the initiatives
of the Group of 77 that resulted in the Declaration and Programme of
Action on the New International Economic Order (U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 3201 (X-VI) and 3202 (S-VI), May 1, 1974; and the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of December 12, 1974).
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distribution and marketing.

More often than not, this
trust was
'

betrayed because both parties
seem to pursue different
objectives.
Transnational corporations historically
incline on maximizing its
profits and of course on maintaining
control over access to natural
resources; nation states see
natural resources as vital
interests and
major sources of wealth, and
particularly, of foreign exchange
on
which economic development and
growth is based.
It will always
remain a casus sui generis and has indeed been treated
so in the

United Nations.
It is

2

thus understandable that basic
attitudes from nation-

states continue to be governed by
natural

a

will

to take charge over their

resources by placing their relationship
with foreign extractive

corporations on

a

new basis of "controlled association."

The need for

controlled association arises mostly from
the desire of host nations to
avoid unnecessary exploitative activities
and conflict.
But in this
case, the conflict between national

organizations
In

is

governments and transnational

clearly complementary rather than duplicative.*

this case, the recourse to sovereign "act"
becomes largely symbolic

and rather redundant unless during
periods or instances of great

provocation.

It is symbolic and arrogant because most developing

nations, for instance, may not do without the
corporations and it

is

clearly obvious that roles and functions are "complementary."

According to Theodor Moran, duplicative conflict is often
zero-sum and involves the survival of one or both parties to a
conflict
In contrast, complementary conflict involves
entities performing
essentially different functions; the competition stems from this
dissimilarity of functions.
Each party has some interest in the
survival of the other.
For full details, see "Foreign Expansion
as an Institutional Necessity," for U.S. Corporate Capitalism:
The
Search for a Radical Model.
World Politics 25 (April 1973), p. 366.

—
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On the whole,

sovereignty reveal

the contradictions
imposed by the demands
of

thrives

not as

i

mme diate gains for
developing

countries, but simply as long
ter m strategy where
the advantage lay
in
the gradual transformation
of the position. As
Bergsten and his
colleagues observed, several
factors explain the
contradiction
between the postures of
less-developed host countries
and the realities
of global economic
relations.
The most inportant
is

the tactical

ad-

vantage gained by keeping the
multinationals and their home
countries
on the defensive.
This advantage could be
seen in the current
discussion about controlling the
multinationals. 3

Despite the contention that the
great size, financial strength
and the superior technology
and organization of vast
international

enterprises set them beyond the
effective control*
nation states,
is

4

of individual

and that "sovereign states are
feeling naked," it

the argument of this study that
on the contrary., nation-states

retain enormous powers conferred by
the principle of sovereignty.
The struggle between it and
international enterprises remains still
an "unequal

contest" and will remain so for

a

long time.

Whether large or small, developed or
underdeveloped, national
governments possess, in their sovereign right,
the power to tax, to

discriminate or restrict trade, or to nationalize
foreign-owned
businesses, or indeed to confiscate their
properties.

governments resort to this exclusive advantage.

Increasingly,

And more often these

*

Professor Raymond Vernon, was not alone in his premature
prognosis.
In Global Reach
Barnet and Muller argue on the same line
Their thesis is that "the structural transformation
of world economy
through the globalization of Big Business is undermining
the power of the
nation state to maintain economic and political stability within
its
Territory." Their description was a passing phase in the reality
of global
economic reality.
,
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governments closely and systematically
scrutinize projects proposed
by foreign investors
with the possibility of
a rejection or
approval
on their terms.
More often than not,
governments have become
increasingly successful at
extracting benefits for their
economies from
foreign investors.
Nigeria, for example, through
the exercise of
"indigenization" has virtually
satisfied her "yearning for
economic
sovereignty." Mexico is forcing
foreign based automakers to
export
more of their Mexican output.
Colombia is placing branches of
foreign
banks under majority Colombian
control.

Iran is insisting that many

foreign-based industrial companies
sell forty-nine percent of
their
already limited equity to employees
or to the general public.

Arabia is fighting to obtain

a

Saudi-

one hundred percent acquisition
of

Aramco's operation.
Industrially advanced countries are also
demanding

a

bigger

share of profits, jobs, technology and
management in their dealings

with transnational.

Several

Germany, which has had

a

European nations, including West

particularly liberal attitude toward foreign

investment, are starting to look closely at
foreign investments for
the national

interests and benefits involved.

In

1975, Canada imposed

a

set of formal criteria on foreign controlled
companies, including

a

requirement that

a

majority of their boards of directors be

composed of Canadians.
The trend toward control of foreign investment, made possible

largely by political transformation, will continue.

It holds a

deadly prospect for the future of transnational corporations
never
before experienced in its history.

It's even more dreadful and
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authoritative when viewed from the
perspective that the doctrine of
sovereignty receives full blessing
from the U.N. General Assembly.

Most importantly will be its
profound impact and implication
to new
and existing body of international
law.

U.N. Resolution 18 03 (XV1T); 2158
(XXI):

Tt, ^i^ Ticatjons

On November 25, 1966, the U.N.
General Assembly passed

resolution 1803 with no negative votes
and six abstentions.
a

nation's right to use and control its
natural

Calling for

resources in the

manner it deems fit while reaffirming the
inalienable right of all
countries to exercise permanent sovereignty
over their natural
resources in the interest of their national
development, in

conformity with the spirit and principles of the
Charter of the
United Nations.

5

These resolutions, while noble in their intent, have
profound

implications in ways nations

conduct their relations in the global

community because it has been treated as

desideratum by the United Nations.

a

moral and ethical

Moreover, in the same manner the

U.N., acting in its official capacity, has invariably
rendered these

declarations

a

casuistry.

Resolutions 1803 (XVII) and 2158 (XXI), call for permanent

sovereignty over natural resources because among other considerations,
it was assumed that transnational

corporations exploit and manipulate

the developing world in matters concerning their natural

resources.

While this assertion is highly debatable and depends largely on
specific instances and experience, the overwhelming notion is that

transnational are "out there" for their interest and profit.

Although transnational corporations
are indeed economically
and commercially very
powerful, within the realm of
political arena,
they are not.
not be.

And the U.N. has made it
clear and

The declarations are indeed

a

a

surety they should

redress for the long standing

grudge borne by most developing
nations against the transnational
s.
These grudges have never been
devoid of emotionalism and
the recent
United Nation's study, "Multinational
Corporations in World Development,"
before it rendered its controversial
judgment, notes that the

phenomenon calls for "serious analysis
lest myths should prove more
appealing than facts and emotions
stronger than reason." 6 In fact,

in

the judgment of the United Nations,
emotions proved stronger than

reason for resolutions adopted conferred
excessive powers on the

nation-state.*

The many government seizures and
expropriations of

corporate assets provide ample evidence
that countries, not corporations,
wield the real power.

In

other words, the weakest country is stronger

than the most powerful corporation.
The Report of the Group of Emminent Persons
the United Nations assumes that the central

appointed by

problem is

a

conflict

between the economic power of the transnational
corporations and the
political power of the host governments; that these
'corporations "are
not per se geared to the goals of development" although
they provide

traditional factors of production, and that they can "accentuate
rather
than reduce inequalities in the absence of proper government
policies

and where necessary social

reforms" could prove to be an easy

conclusion.
*

One could argue that the beneficiaries of these declarations and
resolutions are the developing nations whose bargaining power vis-a-vis
the corporation was improved, and who on occasion have expropriated the
transnational with impunity and were free.
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Without waiting for that
report, the U.N. General
Assembly
April 1974 adopted one of
its many controversial
proposals calling
for a "new international
economic order" 7 (Resolutions
3201 (S-VI)
and 3202 (S-VI, May
1, 1974).

in

Among many other things,
it demanded

"regulation and supervision of
the activities of transnational
corporations," indexation of export
prices, etc.
The report said
nothing about the conformity
of such measures and its
implications to
the norms of international
law.
For, one thing, regardless
of whether
the NIE0 proposals are approved
or not, they have provided
a common
ground or rallying point for
developing countries.
In addition, the

"

Resolutions also asserted all states'
rights to nationalize

economic activities without mentioning
any duty to pay compensation.
In

December 1974, the United Nations
Assembly went still

further in adopting, by

a

vote of one hundred twenty to six,

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States.
that if

a

country expropriates

a

Article

a

provides

2

foreign owned company, any dis-

agreements about the compensation shall
be settled "under domestic
law of the nationalizing country"
and "by its tribunals."
this article is consistent with Article
2, paragraph

7

Although

of the United

Nations Charter,* it nevertheless smacks of
paternalism on the part
of the United Nations over developing
countries.

This is hardly

considering the composition of the U.N. organization,
dominated by
a

majority of the developing world.
The international

aspect of resolution 3201 and 3202,

legal

while supporting the claims of

a

group of powerful third world states,

*

Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter calls for
non-intervention and sovereignty of nations over domestic affairs.
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makes it equally easy for
other disadvantaged
members of the international system or those who
simply would like to
interpret the letters
of international law for
their benefit to run afoul
of this law.
[t
is

indeed scarcely the first
time that international
law has changed
to meet the needs of a
powerful group of states.
Interpretation of
international law to fit one's
perspective of a situation renders
international law weak and ineffective
since it readily serves any
purpose.
Third world majority in the
United Nations Assembly means,
among
other things, that the traditional
principles upon which international
law rests, increasingly is
coming under attack.
It also means the

demand for

a

new international law, sponsored,
sanctioned and

ratified by the U.N.

Customary international law was tacitly

recognized by emerging states, however,
this law has increasingly become
detrimental to their interests.

Emerging states did not exist at

the time when customary international

signatories.

law evolved, hence are not

For customary international

law to be binding, emerging

states not only should be present at the
time of its creation, they
should give
to this.

juridicial

their consent also.

take the stand that newly emerging states reserve
the

I

right not to recognize customary law or any other
aspects

of international
However, if

There are numerous dissenting views

a

law designed to infringe on their legitimate
interests.

state recognizes customary international law without

reservations, this automatically means that it recognizes
body of principles and norms of existing international

a

law.

certain
These

norms and principles constitute the basic principles of
international

relations.

Most newly emerging nations
would prefer as matter
of legal
logic that international
law emphasize on social
change and the
equality of the sovereignty
of states than on
maintenance of the status
quo.
Thus, instead of customs,
emerging states place more
faith on
treaty arrived directly by
common agreements and
providing an "effective
basis of reciprocity."
This is not to imply,
however, that customary
international law is rejected by
newly independent states
in to-to.

Those areas of customary
international law which are
judged equitable,
and reasonable, are always
adhered to.
Those that seem oppressive
become victims of rebuc sic
stantibus invoked by newly
independent
states in "order to terminate
their inherited burdens."
The newly independent nations,
therefore, using the forum

provided by the United Nations as
role played by the U.N. as

a

a

global

body and enjoying the

casuis sui generis, has made repeated

demands that new developments under
international law accomodate
their interests and must secure the
approval of the majority.
Therefore, the third world is setting
the pace in new developments under
international

law and evidence of this is compelling
in the activities

of the General Assembly, the
international law commission, diplomatic

conferences and International Court of Justice.
that pre-United Nations international

No jurist can deny

law barely existed.

The game

of power politics is increasingly subjected
to universal influences
and is modified by new climates of opinion.

This calls for

a

revision of international law based on the enhancement
of "social
justice."

8

The United Nations, searching
for an easy way out of
the

^

contradictions posed by foreign
investment, resorted to the doctrine
of sovereignty (statis potestatis)
for the enhancement of social
justice.

of such

In
a

the process, it failed to
recognize

move.

the implications

Now the issue of confrontation
between the defenders

of traditional concepts of
international law and those seeking
change
in

these concepts has become "most
acute," since developing states

have made it clear that on this
question, they do not wish to be bound
by traditional

norms.

9

preclude an investor and
in

The doctrine of sovereignty therefore
might
a

foreign state from effectively contracting

advance to submit disputes to international
arbitrators.

certainly would prevent

And it

corporations from suing in courts of another

country, as Kennecott Copper and British
Petroleum did in European
courts after expropriations in Chile and Libya,
and as Nigeria did in

United States courts.
The doctrine of sovereignty, though

but commanding

a

a

de jure pronouncement

de facto application, appears to be neutral

fact has profound effect on the international economy.
a

but in

It needed

modification to conform to the reality of international economic

system.

In

the words of A.V. Lowe:

"What is needed is

a

refinement

of the concept of sovereignty in international law, so that it can

accommodate both notions of the independence of states and of the
increasing interdependence of states, without losing its coherence as
a

legal

principle."

®

The Doctrine of "Changing Circumstances"
This doctrine, in contrast to that of "permanent sovereignty"

over natural resources, is
not clear and perhaps less
understood by
those who invoke it under
international
law.

However, it seems that

both doctrines go hand in hand
in matters involving
natural

resource

extraction and bargaining that
lead to extraction activity.
no distinction made so far

-

need to nationalize a natural

There is

either legal or otherwise,
between the
resource because of changing
conditions

of world trade or political will
and the desire to do so simply

because conditions are changing.

Indeed, for most resource rich

developing countries, there seems no
distinction and perhaps if there is,
such distinction is fine and subtle.
The doctrine of changing circumstances,
known technically as

Clausula Rebuo sic stantibus is based on
the assumption that if
fundamental changes in the circumstances upon
which
take place, these changes may be invoked
as

a

a

treaty rests

ground for terminating

the treaty.

From the point of view of developing nations,
clausula vebuc
sic stantibus not only exonerates them from
inherited colonial

oppresssive and obsolete treaties, which did not secure their
consent,
but frees them from "unequal" or "inequitable modern
treaties imposed
by duress."

These modern treaties may include those concluded with

transnational extractive commercial or manufacturing companies who

exploit the bargaining weakness of developing nations.
however that developing countries who in most

It

is

clear

cases are weaker

than some powerful transnational corporations and of course

a

group

of advanced industrialized nations, resort to this doctrine as an

escape clause firstly to unilaterally abrogate long-standing
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concession agreements and contracts
and secondly, as

transforming easily a-stated
position.

a

means of

This practice has been
carried

out most successfully by
radical nations, who presumably
have less to
lose from breach of contract.
Sovereign immunity from prosecution
has
provided an added impetus to
extremely disturbing international

behavior and rules of international
law seem not to adjust rapidly
to
cover legal ramifications such as
the use of sovereign immunity.
The doctrine of changing
circumstances is arguably

of the portent force of sovereign
immunity.

a

by-product

For developing nations,

it serves to proclaim to the rest
of the world the changing balance

of power or force now going on in
the international system.
for those who experienced colonialism,
it became

which consolidates political independence.

a

Furthermore,

pragmatic slogan

Presently, the notion

of changing circumstances seems indeed
hazy and haphazardly explored
under international law

-

both theoretical and practical.

International

lawyers and scholars would rather circumvent
this important notion

when confronted than attempt clarification on
an issue many perceive
as ambiguous and inapplicable.

But the notion of changing circumstances and its legal

implication is real both to domestic as well as international legal
practice.

Although conceding the ambiguity of this doctrine, most

domestic courts in developing countries, however, recognize the

importance of its use as escape clause in negotiations.

It also

reflects the overwhelming desire of developing countries to see

contracts, agreements and contract disputes conform to the rules of

domestic courts and tribunals rather than internationalizing the
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process.

This creates the need to
ask whether international
law
should have "direct" effect on
domestic
law.

There is general agreement
that in the

absence of

"stabilization" devices or clauses,
the law governing
the law at the time of
application.

a

contract is

This general rule applies
when

the contract is governed by
domestic law as well as when
parties agree
to "internationalize" the
legal framework of their
relationship.
The

stability of this relationship
seems shaky and questionable
when
attempts at internationalization
fall short of incorporating
into
the contract specific rules

submission by both parties.

of international law which
commands
Incorporation per se does not and may
not

be adequate to prevent a breach
of contract by a state entity
invoking

sovereign immunity.
Indeed,
legal

a

great problem exists currently among
international

community on the interpretation of what
sovereign immunity

is when a

state enters

parties.

The International Convention on the Settlement
of Investment

Dispute (ICSID) provides

into a commercial

a

legal

relationship with other

framework, however, the language

of the law remains highly equivocal especially
when burdened with
the arbitration process.

Sovereign immunity is

there is no uniform answer."

a

"question to which

The rules regarding sovereign immunity

are in greater disarray than any other portion of
international

law.

The question of whether contracts between states and

private international units can be removed from domestic law and made

subject to international rules of law has attracted much controversy
within and outside the international legal community.

Will

it be

judged better by both parties
or either one if
contractual ao.ree.ents
are "internationalized"
or "localized" or
"de-localized?" This
question has now been clearly
answered in the affirmative
by Article
of
42
the JCSID Convention
There
i,„ a, k
mere is aalso
broad agreement on this
issue among several authorities.
I
found one very much
instructive Institut de Droit International
at its 1954 session
discussed the
question of state immunity and
came to the conclusion
that "attachment
of or execution against foreign
state property is prohibited
if the
property arising from contractual
obligation is used for
.,

"governmental
purposes distinct from any
commercial or economic undertaking.
Thus
the state is liable to be
sued if and when it engages
in commercial
activities (jure gestionis) with
other states or with non-state
actors
It does not however remove
the possibilities that an accused
state
should not resort to sovereign
acts (jure imperii, to safeguard
its

national

interests.
It seems

likely that the question of sovereignty
(suprema

potestas) and doctrines of changing
circumstance

will

continue to

shield non-compliant states from
treaties which are considered

unjust or harmful

to national

interest.

Until

international law

ascertains clearly and unequi vocably what
changing circumstance
is,

and

a

system of bounded sovereignty under which nations
are

allowed to operate, the principle of Pacta sunt
servanda remains

basically weak providing some nations the license
to undermine
international agreements at will.
What. the international

community needs

is a

"code of conduct"

which binds both transnational corporations and the host
country,
taking into account the special needs and requirements of each party.
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"Code of Conduct"?
The fundamental

purpose of

a

code of conduct for transnational

corporations is to prevent the abuse
of power.

No matter how one sees

and judges these corporations,
they are powerful and where
power exists,
there also exists the possibility
of its abuse.
There is no consensus
among "experts" and within academia
on what Robert Heilbroner
calls
'

"business atrocities," however, it

is

widely agreed that transnationl

corporations possess considerable power
and influence and that countries
may find their national sovereignty
infringed upon and their policy
instruments blunted by such corporations.

As George Ball

has noted,

multinational corporations "have the power
to affect the lives of people
and nations in a manner that necessarily
challenges the perogatives

and responsibilities of political authority." 11

Moreover, judging the capabilities of these
organizations, it
is clear they pose a credible threat
to nation states as well

the global

community at large.

as

Professor Neufield argues, "multinational

firms have acquired such important international
dimensions

...

that they

seem to enjoy an unusual degree of independence in their
relation with

particular governments.

1

9

Most observers and analysts therefore feel

(and correctly so)

that such independence and power of transnational corporations
poses
a

"threat" to the global community, because there is no existing body

of laws aimed directly at keeping these "giant conglomerates" in
check.
is

A law to guide the activities of transnational

inevitably an idea whose time has come.

corporations
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It is against this
background that the United
Nations

on Transnationai
Corporations, meeting in L im
a,Peru,

establish m ent of

a

Cession

recorded

the

working group to elaborate
a code of conduct.

,„

addition,

SelSvTlffiwon^^

the establishment of a
n
the P
1tiCa1
l6ga1
effZt of the operations
effects
°l
of

l

'

'

-onoJc

an

S'

transnational s technical
c
pe
to strengthen the
c a°
D a c rt
capacities
of developing countries in
their dealing
with transnational corporations,
and work
ng to
P
efiniti0n f the te
"t-snatio^
°
c^rporat io"s"l3
•

^rrr

™
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However, addressing the commission
at the opening session, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru,
Migel Angel de la Flor Valle,

stated that "it was the desire of
the developing world that

a

code

of conduct [aimed at governing]
the operations of transnational

corporations should take the form of an
enforceable statute" rather
than merely

a

declaration of international intent.

Thus, a code of conduct must be seen
within two perspectives:

1

)

2)

Pol itical

Legal

effects and

implementation

Political Approach
It might prove difficult distinguishing
between the political

and legal mode of

a

code of conduct where political statements and

acts are easily transformed into normative rules or
principles of

international law.

However, in order for any code of conduct to

succeed, it must distinguish clearly the political and legal dimensions.

he ,og1c of political

legitimacy^

International ly acceptable.

that a code

This calls for the
so-called "set" of

formula or "common elements"
or standards on which

events,

.est.

Up t0 this moment,
no set of

agents

win

co™

elects have
been agreed on and if
history be the judge,
the community of
nations will not agree
on a
standard for so„,e time
to come.*
If there is ever a
common code of conduct,
it should spell
out
the obligations of
governments as well as
obligations of the
corporations. As wiHian, I.
Spencer of Citicorp points
out. "a crucia,
step is recognition by
the host countries that
they need to spell
out
Clearly to MNCs the role they
can expect to piay in
achieving national
objectives."
But win this spelling
out of functions be within
the
framework of an internationally
recognized and accepted code
of
conduct? Nation-states as
well as the MNCs are faced
with varying
degrees of difficulties which
may render the need for a
code largely
trivial.
Moreover, considering the different
situations and the
needs of each nation, the
response to a code of conduct
may differ

co™

widely among states.'

5

This is so because governments
(especially

those of the developing nations)
have clearly and carefully sought
to
achieve balance between the
presentation of an "ant1 -social " conduct
and the desirability of encouraging
foreign enterprises and maximizing
their contribution to social and
economic development.
The code

exercise has thus been

a

lesson in tight-rope walking for developing

nations because they are clearly caught
in

a

dilemma.

*

For example, seeking common standards
on which to agree the
eaS
d ."^ ommon heritage of mankind"
is taking over a decade
!n
r;
to fnI
formulate.
It might even take longer before
"common elements" on
which to base a code of conduct for
transnational s emerges, taking into
consideration the "social and cultural objectives"
of each country
W

^V
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However, the need for

a

code of conduct originating from
the

perceived and often real injustices of
the present economic system
and the desire for redress, occupies

agenda.

a

"centre stage" in the world

Whether the code of conduct will in fact
significantly alter

transnational corporations activities and
eventually lead to
International

a

"New

Economic Order" depends largely on the
success of its

impl ementation.

Legal

Implementation
Since code of conduct for transnational corporations
remains

an "evolving" document,

tion,

implementation is often difficult.

Implementa-

to be successful, must take into account the broad
issue of the

relationship between TNCs and nation states.*

organizations such as the OECD drafted

a

Intergovernmental

guideline code proposing,

among other things, that companies be required to divulge confidential
*

There is still no agreement on the nature of this relationship
While some analysts see the TNCs as the villain, others exonerate
them.
For example, one Justice Brandeis, writing in Liggett Co vs Lee
(288 U.S. 517, 514 (1933)) proclaims, "Through size, corporations,
once merely an efficient toll employed by individuals in the conduct
of private business, have become an institution - an institution which
has brought such concentration of economic power that the so-called
private corporations are sometimes able to dominate the state." Barnet
and Muller's Global Reach , and Vernon's Sovereignty at Bay , etc.,
render the same judgment.
But others see it differently.
According
to Seymour J. Rubin, "there may be a time dimension to that proposi tion:
?
it may be the TNC, not the Nation-state, which is "at bay"
(Rubin,
The Multinational Enterprise at Bay.
68 AJIL, 475 (1974).
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.

financial data about their
operations and taxes, country
by country.
The U.S. - a member of the
OECD, objected!
This invariably raises
the
question of whether a global
formulation of a code of conduct
should
have a "direct" effect on
those formulated under domestic
or
municipal law.
In other words, should
a code of conduct accepted
by the
international community be self-executing?
It is only when this

question is answered in the affirmative
will we see the emergence of
genuine code.
Presently, legislation on this
issue in different

a

countries has either suffered
setbacks due to the so-called
supremacy
clause, or in the process of being
"penetrated" by global legislation.
In addition,

code exercise, which Professor
Horn has aptly described as

"an international

process of learning and law making" 16
raises the

issue of which law should take
precedence

nations or municipal law?

-

will

it be the law among

If one accepts the principle of
direct

17
effect and the supremacy of the community
law,
we will have

cut answer to the above questions.

But if history should be

and if it did teach us

is

a

"

lesson,

it

a

a

clear
guide

that the international

community has been wise enough to accord international
law

a

supreme

position and the sole arbiter of international
conflict.*
The code of conduct for transnational corporations
is largely
an international

intent, lacking the force of the law.

The elevation

of this recommendatory resolution to the level of
"enforceable statute"

demands that many questions be answered; it also requires an
unusual

unanimity among international community members that such

a

code is

In theory, members of the international community proclaim
the supremacy of international law; in practice, this has been
otherwise.
On occasions, members have broken these laws if doing so
furthers their interest.

indeed necessary and the

m

Internationa, relations,
enforcing

transnational will be

a

nations perceive the

goal will

probW*

transnational corporations.
the historical

a

of comon

eWts

code of conduct about

diffiV,,it „kj
difficult
objective to achieve.

attests at reaching this

^
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establish^

,

argely depend

Successful

Qn how

and tact brought into
negotiations with

The outcome of this
goal

in turn reflects
role played by maj or
actors in transnational
relations

.
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CHAPTER

HI

HISTORY OF THE OIL
MAJORS OVERSEAS

The study of international

Nations

can be prope(,y

through an analysis of
their historica,
context.
depends to

Us

earned out

relevance

large extent on the
selection of the crucial
period
Historical periods have
witnessed the rise of rise
and demise of
a

nation-states, the emergence of
non-state actors and global
forces
whose influence in global
affairs could only be
legitimately judged with
the passage of tine.
International relations seek
to define and
explain relationships among
these global actors.
Selecting particular
and crucial periods of
history, this study will
attempt to explore,
define and explain the relationship
between the nation-state and
transnational oil corporations.

Although this study draws heavily
from the historical relationship between oil producing
nations and transnational oil
corporations,
emphasis

is

laid on Nigeria as

it is essential

a

case study.

But before this is done,

to present a background and history
of global

oil

industry.
A hard historical

look at the global oil

system in which it operated revealed

a

industry and the

remarkably comolete division

of the world of oil by transnational
oil corporations sponsored
and supported by their respective
governments.

imperialism of oil on

a

It also

revealed the

grand and global scale, generated and
87

perpetuated by diplomatic as
interested

industrial

as commerc1al

nations.

supply, therefore,
were vital

^

Access to oil and
security of

(as they are currently,

to the

industrialized nations for
whom forei 9 n oil and
its acquisition was
relatively easy and cheap.
This access was
determined by the sheer
needs of the industrialized
nations, who were
consequently driven
search of foreign reserves.
If access was in
question at al 1
it
involved rivalries among
the great powers over
partition and over
"ownership,. Concurrent to
the questions of access,
partition and
ownership was the problem of
colonial

-

and commercial dominance.

Concessio n under the Colonial
System
A distinguishing feature
of global oil industry
derives from
the fact that the various
oil giants (corporations)
deliberately

partitioned global oil into
corporate trusts based on colonial
ties
and "joint control." The
colonial system provided an
essentially
"automatic" mechanism by which
the metropolitan countries
acquired
easy access to raw materials.
However the impetus for colonial
expansion cannot be explained by
economic causes alone.

Colonial

expansion has strong geo-political,
strategic as well as "humanitariandimension.
But on the whole, the ideology
of global expansion is that
of power ensuring access to
needed raw materials.
The central point, however, is
that colonial ties and the

benefits derived from it, reinforced
the desire by the great powers
to pre-empt raw materials in their
favor and to deny similar

advantanges to others.

This maneuver for foreign raw materials,
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especially oil resources,
yave impetus to
gave
to
as well as commercial

,
a

•

c
series
of diplomatic

rivalry among the
great powers.

The structure and
politics of international
relations under the
colonial system made it
quite possible that
metropolitan countries
demanded, received and
plundered whatever resources
necessary for her
economic and industrial
growth. As a system of
international relations
colonialism, to a considerable
extent, depended on the
ability of the
metropolis to enforce its
wishes and dominance on
the colony.
This
phase I call the Hegemony
*
.
erioo.
It is
y Period
characterized by privilege
enjoyed by transnational oil
corporations, supported by their

n k

respective countries.

•

Privilege, by its nature,
belonged to the

powerful because out of it
was based the security which
the great
powers sought.

Every colonization is the
product of an imperialist drive.
The history of post World
War international relations
on energy matters
provides an adequate example of
how great powers fought each
other
for a strong foothold on
those areas of the world where
oil was found.
The rush for presence was not
limited to commerce; the acquisition
of

territories usually follows.
obsei~/ed that when commercial

imperialism of

a

Professor A.

P.

Thornton has correctly

empire has been established, territorial

definable kind necessarily begins.

In

the age of

achievement, every energy is taken up
with the purpose at hand... the

planning of

a

system of commerce to include East and West.

The age

*For analytical purposes, I have divided the
history of global oil
into three periods.
They are 1) The Hegemony period, 2) Direct
response period, 3) Tacit bargaining period.
This division will provide
an analytical framework for a discussion
of qlobal oil industry in
the later chapters.
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of imperialism is properly
the age that follows
the success of the
purpose.
What has been got must
1
be
kept.

Access to foreign oil was
secured by the great powers
through
two distinct approaches.
The first one was through
the colonial

system which

I

have described above.

to be through commerce.

will

be based on

The second was and continues

With respect to the former,
further analysis

:

a)

Interest of Great Powers in Foreign
Oil

b)

Changes in the International
Environment

Interest in Foreign Oil
The First World War ushered in

a

period in which the several

uses of crude oil and petroleum
products were recognized.
a

Oil

became

unique commodity, its multiple uses and
varied derivatives gave

rise to complex industrial construction.

reconstruction of Europe after World War

But the industrial
II

significantly influenced

the international oil market and spurred
interest in increased

production.

As world demand expanded, oil

companies devoted

considerable efforts to developing global oil
resources especially
the Middle East where oil

very low.

The

of crude oil

reserves were huge and cost of production

United States of America had become

to supplement domestic production.

imported oil resulted from fears of
oil

in

a

a

net importer

The necessity for

prospective shortage of American

and of a British-Dutch monopoly of foreign reserves.

But most

importantly, this increasing interest for foreign commercial production

was also

stilted

oy the rising costs
of American oi, and
by the

current and prospective
discoveries of large foreign
2
reserves.
Basing its judgment largely
on commercial and
strategic reasons, the
U.S. government decided
that cheaper production of
crude oil in foreign
lands (especially the Middle
East) and the geopolitical
strategic
advantage it offers, serves
the national interest
better than costly
domestic production.
This assumption gave rise
to a determined
imperial

posture in foreign oil
Fear of an oil shortage in
American spurred interest

oil was a fundamental

War

I.

The vital

in

foreign

factor in international relations
after World

role of oil

in a modern

industrial economy forced

industrial nations, especially Great
Britain and the United States,
into

a

policy of oil

imperialism.

Great Britain then had exceptional

concessions to the huge oil reserves
located in the Middle East which
was under her "protectorate."

Exploration and production was

cheap and the U.S., including other
industrial nations, wanted
of the action.

However, Great Britain was unyielding.

Middle East was hers.

Oil

a

piece

in the

She assumed the role of the jealous mistress

eager to defend that which was hers,
acquired as it were, through
colonization.

The unyielding British posture became

a

matter of

serious concern to other industrial nations
especially to the U.S.

whose sound foreign oil policy will envisage not
only the adoption
of well conceived principles, but also their
ultimate implementation

through machinery of international understanding.

3

An agreement with Britain for shared concession and
access-

was important then to the U.S.

A large part of the known oil

reserves

^

involved in international trade
was owned, controlled,
or under
concessions held by the citizens
of Great Britain and the
United
States.
It is necessary,
therefore, that the two
governments reach
an agreement to guide
oil exploration
and supply.

Moreover, concurrent with
deep fears of oil shortage
in the
U.S., and with unfavorable
British response to American
oil companies
requests for Middle East oil,
there was also developing
a general fear
of foreign monopoly of all
foreign oil resources
especially by
the British, the Dutch and
Germans.
In fact, this strategy
of
control was based first on the
"acquisition" of territory in which
reserves were found, and secondly
on monopoly of production and
supply.
1

In

1920 and 1921, the U.S. Senate demanded
an investigation of

the restrictions imposed on
American nations by foreign countries.

But the British position was
impregnable.
all

the likely or probable oil

All

the known oil

fields,

fields outside of the United States

itself, are in British hands or under
British management of controlled
and financed by British capital. 4

The British-Dutch Companies

were endeavoring to prevent the surrender
of the colony reserves to the

American "oil trusts" while simultaneously
busily protecting
trust of their own.

Today, this trust is known as the Royal

a

similar

Dutch

Shell -British Petroleum.

The alleged British monopoly in the Middle
East and the signing

of the San Remo Agreement*

led to

heated and prolonged diplomatic

disputes and exchanges between American and British
governments over
it

The San Remo Agreement was concluded by the British and French
governments for oil concessions in the Middle East on April
24, 1920.
This agreement further convinced the Americans of
a conspiracy aimed at
shutting them off from Middle East oil.

.

the oil
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resources of the Middle East.

The African government,
under

Secretary Colby and later
under Secretary of State
Hughes waged a
"determined" diplomatic war with
the British regarding
the rights of
U.S. oil companies to
participate in the development
of Middle East
oil resources. 5
The American position in
the dispute was that no
one
nation or group of nations
should enjoy exclusive rights
to the
mineral or oil

resources anywhere in the world.

Concurrent to this

position, is the view that freedom
of access should also be
extended
to other natural resources
vital for industrial
production and thus

"open-door" policy, among other
diplomatic demands, was introduced.
"Open-Door" Policy
A diplomatic dispute arose when,
in 1919, the British refused
to permit American oil companies
to send exploration parties
into

Mesopotamia (now Iraq).

The American position in the dispute
was

essentially the "open-door" policy.

The most important provisions in

this policy were:

a)

That no economic concessions in any
mandated territories be so
large as to be exclusive.

b)

That the San Remo Agreement discriminated
against American
national

s

The British point of view was that British
nationals had "acquired

rights," that these rights must be protected and
respected.

The

controversy between the British and American governments
raged on until
Turkish Petroleum Company decided to discuss American
participation.

The resultant
negotiation was set
around the open doQr
po]icy
iCa
nati ° na ' S
"
sessions by Turkish governmen
;
the process gained
a stronghold in
the Middle East oil
from
which she would eventually
donate global oi, enterprises.

7»

~

^

-

^^^-^^
Access to foreign oi,
was based on two
fundamental factors
The first factor was
the necessity to
'acquire" colonies, which
Showed promise of oil
reserves.
The second was the
desire to
dominate commerce associated
with oil.
Thus, the metropolitan
countries, having established
their political control
over the
colonies, often left the
economic sphere to their
private companies
In other words, the
task of clearing the way
for private oil
companies fell upon metropolitan
governments because this task
was
fundamentally political, moreover,
private oil companies could
not
and did not muster the
strength for colonial dominance.
This lack of
strength on the part of
private international oil
companies vis-a-vis
host governments undermines
the legitimacy and endurance
of the
former in current global oil
industry when sovereign powers
of
metropolitan nations is shoved
aside.
Lack of metropolitan government's
(now consuming metropolitan
nations) direct intervention in
the oil

industry which historically
was the case, reduces the role of
private
oil companies to one of
inferior participation.

More will be discussed

on this issue in Part II,
Chapter 2 of this study.

The period of commercial access
dominated the mechanisms of

access to raw materials and though
colonialism took another form,

both formed

a

close association.

%
The essence of commerce
was

profit; its security depended
largely on accessibility to
markets.
Colonialism or its variant neocolonialism - provided the
access, and
in the process commerce
was tainted by the association.
However,
desire for profit was a common
guide 'to action, even though
other
motives were declared for it.
Any worthwhile study of the
global oil

industry must pay close attention
to it.
pay close attention to little
else.

Indeed, many such studies

But this approach in itself is

inadequate for a comprehensive
treatment of global oil politics,
because economic interpretation alone
will not best illuminate the
imperial scene or ask why great
powers struggle for presence in
global
oil

reserves.
In

addition to the profit motive, the
doctrine of strategic

advantage provides

a

useful

framework within which imperial action

during this period could be interpreted.

Neither the British nor

the Americans coveted the Middle East
and other areas of the world for
oil

alone.

There were many other reasons.

was geopolitical.

One fundamental

reason

This was certainly the case with regards to
British

and American interest in oil.

British interests in the Gulf States

initially reflected British concern to protect
the commercial and

communication links and the "territorial integrity" of
its Indian
empire from Russian encroachments.

Only later, on March

3,

1913, when'

the British Royal Commission appointed to study the problem of

converting the Royal Navy from coal to oil did the interest in oil
add another dimension to British interest in the Persian Gulf.

Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, announced the

Admiralty's oil" policy in

%
a

speech before the House of
Colons on

July 17, 1913, in the
following words:

nquid
fuel... We must become the
owners or at anu Ui+l *u
the
controllers at the
e source
U
of It'lSI.! . Pr ° ° rtl ° n f
P
the
supply of naturai on which
°
we require

J

^

This policy was of strategic
importance for the British who

through the San Remo Agreement
with the French had

Middle East oil.
in the Persian

existent.

a

monopoly in

It should be pointed out
that American influence

Gulf during this period was perhaps
virtually non-

The Middle East and the Gulf
States were exclusively under

British sphere of influence.

But following the war (World War

I)

which has "brought about radical
changes in the status of the United
States in respect to the oil

resources of the world,"

a

well

thought

out foreign oil policy requires not
only the adoption of well

conceived principles but also their
ultimate implementation through

machinery of international understanding.

7

policy, Britain had to be consulted
because

In pursuit of this
a

large part of the

proven oil reserves of the world are either
owned or controlled by
the British.

Obviously judging from diplomatic notes exchanged

between the two governments, Britain was not
particularly interested
in

reaching an understanding with America on matters
concerning

Persian Gulf oil reserves because doing so would
mean "trespassing
on acquired rights" and Britain would not have it
so.

But America,

realizing the profoundly important role oil was destined to
play in

post-war reconstruction and its belief that world wide oil

a
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developments by their own nationals
will not only add to the
security of the United States but
will be a major factor in
effective
national defense.

It could be argued that the
United States during

this period did not achieve
substantial political advantage in
the

Persian Gulf region which predominantly
remained in British hands. 8
The most important point which needs
remembering when

considering colonial and commercial
control and dominance over global
oil

until

the late fifties is that once the
metropolitan governments

had secured a place either through
diplomatic intervention or colonial

acquisition, they stepped back and let commercial
interests provide

adequate supply for domestic consumption.

The "vindication" of

this reliability and responsibility came
immediately after World War
II

when oil was discovered to have many uses, but
this was made

possible by the considerable managerial, technical
and capital

assets held by dominant transnational oil corporations. 9
Inspite of the enormous commercial as well as diplomatic

successes scored by international oil companies in developing and

supplying the world with oil, it is only realistic to note that
changes in the international environment drastically transformed this

advantageous position.
first on the colonial

The system, as pointed out earlier, depended

pattern of relationships which assured easy

access to raw materials, and after the decline of colonialism, the

functioning of the commercial mechanism.

All

these depended on

particular structure of international relations

-

a

structure created

and dominated by the metropolis and which conferred automatic

advantage to it.

a

Today, the doctrines of sovereignty and of

"changing circumstances" induced
by changes in the
international
environment occasioned a revision
in the rules of how
the game is
played.

Changes in the International

Envi-

98

ronment

Post-war developments in
international politics undermined
the
advantageous position of transnational
oil companies and also
the
international oil system.

These developments include:

1)

Independence and Nationalism

2)

The evolution of Organization of
Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC)
3)

Creation of National Oil Corporations

4)

Post-war recovery and phenomenal demand
for energy

5)

Nuclear Stalemate

6)

Geopolitics of oil

These developments are quite different
but in the context of global
oil, they are importantly related.

Post-war developments, as they

affect the global energy resources and international
relations, are
discussed in detail in Part III.
So far,

a

historical background of global oil

For

a

thorough analysis and comprehension of global oil

industry within

a

national context, it was necessary to present its

presented.

overall activity around the world.

industry is

History in this context shows

the genesis of oil acquisition and production, the various inter-

locking decision making strategies, because the politics and economics

of global oil cannot be fully
understood when studied in
isolation.
It must be understood
as constituting a meaningful
whole where
decisions made in area A affect
area
B,

pays particular attention
to oil

of global oil.

otherwise.

C,

etc.

However, this study

industry in Nigeria within
the context

A less useful study will
ensue, if it is done
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The outstanding characteristics of global
oil industry is the
dominant position held by seven international
oil companies
The
seven companies that conduct most of the
international oil business
include five American companies and two
European groups.
They areExxon Mobil
Chevron, Texaco, Gulf, Royal Dutch Shell and
British"
Petroleum (BP).
The words "corporation" and "company" are
used
interchangably in this study.

Part II

CHAPTER

IV

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
NEGOTIATIONS AND BARGAINING

This chapter attempts to
communicate the central and fundamental

ideas about the theory of games
and related decision-making

models as they apply to sociology
of conflict.
the results of game theory
to negotiating and

national oil

industry.

relate

bargaining in inter-

The emphasis will be mostly on
tne concepts;

no effort is made toward the
mathematical

game.

It seeks to

"solution" of any specific

However, it is believed that the
application of certain

conceptually relevant aspects of the theory
of game, for example, those
on decision-making, cooperation,
competitive and coalition behavior

may assist in unravelling the often
complex and difficult strategies

employed by actors in the global oil industry.

Moreover, in general,

the theory of games assists in clarifying
situations of conflict

among parties where conflict resolution is
achieved mostly by

collusion and conciliation.
Contrary to the prevailing notion among social scientists
that the theory of games of strategy offers little if
any use or

insight into the study of social behavior, it is
study that it does.

a

contention of this

As a basis for explaining the sociology of

conflict and conflict resolution, games of strategy can offer
useful
insight as

a

tool

for analysis.

Presently, game
102

theory deals with

103
the choices actors may
make, or refine the
choices made in order
to
"better- the. in the resulting
eguilibrium outco.es, and
in some aspects
of the convocation and
collusion which may occur
among players in
their attempts to improve
the outcome of a
negotiation or bargaining
situation.

Games of strategy depend
considerably on the assumption
that
Players are rational and that
in situations of
conflict involving
strategy, players strive to
maximize an advantage or utility
while
simultaneously minimizing loss.
It assumes, in addition,
that players
recognize and are aware of possible
outcomes of a given situation

because of the way a given situation
is perceived.
of

a

Correct perception

given situation naturally leads
to a desire to maximize an

advantage assuming that behavior is
correctly described as the
maximization of utility.

Games theory assumes that players
"know"

them in full and are aware also of
the preference patterns of other
players.
But it is not always easy to maximize
one's utility in

a

game when utility functions cannot
be measured or are susceptible to

non-measurement.
oil

For instance, maximization of utility in
the global

industry does not readily lend itself to
measurable "utilities"

because the situation

is

usually one of political and economic

controversies and maneuvers.
players in the oil
ill

In

fact, the parameters within which

industry are supposedly confined usually are

-defined domains of action where there is considerable
ambiguity

as to the outcome of particular negotiations or
situations within

the global oil

industry.

In

this situation, the value of knowledge

104

and the use put to it
beco.es severely
lim1ted because the
pa y off

of possible moves.

Although an argument
could be posited that
interactions a m ong players
within the global oil
industry is

"conmerciaP

™rket

in nature and hence
susceptible to the principles
of the

(which may or may not
be read „ y measured)>

^

dangerously the political
and ethical basis on
which current international agreements on oil
negotiations rest.
,n this sense,
utility is
not measurable no matter
what may be the precise
meaning of a
market induced agreement.
The hypothesis that players
choose among alternatives
as if

seeking to maximize the
expected value of some guality
called
"utility," is simply intended
to be a scientific
hypothesis enabling
correct predictions to be made
about certain behavior.
I argue that
in international oil
industry (and particularly
presently) no such
thing as discrete measurable
utility exists within negotiations
between transnational oil
corporations and producer governments
because
political and ethical considerations
are brought to bear on most
negotiations.

Although the outcomes of several
negotiations tend to

reflect the demands of the market,
they should be seen within the

perspective of political demands.

Therefore, the theory of games

have limited application to social
and behavioral sciences under

conditions of conflict.

Strategic negotiation in
most cases involves an
acute
Perception of a participant's
interest which may or may
not be
compatible with that of the
opponent.
This unigue element of
strategy
distinguishes the sociology of
conflict from ordinary
bargaining
situations where a constant
thread of opposition and
conflict is
largely absent and unnecessary.
The logic of strategic
negotiation is expectation based
on
interests; its outcome is
dependent upon personal moves of
the

participants conditioned by
historical events

In seeking to

understand the art of negotiation,
there need

to be a realization

that it is one of the means by
which individuals, organizations,

groups, nations, etc., manage
their relationship with one another.
In most cases,

negotiation is chosen over other means
of reaching an

understanding because it offers the
path to

a

least cost of

interaction, certainly it holds out
the advantage over armed

conflict and spares the combatants the
perils of destruction.

In

other situations, negotiations are
preferred because of the real
benefits, perceived by the participants;
they allow the presentation

of facts, ideas and arguments by
parties which ipso facto allow
for a "mutual

learning," trust, and the exploration of
alternatives

necessary for reaching an agreement.

But as

a

sociology of conflict,

strategic negotiation usually involves the deliberate
obscurity of
interest by participants whose disclosure could have
profound effects
on the outcome of a

deprived of

a

negotiation.

For instance,

Ivory Coast was

much needed investment revenue amounting to

a

U.S. one billion Eurodollar
loan for developing the
promising

Espoir oil fields.

106

Phillips Petroleum of the
U.S. and

a consortium
of other oil companies
were main agents who sought
this loan, which
was denied because Phillips
Petroleum reportedly stalled
transmitting

the vital

information on Espoir reserves
which two of the French
banks
in the leading syndicate
requested.
Such obscurity does not
however
impinge on the necessity for
"extention agreement" needed for

bargaining continuation.
On the contrary, obscurity of
particular information ensures

the protection of strategic
interests and the gradual

of one's position in a strategic
situation.

transformation

Von Neumann has

described the strategical situation
as the interaction between
two or
more persons, each of whose actions
is based on an expectation

concerning the actions of others over
whom he has no control.

The

outcome is dependent upon the personal
moves of the participants.
The policy followed in making these
moves is strategy; and policy
in a

strategical situation is often shrouded

in

implicit, non-comprehen-

sive moves designed intentionally to
confuse the opponent.

In

other

words, the aim of policy is to make an
opponent act continously in
a

state of "suspended animation" because they
qenerally act in

the final

analysis on hunch; that is, they gamble without being

able to calculate the risk.

Moreover, strategic negotiation as

a

sociology of conflict

offers some remarkable illuminations on how negotiating teams
view
one another in terms of economic and political behavior
because

usually conflict perception govern such interactions.

Although

J.C.C. McKinsey, in his

Theoryc^ames

eloquently argues

^

"7

strategic negotiation
"win throw ,ig ht on al1
kinds of
which various peopie have
opposing goals and in which
each of the.
although he may exert son*
influence on the outcome
cannot completely
dominate the course of events," 1
from this writer s
gf
strategic negotiation, in
addition to McKinsey's
observation,
involves competition, conflict,
cooperation and diplomatic
maneuvers
In economics, the
basic example is the
exchange relationship of a

^

.

^ ^

the elusive nature of the
constant interplay of
cooperation,

opposition and conflict that
runs through various
interrelationships
of men, from the striking
of a bargain in the market
place to the
unenviable military solution.
Nevertheless, in the literature of
social conflict, an exact
description of the nature of strategy
has not been made, despite
the

enormous progress made on the
purely mathematical analysis of it.
But games of strategy offer
great potentiality for application
to
political and economic behavior in
conflict

situations and to resolu-

tion of such conflicts through
negotiation.

Countless number

of human interaction is carried
on through negotiation and there is
an enormous diversity on the
nature of negotiations, methods of

reaching an agreement and how agreements
are reached.
well

as

Governments as

intergovernmental organizations are constantly
engaged in

diplomatic bargaining, non-governmental
entities negotiate among
themselves, governments and other actors in
the international system.

These negotiations represent different
types of social conflict

and socia! interaction
and in order to render
them more meaningful?
one must distinguish among
different purposes for which
the
parties negotiate.
The parties for which this
study is concerned include
the
Organization of Petroleum and
Exporting Countries (OPEC),
the
multinational oil corporations and
the diplomatic representatives
of
governments.
I
have gone through theoretical
formulation of games
of strategy as a prelude to
understanding the triangular
relationship
between the above actors in the
workings of international oil

industry, and secondly, in the
formulation, articulation and the

implementation of "development plans"
of oil-producing countries.
It was observed that conflict,
competition and cooperation underlie

negotiations between oil-producing
government planners and oil

company negotiators; though there
was refutation as to the existence
of conflict. 2

Strategic decision in the international
oil industry has
always involved

coordination.

a

conflict of interest; the need for cooperation
and

Conflict of interests occasionally surfaces
as

a

result of misperception deeply embedded in
historical events

experienced by "developing" oil-producing nations,
and as
"side effects"

-

result of

that is, effects on outcome which does not concern

the agreement at hand.
is

a

For example, a country whose foreign policy

fundamentally based on "social justice" or the elimination
of

apartheid policy may engage in negotiating for side-effects when
in fact the focus of negotiation may be oil

consequence of such

a

matters.

The inevitable

conviction is that more efforts and ingenuity
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is expended on pursuing
these side effects, no
natter how irreieva'n't
than in coning to grips

with the substance of
the negotiations.

The

"ere fact that this is so
confers subjective legitinacy
to the
nation's foreign policy.
Oil

development in some West African
states obviously start
from the basic assumption
that states should not be
victims of neocolonial exploitation and
therefore officials are increasingly
aware
of and engage in suspicions
of large multinational oil
companies,
resulting from lessons of colonial
exploitation.
For example,
Howard Schissel reports that
"tiny" Benin has chosen
its oil

a

different path

development which excludes large
multinational oil companies

(South Magazine, January 1983).

The government of President

Mathiew Kerekou chose to award service
contracts to two small
Norwegian companies, Saga Petroleum
and Kraeusner.

strategy seems to be an exception.

Small oil

However, this

companies simply do

not have the resources "which covers
Africa's needs."

Moreover, the formulation and execution of
foreign policy

(especially those of oil-producing nations)
has been deliberately
tied to fighting foreign "oppression,"
exploitation and the trappings

of imperial ambition by the multinational
corporations nurtured and

supported

"by

their respective imperial

"centres."

Such ambitions

can be "intoxicating," and has been repeatedly
applied to nations

representing the "weakest link" in the chain of "underdevelopment."
Bingu W.T. Mutharika, the acting chief of Africa Trade Centre
of the

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, argues that
"the experience in Africa is such that multinational corporations
have

not changed the , rage
of colonl,,

^

edt0re9drd

^

^

n,

as
h
The
most pertinent observation
in this respect
fh at
is that
countries
with rich mineral resource
,i
resources a*.*
are almost
invariably the
trouble-prone
or potential
politico-economic crisis
areas'^ Certainly Mr
Mutharixa raised important
issues concerning
the activities of
multinational corporations
in developing
countries, but substantiate
these Cairns is a
difficult task indeed
and one beyond the
scope
of this study.
Earlier on and on the
same path as Mr.
Mutuant

Krishnamurti asserts that
since multinational
corporations follow
a world-wide
strategy of interest,
they do not normally
conform to
the interests of the
countries in which they
4
operate.
I„ all, issues
of colonialism,
neo-colonialism, imperialism,
etc., have all been
dealt with in Part I of
this study and elsewhere, 5
however, understanding the nature and
practice of these issues is
indispensable
to coming to grips with
the much celebrated demand
of a new
international economic order
by developing countries,
and the
«.

sociological conflict which
underlie "north-south" interaction
especially in areas of natural
resources including crude oil.
Th historical advantage
enjoyed by the multinational oil

companies in global oil affairs
as

a

result of the hegemonical role

they played, paved the way for
future conflict

in

perception.

Most

oil

producing countries presently feel
that granted of access to

oil

companies and the subsequent
arrangement in production and

distribution was one of "unequal
exchange."

The oil producers

felt cheated and exploited, but
most, if not all, nevertheless, needed

the revenues from
oil

a sv*t*
m was
system
created in which
groups of
,

™3

companies tended to
ensure access to oil
° UrCeS 3nd t0
m
n
their gains
in a world in
which th
wmch
P v h*H
they
had control over
most of the
factors of production.
•

^™^

•

The

^

on copies
,nte

buttressed by an
entrenched

™"-

««
ana convinced o f
the
inability of producer
governments
ernments tn
n+
to iintervene
in oil matters
either
directly or otherwise,
unilateral
i„ abrogated
=k
atera,ly
the posted prices
of
Middle East and
Venezuelan crude 011
oil ln
in the
t„
S P""9 ° f
'959.
Furthermor
,
.
„ ,a
n Au
ust
I960,
9
the oil companies
reduced posted prices
of Hiddle
^st crude oil which
precipitated consultations
between Venezuela
and the Middle Eastern
countries on measures
to deal with the
lower
"I PHces.
This unilateral
reduction of posted crude
oil prices
(which incidentally
was a basis on which
royalty payments were
made
to producer governments)
by the oil companies
indeed, became the
first recorded instance
of major conflict of
interest between the
latter and the producer
governments.
The incidence formed a
basis
on which a more
careful and closer scrutiny
of oil matters by
producer governments became
the norm.
Although the excuse given for
lowering the posted price
of crude oil was ostensibly
due to
"expanded production" resulting
in a "world surplus,"
the producer
governments have long felt
cheated and exploited and this
incident
provided the spark to act.
In fact, the oil companies
forced the
producer governments to respond
by uniting in a co^on front
against
this highly provocative
activity.
1

^

The shock suffered
as a result of
reduction in posted
P"ce led to the formation
in I960 °
of
f the
th* n
Conization of Petroleum
F
+
Exporting Countries
(OPEC)
And, as Keter
Peter R n
rf .n
0d
ell argued in his
er eptive book
., he oil
Producers sought
collect.ve!,
;
; to enhance
their bargaining
power by
•

.

.

:;

^o^w,

-

^

in order to
prevent the companies
from playing
rrom
nUvinn one country
off against
another in a situation
of surplus oi ,
-eduction

potential."'
Strategic considerations
of the multinational
oil companies
™tters of ..posted" price
reduction, therefore,
worked immensely
against their interest
because strategic thinking
failed to take
-to account the hehavior of
other actors, inching
the

OH sanies.

,n other words,

the logic of strategic
moves

should

according to sociologist
Jessie Bernard, depend
on plans or policies
or choices of hehavior
which always involve
some expectation regarding
the behavior of others.
As a source of conflict,
the oil companies
failed to anticipate the
consequences of their moves or
simply
neglected such consequences
as trivial.
The result was that
multinational oil companies,
as never before, were
subjected to
rigorously and even rigidly
limits in their economic
activities
and socio-political
behavior.

Now there is the sober
recognition

and acute awareness that
corporate planning must be
achieved with
the "knowledge that they
may be checkmated at any
point" by other

actors in the international
oil system.

In the case

of African

producers governments, however,
the lack of regional cooperation
and coordination argues
Nicolas Sarkis, director of the
Paris-based
Arab Petroleum Research Centre
(APRC), and adviser to several

Afncan states

on oil

bargaining position."

mtters , leaves Afr1can
states

^

^

This is so because
oil companies are large

worldwide inter-locking
conglomerates with powerful
political and
economic machinery which
individual African nations
can rarely

match.

This lesson on strategic
thought has the curious
effect of
making the oil companies
more secretive and
manipulative because
they do not have a free
situation in which they can
maximize their
benefits. They are in a
system in which every choice
of behavior
on their part may be nullified
by some choice of behavior
on
8
the part of someone else.
They are faced by countervailing
forces
very much willing to redress
past inequities.
This interplay of forces
inevitably leads to a situation
where sociological conflict
not
only dominates the psychological
constitution of negotiators but
threaten to becloud their
professional judgment. More energy
is then

expended not on coming to grips with
the substance of the negotiation,
but of creating an atmosphere
conducive to serious and fruitful

outcome.

In

this scenario, decisions on policy
are not simple

problems of maximizing one's gain in

a

situation of game, but

problems of maximization under adverse
conditions, that is, under

conditions in which other players are also
attempting to optimize or

maximize their gains, so that
interference occurs.

a

situation of

Moreover, under this antagonistic atmosphere

no amount of astute or clever diplomacy
can "force moves or deflect

policy" because psychology is fixed and no
concessions must be made
to the probable behavior of an opposing
groups.

The breakdown of mutual trust necessary for any negotiated

settlement on controversial issues inevitably leads to quest for
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manipulation, deceit and
calm situation.

-to

The

a

deliberate bedouding
of an otherwise

foliation

of policy conse
q uent ly degenerates

an orgy of mutual
distrust and accusations,

m

Libyan government started
negotiations with the oil

1970 when the

copies

resisted, followed by
production cuts and
nationalization by the
Libyan government led
•..
by
uoionel fihaHaff,uy Colonel
Ghadaffi.it
was rumored that that
was a "communist Piot.
plot " Ghariaff-i
u
Ghadaffi h„
has, however,
built a reputation for
"leap frogging" on
agreements already reached
elsewhere in the Gulf
states.
Thus confronted with the
OPEC Cartel and Libya's
tactics
the mutational oil
companies "seemed to have
evolved a coherent
counter strategy" insisting
on one global negotiation
to avert the
Libyan "leap frogging."
I„ pursuance, thus,
companies sought to
negotiate as a group rather
than as individual entities.
Oil companies
were in luck, concerted
global strategy, which itself
was a violation
of U.S. antitrust regulations,
was cleared with the
Departments of
State and Justice.
Hence, the companies were
set for negotiation, but
prior arrangements failed
due largely to political
interference from
producer governments.
The truth of the matter was
the absence of

which parties need for

a

negotiated agreement.

a

conducive atmosphere

For example, it has

been the policy of the Nigerian
government to create conditions
which stimulate and ensure
meaningful and mutual concerns on
matters
affecting her oil industry.
However, the oil companies operating
in
the country have repeatedly
engaged in price manipulation to increase

their profit.

Such corporate behavior leads to
conflict situations.
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secrecy the ,1, compani.
es do not disclose
what
P-fUs they make on the Nigerian
operation, reports Man
Hutchinson »
repeated demands fr om
the. are made on
the government for
increased
Prom margin. In view of these
demandS)

^

^

^

^oleum
9 overnment

and Energy, Alhaji
Yahaya Dikko,

would act after

a

replied

^

that "the

logical and persuasive
case has heen made

and the case must he
dearly understood not on ly
by those in
government
but also by the Nigerian
10
public at large."

Evidently a

cognation of

several factors have
made it

Possible for the oil companies
to engage in manipulative
adventures
which lacked bold maneuver
and daring, but which
at any rate proved
effective and successful.
One area where success
was recorded was
on the supply of crude
oi, to Rhodesia and
South Africa where shipment
was boycotted by oil-producing
third world nations.
Shell-owned
tankers are being sent from
ton to Durban, breaking the Arab
Oil
Embargo against South Africa,
the Observer Newspaper
alleged in
London." Shell-BP also broke
the Nigerian oil S mbargo
to South
Africa.
But Mr. P.F. Holmes, Chairman
and Managing Director of
Shell

vehemently denied the allegation
saying "net

a

droo of Shell's

Nigerian crude oil reaches South
Africa directly or indirectly." 12
It could be hardly disproved
that this strategy or rather

tactic employed by Shell-BP and
perhaps other oil companies contributed
to unnecessary upheaval

in the negotiating process
and may introduce

an element of conflict in
a situation which least needs
it.

Perfidous

and treacherous behavior such as
this undoubtedly pushes OPEC

countries to use their oil resources
for "political purposes"

which

,

it has, on
occasion, used
lkpH
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The point here is th*+

—

"

aHsin 9 from producer

'

•

Nations

ernment-on. company
interaction should
j
•
be
j
avoided as much as
possible , n oraer
order also
aUn to
t n avoid
the "sterility
of
°" f 0nUtiOn
:

"

tion.

"Agreements,"

observes Unde^
.
Secretary of state for
Economic Affairs,
William Ca sey, "cannot
in
themselves, of course,
guarantee the stability nf
of new arrangements
or
„
th
He flow of oil.
-ese will depend on the
good faith of the
parties
as well as other
developments in the world,

political ones."

including perhaps

u

The theory of games
is essentially »
a theory of strategy
which
takes into consideration
exDPr^tinnc
expectations concerning
the actions of
.

upon the moves of the
participants based largely
on decisions as to

by the amount of
information known to him
or conversely by lack
of
information.
The availability of
information or lack of it
invariably
leads to a strategic
situation and players under
the oerils of

deprivation intuitively adopt
a mood of conflict
of interest. The
situation either degenerates
into a problem of individual
or group

decision-making under

a

mixture of "risk" and uncertainty
or

stabilizes as an interaction
where cooperation, mutuality
of need
and reason reign.
The general assumption is
that the later scenario
is more desirable because
everyone
is a

this is not always the case.

"winner."

m

reality, however,

The need for negotiation hardly
arises

P3rtiClPantS
Political nature.

^

*~ -

issues

especial

tnose of h

Under these conditions,
if agreement

is

J,

eve, reached

because participants
decide to come to terms.
Ga.es are "sets of
rules" comparab,e in
the abstract to the
rules that define
economic
behavior.
For example, decisionmaking
in the international
oi,
industry often takes the
form of "games"
games
,
in (•(,*+
that players
usually
obey rules laid down by
international political
and economic events
and norms.
However, rules that define
international economic life
are
no longer as definitive
and constant as they
were before the 1973
energy upheaval.
There was, after this
event, a deepening
uncertainty
on the nature and supply
of crude oi, on which
most developed industrial
economies depend.

Decision-making on oil issues
under these uncertain
conditions
are subsequently susceptible
to internationa, political
and economic
developments.
Zaki Yamani , in his
discussions with Aramco and
other
major oi, companies, informed
them "again
and arain" that any

agreement arrived at could be
undone by deals elsewhere.

Although

oil companies represent a
major link between producer
governments and

world market, these governments
"were discovering that they can
market
their oil in the global market
independent of thi oil companies and
at prices higher than what
major oil companies are offering.

Furthermore, the Tehran Agreement
became a symbol of the fragility and
instability of international oil
agreements.
There was reason to

believe the agreement will be short
lived.
a

Again, Sheik Yamani in

conversation with Exxon's George Piercy in
Tehran on January 20, 1971,

African production,
wi the
of
^"t? so
ran«H
»
i>o-ca
ed
I

OH

.en frequently refer
t0

f

constlt,
constitution.'
is

Wrp„»i
extreme,,
SC ° V
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risk far+nv,"
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In fact, argues
Mr

6nt
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u-

L

'

Sarki,

S

9e ° 9raphy a " d
9eo7o g lc al
th

geological risk factor
low," and according
to his calculatjon
,
,

^

„

inrelatMpt

;
the
h
highest in the world."
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of we ,ls drilled
is amongst

For examni*
for
*
example, kbetween
1975 and 1979

exploration permits
granted in Africa to
t he top twe n ty
multinational
11 companies, totalled 1.8 m1111on
square
52.2 percent of all exDlnrat-i™
exploration acreage
awarded around the world
over
this period (South
Magazine, January
1983,
61)

^

p.

Since the early

,

^

.

970 s, the re has been
considerable discussion'on

the notion of a "new
international economic order,.
Among the demands
of this new economic
arrangement has been the
overriding desire of
"developing" nations for a
just and adequate share
of the global
economic prosperity.
The impetus for a revisioi
in the global economic
order was indeed occasioned
by the new found
strength of the oil
producing exporting countries,
OPEC, who, having been
rallied around
by a majority of the
"third" world, sought a
major overhaul in the
international economic system.

Although OPEC member countries
in thier "historic"
meeting
of the Sovereigns and Heads
of State held in Algiers in
March ,975
issued a "solemn declaration"
reiterating their "profound faith
in
the capability of all
peoples to bring about a new
economic order via
international consultation and
cooperation rather than confrontation,"

'

iv':::::r
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^

"« «

«

6XamPle
Of
>
protest
otest...a revolt
against the highhandedness
of the mult 1nation
al oil
which thas] held sway
in
soverefgn
produced and sold our
oil as ,f
if lt
<*
OH
were their own. w
e , the host
countries, were not
consulted; the multis
deterged

'~

^

prices and

Paction
national

in accordance
with their own
interests and those
of their
14
foreign

policies."

Thus the game which
the producer
governments wish to play
is
one conditioned and
legitimized by changing
circumstances „ anrf
new develops in
the international
arena.
,„ the fjrst
place
the events of
1973, coupled with the
rapid increase in
energy
consumption by the developed
countries inevit,b,y
introduced
numerous uncertainties
in the decision-making
processes of the
international oil industry
and ushered in an
erain which fundamental
..

policy making decision
on matters of crude
oil production and
pricing primarily reside
with producer governments.
This development
effectively shattered and
clouded long term strategic
decisions
already made by international
oil companies.
The producing
governments in turn suffer
uncertainties on whether the
oil produced
could fetch its share of
the market value.
Under these conditions,
a curious situation
develops; actors who supposedly
have conflicting
interests band together to
bring "order" to the oil
enterprise.
This apparent identity of
interests does not however,
remove the
sociology of conflict described
earlier in this chapter.
Producer
governments and multinational oil
companies, obeying the highly

convenient doctrinp nfc.i
n
of Bebua Slc
stmiibus have
unilaterally abrogated
terms of contract
contractor
h„
or have
suit their purposes.
This issue will ue
be treated
created
chapter. What to bear
in mind, however
uwever, is that
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occas on

amended it so as to
in h
deatil

•

in the next

renegotiation clauses"

a

permanent feature of
international legal
-actions. But new African
oil-producing nations
have sparingly
tanged basic legislation
governing company-state
relations over the
Past decade.
Such policy of
judicious protection of
interests
became necessary in a
climate where decisions
are made under
uncertain
conditions.
The instability and
unpredictability of the
outcome of any

9ame as decisionmaking
in the international
oil industry could
be
dearly stated by referring
to recent concrete
examples.
These examples
are political as well
as economic.
By the early , 970 s,
OPEC's power
had increased as did
demand for crude oi,
grew more rapidly than
supply.
In June 1968 OPEC
adopted a ••Declaratory
Statement of
Petroleum Policy in Member
Countries" which stated the
intention of
OPEC countries to obtain
the maximum control of
their oi, and set
the framework for future
activity within OPEC.
This was done firstly
by obtaining more
revenues for their oil through
a series of
negotiations with the oil
companies and later abrogating
the terms
of these agreements.
There were several agreements
most importantly
the Tehran agreement, Tripoli
agreement, Geneva agreement and
the
15
OPEC participation agreements.

These agreements were individually
and collectively altered,
abrogated or neglected due to
institutional safeguards.
The Djakarta
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Agrees

of 1965 in effect provided
that the OPEC position
should be
the moderate one; however,
individual members would be
permitted to
depart fro. that position if
they so desired.
Leap frogging by
individual member countries
stewed from that agreement and
is not
regarded as a breach of OPEC unity. 16
International oil industry is
fundamentally based on political
foundations; a proper analysis
cannot be made unless one takes
into

consideration the part played by
political negotiations.

The formation

of OPEC and what this organization
hopes to achieve proceeds from
this assumption.

The OPEC Statutes of 1960, reaffirmed
in 1968, are as follows:
1.

Unification of the Petroleum policies cf
member countries,

2.

Stabilization of prices in international
markets, and

3.

Efficient economic, regular supply to
consuming nations and
a

fair return on their capital to those
investing in the

petroleum industry.

In addition,

recent developments in the international political
economy

have made it necessary for the OPEC to add
statutes.

a

numter of factors to its

These include:

1.

Development of national petroleum industry

2.

Equity sharing and control

3.

Compensation for monetary fluctuation

4.

Conservation.

These last four factors, borne of increased bargaining strength

of OPEC members, came as

a

surprise to major international oil

compares whose decisionmaking
structures were
•ineffective.
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m0 st rendered

As a result uncertainty
was introduced in decision-maki
ng

and the oil companies were
forced to rearrange
decision-making

structures in order to maintain
"order" and harmonize
interaction in the
global oil industry.

the oil

Inspite of this rearrangement,
other factors brought to bear
on
industry.
One of these was the Irab
Israeli War and the

consequent embargo and supply
shortage.

On October 16,

1973, ten
days after the outbreak of the
fourth Arab-Israeli War, Saudi
Arabia,
Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Abu Dhabi,
and Iran "declared themselves
to be

the sole arbiters of price and
unilaterally raised" their crude oil

posted prices by an average of $1.99
to $5.00 per barrel, effectively

nullifying the Tehran Agreement.

Subsequently, the other OPEC members

announced similar increases.
Contributing also to this atmosphere of
uncertainty is the
vagaries in the oil industry including
the issues of "transfer pricing,"

production limits and manipulation by the oil
majors and the instability
of prices since the traditional concession
agreements were brought to
an end by the 1968 Vienna Conference.

In

order to secure "economic

and political justice for "our peoples," the
producing countries
are demanding that changes be made in order to
get the most out of

their oil.

There are several methods which the different oil

producing countries have exercised to reach this goal:

partial

nationalization (Algeria), joint ventures (Nigeria, Saudi Arabia),
nationalization (Algeria, Libya and Iraq), service contracts
(Indonesia, Venezuela, etc.) and finally participation which is.
the official OPEC option.
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These developments undoubtedly
i„f lue „ C e the long
term
decision-making strategies of
producer governments, the
oil companies
and the consumers.
Firstly national control
of oi, production would
certainl.v
Produce complicated movement
of petroleum, although
almost impossible
to determine, could be
analyzed with some precision
by state owned
oil corporations who
will monitor and control
these movements.
Projected
estimates of oil requirements
(largely a duty of consumers
and oil
companies) and price stability
(mostly determined by
producer governments)
could be theoretically brought
into equilibrium.
Secondly, prudent
measures will be taken by
,n concerned to intensify the efforts
for
alternative energy sources and
the reduction in energy
growth rates.
Thirdly, OPEC members would
have to reconcile themselves
to the continuance of output restrictions if
they wish to ,void determining
the price
structure.
Fourthly, producer governments
would be guided by prudent
measures on pumping of oil to meet
declared development objectives

and needs.
eliminated.

Thus, flooding the market with oil
would be largely

And on balance, concluded one report,
"we consider that

the uncertainties surrounding
international economic developments
are likely to intensify rather than
to diminish during the next few

years with the concomitant implication
for energy developments." 17
The international oil

industry is an enterprise in dynamic

flux and hence susceptible to change,
and any long-term strategy

designed to bring order and certainty in the
industry is bound to fail.
Peter

R.

Odell

in Oil

and World Power has convincinqly argued that
the

traumatic events in the oil world indicate that
the interrelationships

of the several sets of actors involved have become more,
rather than

less, complex.

They have also produced
a

realigns

of forces which

made the world of oil in
the second half of the
1970s significant!*
different from the one to
which we became used between
1945 and 1973 18
The vagaries of the
international oil enterprise,
especialiy in
recent developments, render
decisions made in light of
proven certainties
in the industry unreasonable
and invalid.
The strategy of games as

decision-making, then, can be
fruitful only in the short
term rather
than in the longer term because
only those arrangements which
prevail
at a particular point in time
can be trusted.

Serious negotiations

between actors in the global oil
industry take this fact inot

consideration.

T
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CHAPTER

V

NEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
OIL INDUSTRY

this chapter,

I

analyze the traditional
"concession

contract system in the
international oil industry
as they evolved
over the years, the
strengths and weak nesses
of this system, and
the
constraints on it, dictated
primarily by the doctrines
and of "changing c
instances." These doctrines,
presently, offer
Producer.govern.ents impetus and
tremendous leverage over
transnationa,
OH corporations on matters affecting
international oil negotiation
As a result, efforts
made by oil corporations
and recourse to international rule of the game
have proved largely
ineffective.

„

There is no law or rule
of law presently under
international
law which has precisely
and coherently addressed
the issues of
"changing circumstances" and
"sovereign act." And because
this is so,
transnational oil corporations
have found themselves
mercilessly at
the whims and caprices of
producer-governments demands.
In my view,
a

state's legitimate right to
permanent sovereignty over natural

resources take "precedence "over
contracts between it and
party.

a.

third

This is the inalienable rights
of sovereign governments.

Thus in the language of international
diplomacy and law, permanent

sovereignty over resources is

a

"higher law" than contractual claims.
131
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Sovereign acts present,,
constitute defense
mechanisms as well as
o^ensive devices through
which producer countries
have sought redress
for historical and
l0 ng-standing
excitation of their natural
oil
resources by the oil
companies.
This decision hy
producer-countries (most notably
those members
of OPEC) to get even
with oil companies is
inherently ideologically
motivated and implicitly
stated in major speeches
and press releases 1
Thus bargaining theory
cannot fully explain the
evolution of an
agreement, as other extraneous
factors and "conflicting
goals"
impinge on the negotiation
outcome.
Economic rationality which
presumably govern these
negotiations may therefore not
apply.
Moreover, in the conduct of
oil negotiations, much
energy is expended
in order to incorporate
the element of the "new
economic order,"
than coming to grips with the
substantive content of negotiation.
The
general emphasis is on setting
a transformational
framework of

negotiation aimed at radically
altering the traditional mode
of
international oil negotiation rather
than understanding concretely
the nature and content of
particular petroleum deals.

Altering the traditional method of
petroleum

2

agreements

has inevitably led to
producer-governments recourse to those elements

of international law which can be
advantageously employed in dealings
with oil companies.

But invoking these clauses have economic
as

well as political costs in the
relation between states.

A state

which habitually resorts to invoking a
rebuc sic stantibus in order
to escape its international obligations
would lose its credibility

-
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eventuan,

Us

w^-ness.

oceans.
and

agents

sho uld be obeyed,
and record

shows that

^

Sovernments can be iegally
blameless when

a Rebuc sia
stmt
invoked or claimed under
the tenets of Internationa!
law, for
revoking a long-standing
a agreement
s'ccnieni witn
with an
an oil
„<i
company. The
standard practice of the
international co^nity
is one of Paata
Sunt Servanda.
Until the international
legal community settle
the issue of the status
of what Uohan Galtung
called non-territorial
actors,
(such as the oil companies),
under international law,

producer-governments
oil

win continue

to enjoy an advantage
in most

negotiations.
In this chapter also,

I

argue that government-oil
company

'

negotiation approach to petroleu*
matters is anachronistic and
does not
justify the trust placed on it
by the governments of
major
4
industrialized nations including
the United States.
I
submit, in
its place, an alternative
method; producer-government
versus

consumer government negotiation.

This will have the advantage
of

reducing contract uncertainties and
introducing concurrently elements
of contract stability because
producer-governments would understand
the mutuality of sovereign power
(supreme poteetas)

.

Moreover, taking

into consideration the fact that
the United Nations acting as

a
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consumer-governments, also

ac t as c „ untervai
, ing force

Internat10 " al 011
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has legit1mi2ed
severai

« ncn.te.U0Ha,

and hence non-members
of the United Nations

,

actors

My argument is not that n-n
o,l companies be
left out entirely
of
the international 0 i,
deaIings , rather ,

^^

comprehensively and generally
ag r ee on petroleum
matters with the
on companies playing peripheral
parts and sorting out
the substantive
and detailed aspeot
of the international
oil industry.
Before

elaborate on the structure
and the constitution
of
this alternative approach
to international oi,
negotiation, it is
necessary that a discussion
of the traditional
international oil
agreement approach follows.
I

Negotiation Based on

Gnvem^ nt-Comoany

A ppm,,..,

To understand fully the
mechanism and the regime under
which

this approach operated or
rather operates, it would
be useful to

theoretically analyze the evolutionary
trend which characterizes
these
"petroleum contracts." The
process of evolution seems best
in
describing our present international
oi, industry and understanding
its dynamics and negotiating
behavior demands that one focus
on

evolutionary trends.

For purposes of analysis,
description and

•ft

1
3re General Assembl
y Resolutions 1803 (XVII)
and 2158 ^Xxn
(XXI > filing f or permanent
sovereignty
over natural "resources
1:2
eS ° UrCeS
Th?c
Th
1S gave impetus to the
agressive "natural resource ideology

^?^"*^

-

.

clarification.
C ° mPany

1
.

,

have divided the

aPPr °- h

J

pen, d which

Phases.

These 1nclude:

The Hegemony Phase

2.

The Direct-Response
Phase and

3.

Tacit-Agreement Phase.

The Hegemony

Pha<: 0

(1

9QU1957) 5

The Hegemony phase
was characterized by
the granting of
full
c-essions to the major oil
companies.
Across the hoard
concessiona
Power and advantage me ant
'.effective control by
the oi, copies of
the entire range of
petroleum activities,'
The State exercised
no
real voice in either
the management or
conduct of oetroleum

operations 6 or the profits
that accrue from said
operations except
the receipt of "royalty."*
Especially in the Middle
East, their
control over levels of
production was absolute and
was determined by
7
their ability to sell
Producer governments played
less active role because
then,
knowledge of petroleum uses
and its worth were virtually
absent, and
the technology and management
needed for extraction were
lacked.

Moreover, the resource

and poverty ridden nations
were relieved by

the much needed royalty payments.

A closer investigation of
this

hegemonical relationship and the "far
reaching rights exercised by
the oil companies" would indicate
the dynamism of exploitation,

domination and imperialism by the
industrialized nations. 8

e

^

This

Amount paid by oil companies to producer
nations as "owners
dUCt
Pr °
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traditional concession and
the
6 inevi+
a
lnevi Ability
of* hegemony "was by
its
very nature a state
within a nate,
state and
anH i+
,„
it was a matter
of time
before the state „ou,d
assert its legislative
and executive powers"*
to that which belongs
to it.
Gabon, the smallest
OPEC member
Producing around 7.! million
tonnes , ftp example(
^
of domination under the
traditional concession
system.
This nation
has been struggling
against the wishes of El
f-Acquitine, the French
state-controlled group, to
increase its equity in
Elf-Gabon fr om
twenty five percent to
between thirty five and forty
one percent.
But Elf organization proved
difficult and very strong for
tiny
Gabon.
Elf indeed has tremendous
bargaining power and leverage
over the state, for the
company produces about eighty
five percent
of the country's output.

Mn+

L

^

^

Another example of

a

state which seeks gradual
transformation

in concession agreements
and increased state's share of
her oil

revenue was Congo against Aquitine
and Italy's Agip.

against Congo's request was "sharp":
and all new investments were
halted.

forced to work out new arrangements.

The reaction

payments of taxes were halted,
The government was, however,
Oil

revenue provides about

half of the nation's revenues.
The dominance of the oil companies
persisted through the
two world wars, with two major
exceptions; the Soviet Union nationalized
its oil

industry following the October Revolution
of 1917, and Mexico's

expropriation of domestic assets of foreign oil
companies

in

1938.

10

Dominance was hegemonic; its advantage was strategic,
and strategic

Wactlon

was a cent,,
feature involving

M1

*

co.pan.es and producer-nations
no matter how
small or
negotiations were.

trUU]

^

Access to oil was not
the only driving
motive behind
finance, strategic behavior
increasingly became
manifest.
Choice
of action employed by
the international
oil companies
became contingent
upon its estimates of
the actions or choices
of producer-nations
"hich was in most cases
minimal.
The 01, companie$
th,« situation and turned
negotiations into series
of strategic
interactions and strategic
choices made possible by
the passivity of
governments.
Strategic behavior consequently
degenerated into a
game of assymetrica,
choice, when in theory,
choice and behavior
should be independent and
strategic interaction
measured by outcomes
11
controlled by interdependence.

^

Change in the regime and
mechanism of negotiation and
concession was inevitable.
The process of change was
economic and,
increasingly, political in
12
nature.
By the late fifties, expanded
production capacity of oil
resulted in a world surplus of
available
crude oil, and in the spring
of 1959, oil companies
unilaterally
lowered the posted prices of
Middle East and Venezuelan crude
oil.
Further reductions in the
posted prices took place in August
1960

precipitating consultations between
Venezuela and the Middle Eastern
countries on measures to deal with
the lower prices. 13 The product
of this consultation was the
birth of OPEC in September 1960,
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which was an act of
protest
protest...
a Mun
a revolt against the highhandedness
of
the multinational oil
companies. 14

u

The Direct-Response
Phase (1957-1966^
The formation of OPEC
marked the demise of the
Hegemony phase
based on visible dominance
and exploitation of
producer-countries

Direct-response period ushered
in regimes of
concession measurements
based on joint venture
agreements,

^^s^^

Part of the package of
transformation included

b e came

also

into joint ventures

which included creation of
state oil companies.

Transformation of

this sort is characterized
by an "increasingly
active state role
in the conduct of oil
company

operations."

Political considerations
played an important part
during
this phase in the sense
that producer-nations wished
to redress past
exploitations stemming from the
fact that multinational oil
companies
explored, exploited and "sold our
own oil as if it were their
own,"
and the explicitly stated
intention of producer governments for

"participation"^ the running of the
international
Not all

oil

industry. 15

governments experienced the hegemonial,
or direct

Phases of negotiation, but most are
experiencing the tacit phase.
For example, Nigeria did not enter
the direct-response phase until

she joined the OPEC in 1971, although

a

series of legislative and

executive moves were made to regulate but
not direct the activities
of the international oil companies. 16
If the Hegemonic period was
characterized by dependency

relationship between oil companies and
producer-nations, direct-

e SP
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independence

by 011 producing
nat10ns

Elements of independence
adopted are various
various, but
h„t the most
significant
these are the
establishment of state
,„ companies wh1ch
an important policy
instrument in f orging
self . re ant
matters concerning
petroleum development
eveiopment, ano
an* ,„
concurrently "increasing
the host country's
equity
y position" , aand
„H m,
the *
formation of the
Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries.

„

^

„

P^mon

The creation of these
elements of independence
was based on a
radical transformation
of the existing
structural relation in
the
international oil industry
and the inducement of
a regime change
"hose inspiration and
conception was primarily
pol1tically
and managed.

For example, in 1973,
ninety three percent of
OPEC production
which amounted to 27.9
million barrels per day,
went to major oil
companies on long term basis.
By 1979-1980, this amount
dropped to
about fifty percent of OPEC
exports and forty two percent
of world
trade in crude oil.
Concurrent
to these developments,
OPEC
nations' ownership
"entitlements" of crude oil produced
rose from
two percent in ,970 to
eighty percent in ,980.
Currency, the thirteen
OPEC National Oil Companies
(NOCs) directly market more
than

fifty percent of OPEC exports
compared to virtually nothing in
1970
and barely five percent in
1973.

Important points to note in this
phase are that the bargaining
strengths of producing countries
became increased and stabilized with
the creation of the elements of
independence mentioned above.

Most
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Nat.ons General Assembly

gave

bargaining position of
producing countries.

banning

^

^

the

Strengthening the

capacity of oil-producing
nations inevitably led
to restructuring of the fabric
of international oil
industry and the
rearrangement of the rules
of the game. Hegemony
and dominance gave
way to direct negotiation
based on strategy
and

Strategic interaction
assumed

of opposition and
conflict.

a

.animations

strategical situation; its
iogic one

Substantial energy became
expended in

order to outmaneuver the
opponent and hence gain
an advantage
In
essence, the whole strategical
behavior degenerates into
one of
"games" whereby each player
must ta ke the other fel,oWs
thoughts and
"»ves into account, 17
because in theory each was
expected to make
an optimum move based
on strategical considerations.
The point, however, is
that in conditions of direct
response

negotiating phase, it is generally
assumed that each player usually
examines strategical relationships
before any move is made.
This is
based furthermore on the
unproven assumption that rules
of the game
has been identified and
that rules should define
economic and
strategic behavior.
A closer investigation of
strategic, economic

behavior of most African governments,
for example, indicates otherwise
A study by Robert L. Curry, Jr.
and Donald Rothchild on the
economic

bargaining between African governments
and multinational companies
reveals that "impatience" and "reciprocal
demand intensity" usually
prove decisive in most negotiations.' 8

Although the oil industry

-Presents

-serves

a

un1,ue case, several

in their bid ha1t

hard foreign exchange,

natjons with potential

excessjve

are

transnational oi, co m panies.
deal on their resources.

^^ ^ ^ ^
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^

i„ a hurry t0
conc]ude

These nations may not
a,„a y s get the best

The issue of impatience
however may not

be a major concern of
those developing nations
where large proved
reserves of crude oi, have
been discovered and
where there has been
a long history of
oi! dealings with

transnational oil

copies.

Mature oil-producing developing
countries have particularly
endeavored to understand this
phase in their negotiations
with
oil companies.*
Therefore, they have insisted
on joint ventures and
production-sharing contracts, and
in so TO cases, outright
participation
in day to day operations
of the oil industry. The
extent of
successful "participation-in
the affairs of their oil
industry differ
fro m nation to nation.
For example, a review of
the contracts
signed by Indonesia (which
pioneered the concept of
production-sharing)
in 1979 and 1980 indicate
that Pertamina has suspended its
"joint

participation" scheme with Conoco. 19
a

However, production-sharing was

success and was widely adopted by
the new producing countries as

well as those with no traditional

petroleum industry.

Outside

Indonesia, production-sharing has
been adopted in countries as

diverse as Egypt, Libya, Chile, Nigeria,
Angola, and India. 20
"Service contracts" have also been a main
feature of the

direct-response negotiating phase.

These are two types of service

For Nigeria, the direct-response phase may
have begun in 1971
when she. joined OPEC as a full member.
Prior to this date, attempts at
participating in her petroleum affairs was mostly in
the form 0 f scattered
legislative enactments geared toward regulation of
the activities of
oil companies.
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contracts:

under one kind, the

governs

bears all or

s 0me

part of

exploration risk, hiring an
oi, company as a
contractor to provide
the nation's oil industry
with needed services.
A good example of
Wns ,s the Saudi Arabian
arrangement with the Aramco
consortium
whereby Aramco provides a
"full range of exploration,
development
and production services
to Petromin" : the
state-owned oil company,
for "reimbursable Costs
plus a fee of less than
twenty cents per
barrel of purchased crude;
under another kind, the oil
company
furnishes all capital necessary
for exploration and
development of
petroleum fields. The producer
government would in turn reimburse
to the company over a period
of years after the field
comes into
production.

'

This is done either in cash
with interest or in crude

which the company's entitled
to purchase. On the whole,
service
contracts are most applicable in
cases with proven oil reserves
and
therefore may not provide an available
option to some countries.
However, this sort of contract
recognizes the status of producer
states as owner of the oil produced
with international oil companies
as providers of technical services.

This kind of contract first came

into use in the late 1960s,
particularly between oil-producing

countries and the companies which desired
to gain access to assured
supplies of crude oil. 21

Service contracts agreements were concluded

in Iran in 1966,. in Iraq in 1968 and
Venezuela in 1971.

Similar agree-

ments have been recently signed by oil companies
with the state oil

companies of Nigeria, Brazil and Vietnam.
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The extent of success
recorded by various
governments on
"modern" concession regime
vary.
Modern concession agree
m ents
-elude as detaiied earlier
service-contracts and
production-sharing
contract, and typicaHy, they
might include a
United contract area
a United life or
duration with possibility
of extension, royalties
due to producer-nation is
calculated on the value of
production and
Producer governs has authority
to review and control
company
decision and activities, and
finally provision for
governs eguity
participation.
These provisions imply the
increasing power of
producer governments over oil
companies.
Often success is a factor
of
how technologically, economically
and managerial
ly advanced a nation
is.
However, the "tendency of
governments to copy parts of
agreements from other countries"
render these innovative
concession

regimes more of

a

framework on which specific
agreements are reached.

For example, in April 1971

,

terms of a five-year agreement
on oil

revenues were agreed "in substance"
between Nigeria's government and
Shell -BP.

The agreement follows "closely"
the pattern set in
Teheran and Libya. 22 Again, in
May 1971, following the Shell-BP

agreement of April of the same year,
Nigeria signed
settlement for all companies.
the 1971

a

five-year oil

"It is patterned almost identically
on

Libyan settlement" 23 except for the
temporary freight

premium which was established at nine
cents/bbl.
In sum,

the direct phase of negotiation represents
a period

in the history of global

oil

negotiations in which strategic behavior

and interaction took the form of exchange
relationship of buyer and

U

"
seller each trying to
"maximize" hisS gain
9a1n an.
„ f course
and of
minimize loss
.
..
the process, a
curious distortion
usually ta.es place;
first of
-operation and then of
conflict.
Conflict more than
cooperation
-ally characterizes this
period because
situations have been
created
in wh,ch several
possible outcomes will
result with respect
to which
certain preferences are
desired.
Though' payers may
have some
control over the varices
which determine
outcome they do not in
most
2
cases have full control. «
"hen such is the case,

m

then, the

one with more determinate
control over variables
usually ends up
calling the shots.
This, of course, does
not necessarily mean
that
a state of perfect
control has been reached
in which action
cannot
be nullified by some
choice of strategical
behavior on the part
of an opponent.

Tacit-Re sponse Phase (1966-1979?
)
This phase represents the
most recent period, although
beyond
that, events in the
international oil industry have
not fully

crystallized and predictions based
on post 1980 events are
merely
assumptions and not concrete.
Tacit-response phase can be further
divided for analytical clarity
into 1966-1973 and 1973-1979,
and "was
marked by the emergence of the
oil producing states as fully
active
and controlling actors." 26
The yea rs beginning from 1966
to 1973
represent the emergence of producing
nations as the "arbiters" of
their petroleum resources because
their bargaining strength was
increased due to the politically
and economically instigated creation
of elements of independence including
production sharing contracts
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and service contracts.

These two methods of
concession regimes are

innovative and aimed at eroding
furthermore, the powers of
the oil
companies and entrenching the
position of the state.
In terms of concrete
realization of bargaining
strength,

the tacit response is
remarkably important in the
history of the
international oil industry because
it witnessed the
entrenchment of
OPEC goals and ambitions.
This was particularly so
in the early

1970s, when, according to Fadhil
J-Al -Chalabi

a

"radical

transformation
of the international oil industry
took place with bargaining
,

advantages accruing to producer-governments." 27

Analyzing the

interaction and interdependence of
the international legal and
economic
dimensions of government-company
relations in petroleum development,
and the changing roles of the
multinational oil companies operating
within the market, Kamal Hossain
correctly placed 1970 as the
turning point in relations between
producer governments and the

operating companies.

He traces the course of change in
the bargaining

power against the oil companies and
suggests that the establishment of
National, State-owned companies have been
instrumental
the producer-government position.

in

strengthening

28

If the direct-negotiatinq phase was usually

a

period of qreat

tension and maneuver, the tacit response period
was characterized by

situational acquiescence of the oil companies to demands
made by

producer-governments.

buttressed by

a

The logic of this phase was transformation

favorable shift in the bargaining position; its

success depended considerably on the advantages of

a

coalition
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strategy adopted by major
oil producing
countries.
Moreover, the major emphasis
was on direct control
over
development and production
strategy of oil reserves.
The oil company
acts merely as a contractor,
providing technical services
and in many
cases assuming the exploration
29
risk.
The consequent result
of this policy was a "steady
advance in the terms and
conditions of
arrangements" between various
actors in the oil industry.
The nature
of the arrangements prevailing
at particular periods
between particular
actors usually reflects the
bargaining strengths of each.
However, the
general mode of concession
arrangements have been set, one
which
takes into account the new
powers of producing governments
and of
course the eroding powers of
the oil transnational s
It is my
.

contention that producing governments
over time will acquire more
strength through the process of
economic growth and technological
diffusion and development, and will
eventually displace the
transnational oil companies in matters
affecting domestic crude

production and refining.

I

submit that this is so after

a

careful

study of State oil companies as
instruments of government policy,
and the introduction of innovative-type
concession agreements.
It has been argued several

places

30

that sovereign states

are "feeling naked," and that the
"structural transformation of the

world economy through globalization of Biq
Business is undermining
the power of the nation-state," the fact is
that as represented by

tacit response phase, it is the multinationals who are
really feeling
naked.

The nation-state, particularly the powerful ones, possess

enormous powers to deal with transnational corporations including
of
course the recourse to "sovereign acts."
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The years

973- 1 979 marked the
indiscriminate use of sovereign
acts by major oil producing
governments particularly
those of OPEC
organization. As governments
on their subunits
increasingly
became part of the global
economic and commercial
domain, they
continued to claim and
enjoy total i„nity for
their activities even
in a
competitive environment, and
individuals and non-state
actors
doing business with them
were placed at an unfair
disadvantage.
1

As a recognition of their
newly found wealth and
strength (as a result
of the events of 1973 and
its effect on the
international oil

industry),

producer-nations quadrupled the
price of oil,

nationalized certain oil companies, 32
dictated the agenda to operating
oil companies and generally
assumed political control of
the
international oil industry.
The response of the oil
companies to the new posture of

producer governments have been
varied; each company is different.
But it is possible to make broad
generalizations as to how each

company reacted.

Generally, the companies have
accommodated the needs

and concerns of producer-nations,
however, the logic of concessions
was mostly strategic.

The essence of it was access to
production; the

strategy behind it assumes fundamentally
that debt should be incurred
in

lieu of equity.

For smaller companies, acquiescence
became

a

means

of challenging the "majors" traditional
control over the world's main
oil

producing areas.

For example, Occidental

in 1970

agreed to

terms with Libya which were significantly more
favorable than those

applying in the major's concession areas in
33
the Middle East.

As a
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rule, these oi, companies
through various inter
and intra corporate
transactions and through m
anipu,ative .echanis.s as
"transfer pricing"
eventual either get even or
profit .ore fro m oi,
transactions with
producer nations.

Althought the economic analysis
of global oil may have
some
validity in earlier periods,
and presently, it "tends
to obscure the
Political significance" of
tacit response
phase.

Several

regimes and

mechanisms of concession including
service contracts and
production
sharing as practiced in this
phase "undoubtedly
emphasized the
status of host State as owner
of the oil even after
recovery, relegating
TNC to the role of a general
contractor" and provider of
technical
services.

The oil companies understand
in general terms this

transformation and the advantage
conferred on host states, thus
their
policies have been one of cooperation
rather than confrontation.
As for earlier governmental
and intergovernmental considerations

of forming what Walter Levy
(possibly the top American private oil

consultant), has called

a

"countervailing power" to the oil -producers

cartel OPEC, most top U.S. oil officials
have concluded that such

a

"confrontation organization" would be
counterproductive." 34
Cooperation, rather than confrontation most
observers assume, would

ensure access and production and alleviate
the tendency of what the
then Under Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs, William J. Casey,

described as "an increasing Balkanization of the oil
market" as each

country seeks its own oil policies and preserves.
Negotiations in this phase are therefore delicate and fragile.
Any false move from the oil comapnies may invite
sovereign acts
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from host governments
and hence efforts
are made toward
developing
appeasement packages and
rhetoric which presumably
should have
soothing effect on
producer.government-co.pany
relationship
For
example, African oil
contracts in the 3ulf
are not merely
commercial
increasingly, they are being
negotiated in the context
of complex
explicit or implicit, military
and political relationships
»
0 i,
negotiations are in effect
only part of a tacit
.package dear involving
broader ties."

Cultivating broader ties thus
leads to injecting
extraneous
affairs in the negotiating
process which in many cases
are fundamentally
politically inspired. On the
other hand, on several
occasions, producernations have indulged in
political manipulation of
supplies to
extricate concessions from oil
companies and their governments.
Such
linkage strategies tend to
serve immediate demands of
actors,
defeating a major

purpose of long-term relationship
which in the

first place it is meant to
cement.
It is obvious then that dealings
in the international

oil

industry could not be only understood
in economic, commercial terms.
Undeniably, elements of political
interplay are increasingly important
and essential as a medium and
means of play.
.

There are arguments

which purport to convince us that
politics and political variables are

unnecessary in determining the dynamics
of global oil.
ponents of this argument,

I

To the pro-

caution the dangers and folly of

ideological proclivities and their simplistic
view and interpretation

of global politics.

In

response,

I

submit the primacy of politics

over economic postuUtion
and argue that the
present crisis of Iob
a,
g
011 cannot be understood on
economic terms aione.
A thorough ana,
y sis
and grasp of fundamenta,
knowledge of internationa,
politics is needed

This study

proceeded from that assumption.
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Oil Reserves,
Production,

and Exports

Structural Changes in
the World Petrol
eum Market

1970

OPEC Sales of Crude fm nh/Hl
ro Majors
Affil iates
Third party

1973

1978197^7^^

21.1
6.8

14.5
4.8

14.1
3.4

27.9

19.3

17.5

0.9

Total

Direct Sales
State-to-state
Commercial

1.5

4.6

0.9

5.1

5.0
7.8

2.4

9.7

12.8

30.3

29.0

30.3

80
42
24
58
42

7.6

6.0

Total
Total

Other Indicators (%)
u^Ll uwnership/entitlements
to own crude
Direct OPEC exports
State-to-state deals
Majors' share in OPEC
oil
Majors' share in world
oil
trade
Source s:
Mohnfield,"

—

'

i

2

20

1

7

1

7

99

93

75
33
19
67
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International Oil

Industry

y Bar g a,„ f „ 9 Modcl

(i n

Phases)

HEGEMONY PHASF

Principal Bargaining
Features

Power/Dependency Relationship

Assymetry of Concessions

Government feedback.

Coercive Influence Tactics

Strategic Interaction and
Strategic

Range of Possible Outcomes

feedback

Behavio

*L
Hegemonical Access of Oil
(Conditioned by Bargaining
Features)

,, th ,
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DIRECT NEGOTIATING pmac
f

Principal Bargaining Fpati.rac

~~

Issue Structure

Political Ascendancy

Countervailing Power
Cooperation and Confrontation
Tension and Maneuver

Government (perceptions;

Dependency and

Interdependent

(perceptions) Oil

Situational Complexity
Ideological Differences

Manipulative Relationship
Joint-Ventures (Constituent
Demand)

Equil ibrium Position

Increased Strategic Interactic&Tand
Strategic Behavior

Range of Possible Outcomes

-

Determinated and Limited Access to Oil

(Conditions by Bargaining Features)
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TAOT-RESPONSEPHASE

Principal

B argaining

Featjj res

Issues Structure

"Sovereign Acts"

Dependency/ Interdependency

Coercive Influence Tactics
Political Hegemony

Context/ External Events

Vulnerability

Government

(

perceptions V-

Delicate and Fragile

-Kperceptic

Unlikely Increase in Strategic
Interaction aid Strategic Behavi or
Range of Possible Outcomes

-

to

Increased Political Demands on Access

on

15!

Throughout the tacit
response period, there
has been
advance" in the terms
and condnions Qf
Producing states and the
oi, companies.

arrangers

^^
a

"stead,

This stead, advance
of

produced enormous political
and econo.ic advantage
for
Producing-nations while
simultaneously creating a
steady deterioration
of the bargaining
positions of the oil
transnational co.panies.
Gradual erosion of the
powers of the oil co.panies
came as a
result of the creation of
OPEC and it "demonstrated
clearly that the
balance of power in the oil
world was moving away from
oil companies
and in favor of the nations
with oil resources." The
oi, companies
felt vulnerable and
apprehensive.
To improve its bargaining
position and reverse the fastly

deteriorating hegemonical position
in global oil industry,
the major
international oil companies created
what has been called the London
Policy Group (LPG).
The establishment of this
international association
of petroleum companies, in
which all consumer nation's
petroleum
companies which play a substantial
role in the international

petroleum industry would be represented,
was directed to the objective
of maximizing the bargaining
leverage of companies in their dealings
with producer governments and expanding
the understanding of consumer

governments of the limits of the companies
bargaining position. 36
The formation of London Policy Group
was therefore

a

product

of the

general admission that the "companies are
no longer able to effectively

.

bargain with producer

-sues such

governs

as access to and the

over price" and other
major

detection

of production leve,
of

crude oil
Thus the

institute

goa, of London Policy
Group (henceforth

referred to as LPG) was
the enhancement of
their bargaining
position
through "coordinated planning
and strategy," supported
and encouraged
by their respective govern
m ents.
In other words, the
logic of
LPG

was the provision of
countervailing power; its
essence was the

assurance of continued access
to favorable treatment
in oil matters
and the avoidance of risks,
and castastrophe even
when conditions
have changed and the perils
and threat*
ana
f n
v
tnreats n
of
producer governments imminent.

^

Although oil companies still
maintain
market power which ensured
almost half

a

"residue" of the

a

century of global oil

dominance and control, this power
has been gradually eroded
by the
increased strength of producer
governments.
Transnational oil

companies subsequently faced

a

premonition of catastrophe and

subsequent effort was judiciously
directed towards ameliorating their
weakened position in future
negotiations.
One of the factors of

catastrophe was the "extreme
vulnerability of certain companies to
threats of production cuts or
nationalizations which thereby reduced
the ability of the companies to
maintain

a

united front.

A second

important factor was the "shortsighted
policies of the United States
and other consuming governments which
not only impeded the ability

of the companies to coordinate their 1970-1971
negotiations in Teheran
and Tripoli, but actually undermined their
position by making concessions
to producer governments at the diplomatic
1 37
level.
'
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in contrast to the

Native

cohesion of the OPEC
governments,

governments of consuming
nations tend to act
independently and in
so** instances at
each other throat.
Reacting to the possibility
of
a future oil
shortage, consumer
governments have sought
to protect
their interest by seeking
special access to sources
of supply. One
major consequence of this
policy ts
•*
Hv.ity
is general
aener S l ire
insecurity
which might
induce consumers to bid
up prices,
prices th,K
tl
tnus ,t™
strengthening
the
negotiating position of OPEC
governments.
.

Until

the early 1970s, the
United States had no
consistent

and comprehensive national
policy regarding energy
with the result
that during the "energy
crisis," she found it
almost impossible
to convince her allies
of the need for cooperation
on energy matters.
The European Parliament
went along, however, Japan,
which imports
more than ninety percent of
its energy needs, refused
to join a
"consuming group." Such a state
of affairs was hardly conducive
to
the efforts of oil companies
at negotiating effectively with
producer
governments.
Most importantly, the State
Department's attitude toward
united bargaining front for oil
companies was negative.

antitrust laws posed
this sort.

a

a

The U.S.

major problem for industry cooperation
of

This concern for "maintaining
competition among its

companies in the acquisition of foreign
supplies has not only been

unappreciated by other consuming nations but
has contributed materially
to the inability of these companies
to negotiate lower prices from

OPEC governments.

In

addition, diplomatic sol utions proved

unpragmatic and IH-tlned.

T he

»

Irving Hission „ tQ

^^
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conflicting signals both to
the London Policy
Group and producer
as well.
The mission instead
of com^unicationg
effectively
if desire that oil companies
present united front on
bargaining
Positions, the Shah of Iran
maintained his unacceptance
of this
strategy.
The Irving Mission
acquiesced.
Henceforth, the London
Policy Group was unable
to negotiate as a
group.

Sevens

How successful LPG would
have been without
government
assistance is open to question;
however, one point is
clear - the
successive meetings held by
this group only served
to cement the
cooperation between oil companies
and producer governments.
Why
cooperation instead of conflict
became the outcome was not
clear,
but it seems plausible to
think that oil companies
cannot afford
a prolonged risk of
confrontation with a strengthened
producer

government.
It is highly paradoxical

supposedly

a

to infer that LPG which is

countervailing power, would engage
in overt cooperation

with producer nations.

Inference such as this may form
part of

the inexplicable mass of strategic
interaction and behavior which
has confounded observers of
global oil.

that this cooperation was

a

Peter

R.

Odell explains

"development of immense importance, in

the distribution of world oil

power.

The immediate impact of such

cooperation was strongly felt in oil price rises
and shortages
many consuming countries in the period
between 1971 and 1973.

in

1,38

One possible explanation of this strategic
cooperation was
the desire of the oil companies to
accomplish their objectives of

159

-proving company bargaining
strength through tacit
cooperation and
acquiscence to the demands of
producer governments.
The companies
needed a "safety net" and
this was found largely
in cooperating
with
other actors. There is
considerable evidence to
indicate that oil
companies may have received
numerous orders from
their respective
governments on the need for
cooperation rather than
confrontation.^
Several factors combined
to render the companies
incapable

of bargaining individually
and left their attempt
at "shoring"up
their position through the
LPG largely "fragmented
and ineffectual."
One of these factors is
the perception by the
members of the
London Policy Group that they
operate in an "apolitical
environment"
and that dealings in the
global oil industry is mostly
com^rcial.

Consequently, negotiations on
price, for example, was pursued
solely
on the economic laws of supply
and demand.
It was thought that
the dangers inherent in
diplomatic confrontation over
price levels

may be replaced by subtler
effects of indirect coordination of
supply

arrangements so as to maximize the
incentive and opportunity of

producer-governments to compete.
is fundamentally wrong!

Once

a

This approach and assumption

member of OPEC, member governments

usually obey the laws of a cartel which
in this instance is

highly politically strengthened.

Economical considerations are

usually made, but the oil-producing nations
regard disposition of
their most vital resource as a subject for
governmental negotiations,
and they have in fact been making
government-to-government agreements

with some European countries for years. 40
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^

Although the U.S.,
deviat1ng from 1tf
laws, encouraged the
gathering of the oil
maj0 rs in London for
a
discussion of issues of
mutual interest, the
Policy Group W as
basically a failure.
It was a failure
because of its treatment
of
global oil as economic
matters, and its proven
failure to recognize
tbe fundamentally
political nature of the
Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Evidently acting on the
instructions from
ttair respective governments,
oil companies (who
on most
occasions serve as instruments
of foreign policy)
refused to
recognize the political
nature of OPEC.
On a more technical

level, the various individual
oil

companies have divergent views
and interests and could
not therefore
form a coherent, consistent
front against producer
nations.
In
addition, the idea of

a

formal countercartel

to OPEC has lost a great

deal of ground because of
fears of arousing the
producers'

ire.

A

respected oil economist, Professor
Walter Meade, says that the
exclusive supplier negotiating
with the exclusive buyer is
a classic
example of a "bilateral monopoly,"
which "inevitably leads to

stalemate."

Bringing "order" back to the world
oil market was supposedly
the mission of the London Policy
Group.

This order was aimed at

reversing gains and the advantages
accumulated by producer-governments
since the formation of OPEC, and improving
deteriorating position

of companies in world oil.

This "order" was never achieved; instead

several arrangements based on tacit
consent and cooperation emerged,
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governs.
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cooperation became a
fact of the oil-

power system of early
42
1970s.
The

faHure of the London Policy
Group effectively
entrenched

the tacit-response
phase of bargaining in
international oil, an d
recognized the dominant
position of pacing
nations

«-»*«,
It

furthers,

"forever" ended the era
in wh1ch the companies
cou]d
dictate price levels an
d production limits
to producer governments
though this failure has
not completely nu„ifi
ed the ab111ty of
oil companies to
negotiate price in times of
excess global capacity.
Producer-governments were aware
of the shrinking and
eroding powers of the
oil companies and took
advantage of this
situation by gradually but
effectively transforming their
position.

^

Jhejomics
In

of Transformation-

Nigeria. OPEC. an d the

^J

j^.

the earlier chapters, attempt
was made to explore, analyze,

and explain theoretically
the dynamics of global oil
taking into
special consideration the
bargaining strategies inherent
in the oil
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realigns

of forces and the
political „i„ to maintain
and
sustain the new position.
Efforts to this end
usually are accompanied
by new political and
economic issues which
threaten the viability
of the new regime and
works to support the
established order
The
first strategy breeds
discontent and revolution
leading to systemic
instability; the second only
strives to sustain
implied legitimacy.

The politics of global
oil is strategy; its
objective is
access based on particular
interests.
The outcome of strategy
could
either be predicted, called
with certain amount of
accuracy according
to the role of each actor
and the environment of
action.
Limit has
been placed on the number
of actors to be dealt with
here because
of space and most importantly
scope.
I
have chosen to discuss the

position of Nigeria within the
framework of OPEC and the
politics
of transformation which by
no means is limited to
the oil sector.
The politics of transformation
in the Nigerian context
extends to other
fields of economic enterprise.
This extention will be discussed
later in this study.

Nigeria is rich with large amounts
of hydrocarbons.

Indication that Nigeria might be a
potential oil-producing country
led a German company known as
the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation
to
take

a

license for

its exploitation. in 1908.

But this company

folded up at the outbreak of the first
world war.
Two decades later, the Anglo-Dutch
Consortium Shell D'Archy 43

entered the stage.
1937.

The company's search for oil

in Nigeria began in

The operations of this group were also
disrupted by the
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second world war.

However, In 1956
perseverence and effort paid
off
and oil was discovered in
promising quantities at
Oloibiri in Jenagoe
Province.
This find was rapidly
developed and two years
later and an
expenditure of 25M (British
pounds Sterling), Nigeria
was in
the oil business. 44 At
that time the government
and the company came
to an agreement that
profits which might derive
from the company's
activities should be divided on
a 50/50 basis which
was in line with
prevailing international practice.
Initial agreements were
quite
elementary, reflecting the
assymetry of bargaining strengths,
with
oil companies of course
enjoying the advantage.
In fact, serious

interpretation of available data
indicated a process of unequal
exchange.
Today, the 50/50 sharing
agreement has subsequently
been modified in favor of the
government.

For instance, by the

present equity share the government
receives 98.2 percent of the
profit while the companies get 1.8
percent based on 60/40 joint-

venture agreement.

Subsequent modification, creation of new
agreements has

substantially transformed the government
position from one of
unequal

partner to

one of comfortable, full-fledged actor,

reflecting among others, historical
developments which confer
advantage.

The government position gradually was
transformed from

one of bargaining inferiority to that of
roughly equal strength based
on the fact that hegemony favoring oil companies
gave way to direct

bargaining phase and finally to tacit-response phase.

These
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chronological adaptation of
the history of global
0ll reflects
eroding of the powers of
the oil co m panies and
a massive transfer
of instruments of power
to producer-governments.
The transfer of
Power and how it operated
was analyzed earlier in
this chapter,
and in the Nigerian context
such a state was reached
largeiy through
political means and by the
instrumental role played by
high level

^

bureaucrats whose contributions
remain highly controversial
even up
to the present.
In Nigeria where pluralism
is most pronounced but
where

autocratic tendencies flourish,
choice of instruments and
techniques
in the planning process
usually tend to be formulated
and presented
by high-level bureaucrats
in morsels of unquestionable
dogma.
This
means that the conduct of policy
usually entails "disagreeable
debates and controversies conducted
in terms of personal abuse
with
a

conflict of personalities and largely
by those who cannot fully

appreciate the meaning of the great
45
issues at stake,"
because there
has always been a conflict of
interest between the "political

class"

and the bureaucrats.
The political class in Nigeria "is
not articulate" and

consequently policy formulation and execution
has largely been
left solely to the bureaucratic regime
legitimized by occasional and

incoherent compromises forged in concert with
the ruling or political
class.

The result was that policies formulated took
bureaucratic

forms and imperatives, and popular participation
when possible and

desirable denied.

Bureaucratic dominance naturally led to several
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abuses of power and corruption,
and resulted accidentally
in the
complete control of the
machinery of government.
Thus, the bureaucratic group drawn fro. the
intellectual and professional
class play
a disproportionately
significant role in the
determination of
development objectives particularly
where the political class
is not
46
articulate.

Bureaucratic dominance of policy
formulation
dangerous in

a

is

country so diverse and large
as Nigeria.

highly
In the

process, the Nigerian character
was subdued and bureaucracy
inevitably
became an instrument of national
policy.
The abdication of the powers
of policy formulation by the
then military government (who
presumably
are the guardians of national
growth and welfare) to a bunch of
self-

seeking bureaucrats constitutes
one of the most political mistakes
in the history of the Republic
and invariably destroys the
legitimate

participation of the body politic in
affairs which determine their
future.

This abdication is dangerous because
the spirit of policy

and that of bureaucracy are diametrically
opposed.

The essence of

policy is its contingency and accommodation;
its success depends on
the "correctness of an estimate which
in part is conjectural."

But

that of bureaucracy is its quest for "safety"
and calculabil ity

based on

a

given legislative mandate.

In

this sense, policy

involves an adjustment of risks and demands; administration
an

avoidance of deviation.
Analyzing the role of the bureaucrat in policy formulation
and execution of development objectives in Nigeria is necessary
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'
.

because one cannot understand
fully how critical
decisions
(especially those on petroleum
matters) are arrived at,
unless a
thorough analysis is made
of the bureaucrat and
his power in the
government machinery.
I„ other words
,
negotiations

^^

m

N.geria can be analyzed and
understood when the significant
role
Played by the bureaucrat is
considered because apparently
they were
and still are the main
actors.
The kind of game Nigerian
"planners" decided to play in
dealings
with international oil
companies was not one of bold
maneuver
which risked prudence and
caution on a quick checkmate.
Rather,
it was deliberate, cunning
and purposeful; a game where
the

advantage lay in

a

gradual transformation of the
position, in which

the opponents moves were utilized
first to paralyze him and then

force him into submission.

It was a game whose daring
resided in

the protection and advantages of
an alliance through which it
has
to by played, when one wrong
move might mean disaster and loss of

confidence might spell isolation.
The principles

with the conviction that

of the game have been formulated and
executed
a

transformation of the government position

on matters concerning her natural

and sensible.

resources was indeed necessary

The need for transformation reflects the
urgent need

on the part of the government to maximize
benefits from natural

resource extraction.
It is a common knowledge however that several

resource-rich

nations of the "third world" do not have the financial
and

technological base to exploit those resources.
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In order to tap those
resources, nations have
resorted to

either one or all of the
following basic methods:
1)

undertake joint ventures in
which foreign investors
supply
management and technology and
markets as well as a portion
of the capital - with remaining
capital furnished by the
host country,

2)

institute management contracts
whereby experienced foreign

corporations offer management and
technology only, and the
host nation supplies the capital
and tries to market the product,
3)

do without foreign participation
entirely and furnish

management and technology, capital and
markets itself.
The British colonial government in
Nigeria, as "soleowner"

of petroleum minerals in Nigeria
implemented the first method. 47
But the government of the independent
Republic of Nigeria presently

employs options

2

and 3.

However, at various points in the negotiating
process, Nigeria
has demanded from the oil

the package deal

companies options

1,

2,

and

3

depending on

presented by companies and more importantly depending

on how government negotiators perceive each
deal.

options as guidelines for her oil

Reliance on these

industry was not completely

attractive to the government of Nigeria and governing legislation
for
petroleum operations in the country contained in Mineral Oil Ordinance
(Chapter 135) and its subsequent amendments as well as Petroleum
Decree

51

were published on November 27, 1969.

.
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Petroleum Decree

51

seems to be the most
important and perhaps

the most powerful government
pronouncement on petroleum matters
up
to date.
It repealed some of the
previous scattered legislation
and
provided for petroleum rights
under defined terms. 48
Decree 51
also made it clear that "no
further" petroleum mining
rights
be granted and that henceforth
all

rights would be granted in
the form

of production contracts through
the government's national
oil company. 49
Furthermore, the decree provided that
"special terms and conditions" including government participation
and "special provisions
applying
to any national

gas discovery"

-

may be imposed on

a

prospecting

license of mining lease "if considered
to be in the public interest."

Existing rights were allowed to remain
in force at the government's
discretion.
A clear definition of government's
policy and purpose was

therefore instrumental and influential in
determining the future
course of oil exploitation in Nigeria.

In addition,

clarity of

purpose had tremendous impact in the formulation
and execution of
policy by high-level bureaucrats, and also in
preparations for

strategic bargaining and negotiations with the international
oil
companies
Following the drastic changes in concession terms which began
in the Middle East in 1970, Nigeria,

following such example and trend,

transformed her position into one of advantage.

The 1970s ushered in

an era of increased production and increased revenue and consequently

of boom for Nigeria.

The 1970s also represented an era of increased

'
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dynamism in the Nigerian oil
industry

characterized largely

by the direct-type negotiating
strategy.

Nigeria's entry into the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in July 1971
gave tremendous boost and
impetus to
her bargaining position
within the international oil
industry.
In
fact, Nigeria's entry into
OPEC had an immediate impact
on her bargaining
position.
Not only was she able in the
short run to enjoy the wealth
of OPEC experiences which
proved tremendously helpful in
the series

of participation agreements
reached with various oil companies,
the
huge increases in the price of oil
during the 1973 Yom Kippur War
swelled her treasury.

Before 1973, the top quality Bonny
Crude was

selling for less that $3 per barrel; in
January 1981, it hit the
record high of $44 per barrel on the
spot market.

Thus between

1977 and 1980, Nigeria earned $53.4 billion
as oil revenues.

Before 1971, Nigeria's control of its oil
industry was

virtually nil.

Oil

companies were given free hand to operate the

industry as they saw fit and the country "drew
whatever small revenues
were offered."
into OPEC, all

After 1971,

and immediately after accepting membership

these measures changed.

The nation has taken greater

control of the oil operations in terms of participation
and equity

share-holding, expatriate
of local manpower.

quota and the employment and training

Major steps such as these have contributed

immensely to confidence building measures which the nation enjoys.
Before she joined the organization, Nigeria relied mostly on
the traditional concession and contract agreements with international
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oil

companies for the production and
disposal of her crude oil.
Recently, "innovative" agreements
such as production-sharing
and

service contracts regimes, drawn
upon the pool of international

knowledge and experience, has
dominated contractual agreements.
general, these innovative contracts
are designed to reflect the

In

growing strength of producer-government
and the gradual erosion
of the powers of international oil
companies.

This has been so with

Nigeria and indeed with major, mature
oil producing countries.
Since her inception into OPEC, Nigeria
has achieved enormous powers
and advantages over the oil companies
which represented an important

step toward the fulfillment of her
economic development plans.

However,

on several occasions, these triumphs
have proved to by pyrrhic

victories.
Several major concession regimes and contracts
concluded

during the 1970s reflected for the most part the
increasing strength
of the government and her ability to transform
without much

difficulty

a

stated position.

Moreover, elements of independence have

been judiciously created and where necessary have displaced
foreign

establishments or have, when complete displacement is impossible,
entered into joint- venture arrangements.

The aggressive stance of the

government stems in part from her increased sophisticated knowledge
of the intricacies of the global oil and perhaps more importantly on
the international

knowledge and experience on which the majority of

her agreements have been drawn and based.
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The nature of agreements
concluded with major oil
producers
indicate attests at following
closely those arrived at
with OPEC and
Us members. This trend increasingly
reflects the importance
of membersh,p ties to this
organization by the government
of Nigeria, but
recently, arguments abound
within governmental circles
whether OPEC
as a cartel is indisposable
to the needs of Nigeria.
In other words
Nigerians membership in
OPEC became controversial.
Several authoritative
figures have voiced "we do
not need OPEC," but I
argue that Nigeria
does need her membership
,„ the organization.
A short survey of major
agreements reached by the
government and significant
international
oil

companies will undoubtedly shed
light on the various arguments.
However, before this can be
done, it is necessary to
take a look at
the major agreements.
In April

1971,

terms of

a

five-year agreement on oil revenues

were agreed "in substance"
between Nigeria's government and
Shell/
British Petroleum, the nation's
major oil producer. A new clause
refers to "a new schedule of producer
capital allowances" under which
Nigeria reduced capital expenditure
that companies may offset against
tax liability.

The overall effect may be to reduce
capital

allowances by between ten and fifteen
percent.
will

be granted for companies operating
offshore such as Mobil,

Texaco and Gulf, which have more

production costs than companies

operating onshore, such as Shell-BP.
a

Effect of reductions

pattern set in Teheran and Libya. 50

The agreement closely follows
A new posted price for

Nigerian 34-gravity API crude was fixed at $3.41
per barrel.

This
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represents an increase of
85* over basic posted
price of $2.36 fixed
Septenber 1970. The new
agreement also contains
the 2 h percent

m

'

escalation rate to insure
against
yarns* inflatinn
mriation and 5* per barrel
annual
price increase from January
'udry 197^
iy/j.
a lrv
A
10* per barrle with
2<£ annual
increase premium for sulphur
ui^nur is also
akn nar+
part of *u
the agreement because
of low sulphur quality
of Nigerian crude.

™

On May 3,

1971, the five-year oil

"settlement" was signed.

It was

patterned almost identically
on the 1971 Libyan
settlement except
for the temporary freight
premium which was established
at 9 cents/bbl.
Libya's freight premium was
set at 6 cents/bbl.
The Nigerian
settlement is effective on March
20, 1971 just as the Tripoliagreement, and includes the same
10* low-sulphur premium
escalating
upwards
annually, the same temporary
short-haul premium (adjusted
for Nigeria's geographical posi
tion) the same inflation
escalation

U

,

provisions and the same rise in the
base tax rate from fifty percent
to fifty five percent. 51
These new arrangements, although
it undercut significantly
the profit base of major oil
companies, nevertheless kept the

companies operating in Nigeria.

This is because many economic and

political factors influence oil company
operations in the country.

These include, but are not limited to,

assured access to crude oil,

rate and extent of exploration, rate and
extent of sector development,

financial arrangements with the government, rate
of production and
level of output,

transfer of skills and technology, sharing of
financial

returns, pricing and so on.

the case of Shell-BP
operations in Nigeria,
these factors
have contributed to the
forging and establishment
of linkage"
In

meChan1Sm Wh6reby

3

10SS in the "upstream"
operations is compensated

with a gain in "downstream"
operations in Nigeria and
elsewhere.
This
made possible by the
vertical network of
corporate arrangement
and by the interlocking
directorates among international
petroleum
companies which made it
possible for the "establishment
of a common

-

oil

policy throughout the world."

Thus,

a

loss in Nigeria could

translate into a gain in
Indonesia, for example,
and vice-versa
Moreover, ownership of factors
of production and
distribution is
"shared." Such a network of
joint ownership obviously
provided
opportunity, and even necessity,
for joint action. 52
In fact, a temporary
setback for Shell-British
Petroleum

has not discouraged her
from exploring and producing
Nigerian oil

because the company's strategy
has been mainly one of
access and
assured production of crude
oil.
In addition, as Pearson has
pointed
out, concrete economic
factors include the location
and quality of

Nigerian crude.

Advantages of location include
both international

shipping charges and security
of supply routes. 53

Therefore, it is

understandable why Shell-BP including
other oil "majors" are very
much interested in Nigerian crude
even at exorbitant prices, which

occasionally go beyond the official
postings of OPEC.

Despite the

price hike, the activities of Shell-BP
logistically and otherwise
have increased dramatically.
Like most oil companies, Shell-British
Petroleum has

a

vast

collection of diverse affiliates with different
functions operating
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in

different countries
tries both
hnth

operations.

m

+u
the

»

"upstream" and "downstream"

These include
exploration and production,
refining

operations, petrochemical,
sh1ppl„ g and
distribution of products
research and deve lo pment.
Although major oil
companies pl ace a
great
deal of entasis and
Importance on access
to crude oH
production,
when access proves
unprofitable, recuperation
usually follows with
enormous profits made
fro. downstream
operations such as refining
of crude oil and
petro-chemlcals.
Therefore, Investment
patterns of major
companies tend to
be highly diversified.
The
head nff,v„
me nead
office of ^
the entire "integrated"
operation systematically
iy reassess its
it* ni^,,
global marketing position
and
then reallocates
production to its various
producing areas by
choosing the most promising
and profitable investment
alternatives.
In this; the overriding
strategy is to maximize
profits on a global
scale. Christooher
Tugendhat observes that oil companies
are not
philanthropic organizations, nor
are they for the most part
instruments of government policy.
They are independent
commercial concerns
trying to make money. 54

Corporate directors and executives
have this notion of healthy
return on investment before them
while making investment decisions.
Host governments normally are
aware of this need and tailor their
own
demands during negotiations in such
a way as to control and
check

profits earned by companies.

This attitude has on many occasions

given rise to reciprocal demand intensity
whereby both parties are bent
on achieving the best possible
results on given set of bargaining
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issues.

Inevitably, the central
question

edging

fr 0m this situation

is, What will

be the benefit-to-cost
ratio that is simultaneously
acceptable to each agent? 55

The directors of Shell-BP
in Nigeria over the
years have been
"Pushing" for increased crude
oil output - a concession
the government

granted in return for increased
royalty payments.

Though head offices

Plan globally so as to balance
supply and demand, in the
case of
Nigeria, production has been
geared toward maximum output,
but during
time of "glut," exploration
has been halted requiring
the government
to grant tax incentives for
a renewed effort.
This was so in 1977
when the government was forced
to "arrest the decline in
oil exploration activity by granting several
incentives." 56 However, keenly

aware that petroleum is

a

wasting asset and that current world
prices

are affected by oversupply, some
Nigerians, anxious to make the

best possible use of potential oil
revenues to spur agricultural and
industrial development, have called for
restraints upon production
in

the short term. 57

It is enough to say that oil companies
through

coordinated effort, deliberately reduce production
maximize profits.

in

a

concerted,

order to

However, this trend does not entirely capture

Shell -BP's long-term investment goal

in Nigeria where total

investment

currently, according to British financial circles,, approximates
or
varies from

210 million (Financial Times) to

(British pound Sterling).
as possible,

600 million

58

The strategy is to produce as much oil

refine some at home base and most abroad and then in turn
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resale the refined crude and
allied products at exorbitant
profits
to Nigeria and other buyers.
This lucrative business
continued
until

Nigerian government nationalized
British Petroleum.

Before
"Nigeria's axe fell," British
Petroleum was getting 2.4 million
barrels per day from all sources,
so it could afford to
resell

400,000 barrels per day after

2

million barrels per day must
have

gone to satisfy her internal demands,
Nigeria's chop cuts out

240,000 barrels per day, leaving
resale.

a

mere 160,000 barrels per day
to

The 240,000 barrels per day
nationalized was sold in the

"spot market."

Monty Pennell, BP's deputy chairman
predicted this

will act as a "destabil ization
factor" on world oil
did, but however the effect seemed
trivial

prices.

59
It

since the excess figure

represented what BP would have at any rate
sold to customers all
be it on contract basis.

Another major agreement was between the government
of Nigeria
and Elf's Safrap under which the company
"is to be allowed to resume

operations in association with the government, which
will acquire

a

35 percent interest in the Company, scaled to rise later
to 50 percent

One important feature of this agreement and all
others is the

provision for government "participation" and ultimately
control of
oil

operations.

The government announced in 1972 that no further

rights would be granted under Decree

51

and that henceforth all

rights would be granted in the form of production-sharing contracts
and service contracts through the government's national oil company.
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By decree of April
27, 1971, the Nigerian
National Oil
Company (now Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation, NNPC)
was
established.
This organization, although
it "had no statutory
duty
to regulate and supervise
the operations of the
oil industry in Nigeria
nevertheless became the instrument
with which the government
was able
to concretely carry out
her participation policy.
NNOC requested
thirty five percent participation
in 1973 from operating
oil companies
in Nigeria, and in
1975 raised its request to fifty
five percent and
in 1979 to sixty percent.
Most companies, including Agip,
Marathon,

Texaco/Chevron, Phillips, Mobil, and
others signed "agreements of
assent to participation" in early
1974.
The policy became effective
April

1,

1974, and "covers all

production."

Under the agreement,

the government obtained fifty five
percent participation, but allowed

producers options to buy up to 86.25
percent of total production. 61
In

pursuit furthermore of Decree 27, NNOC
was empowered to enter into

contract or partnership with any company,
firm or person, who, in its
opinion, will

"facilitate the discharge of its duty."

Negotiations

as a result became more difficult
and protracted because the

national oil corporation "shall have powers
to do anything which in its

opinion is calculated to facilitate the carrying
out of its duties"
and because the "Commissioner" was granted
62
enormous powers.

Enormous and unproperly defined powers inevitably led
to finding
faults where there was none and consequently some of these

participation agreements were slow to finalize.

Texaco and Standard

of California announced final agreement on fifty five percent
only
in January 1978.
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Safrap Agreement was
signed 1n 1972
1,81

—

thl>ty

"»^««

Under

.

in

^

§

^^^
an

was obtained to be
Increased 1„ stages to
.
the JO int venture's
crude oi, production
reaches

„ f Satrap's
interest

^

400,000 barrels per

percentage has been review
*
revised *n
to sixty
percent in conformity
with
the general

rule.

By far, the most
controversial of these
agreements was signed
with Ashland Oil (Nigeria)
Ltd., on 3une 12,
1973.
This agreement
^sed on new innovative concession
regime known as production
sharing
described earlier in this
chapter.
Nigerian National Petroleum

»

Corporation (NNPC)l actina
acting on behalf
hohaif „*
of *u
the government appoints
Ashland
Oil Company to conduct
petroleum operations. Ashland
bears

exploration costs "and has
economic interest in development
of crude
oil deposits in the
contract area." The company
also bears risks if
no commercial discovery
is made.
Proceeds from the sale of
up to
forty percent of crude oil
produced,

known as "cost oil," is set
aside

for the recovery of
capital

operating expenses.

invested by Ashland and the
company's

A percentage of the remaining
part is set aside

for the payment of all

fiscal dues by Ashland.

The net remaining is

shared between the government
and Ashland in the ratio of 65-35

percent basis for output of up to
50,000 barrels per day and 70-30
percent basis if output exceeds
50,000 barrels per day.

Although government's policy on new
agreements were in general
tough, and although government
officials followed prudent measures
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on negotiating deals,
Ashland agreements were
embroiled in
controversy.
It was generally
thought Ashland earned a
better deal
by enjoying the uniquely
newly introduced marketing
commission on

specified quantity of NNPC oil
disposed by the company.
Moreover,
Ashland secured access to
the much needed low sulphur
Nigerian crude
for a comfortable period of
time which under older
concession regimes
would have otherwise been
difficult.
Although it is because of the
"measure of its success" in
Indonesia (which pioneered it),
that

production-sharing was adopted by
Nigeria and by other major
country
producers, advantages went to Ashland
because "the overall management
of petroleum operations by the
State" which is one of the
provisions
of production sharing regime, was
left largely to Ashland Company
due to technical reasons.
Nigerian planners presently have
not,
unfortunately, mastered the intricacies
of petroleum production
technology.

Although the state legally retains
overall management

control, in practice, the oil company
exercises day-to-day control.
A major reason for the adoption
of production-sharing contracts and

service-contracts by the government of Nigeria
was because of the
political significance of the new legal
arrangements which was

a

factor in quieting informed public opinion
on issues of petroleum

concession regimes.

Although in practice, the control of the

petroleum operations tended to remain in the hands of the
contractor,
the ownership factor was not without significance. 63

The essence

of these innovative contracts was its attractiveness based
on the
notion of national control.

At a time when calls for "natural

.
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resource ideology" became

a

cliche, production sharing
and service

contracts were engaged largely
to cement the politics
of transformation and add legitimacy
to this transformation.
Indeed Nigerian
public opinion needed that,
and the notion of control
became
synonymous with supervisory
effectiveness and efficiency.
In pursuit of her policy
of diversifying agents for
the

country's crude oil production,
Nigeria also granted an oil
Prospecting License No. 90 to
Occidental Petroleum of Nigeria

commencing October

1,

1971

and good for five years.

This, of course,
was subject to the Petroleum
Decree 1969 and the regulation
there-

under.

This agreement was the joint
venture type and different
from
the more innovative types
described above. The government,
through
its agent, the NNPC, participates
in an undivided working interest

with Occidental

in the proportion of fifty
one percent for the

government and forty nine percent for
Occidental.
is

This arrangement

different from innovative methods because
"all investments, costs

and expenses of operations borne by
in proportion to respective

percentages interest provided" however, until
discovery of petroleum
in commercial

quantities Occidental shall advance all funds
necessary

and shall be solely responsible for all

investments, costs and

expenses
Unlike the production sharing agreements of Ashland Oil
Company, arrangements with Occidental place enormous financial

burdens on the company while the government retains

of operations.

a

de jure control

Occidental's strategy has been one of gaining access
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to Nigeria's oil

based on

fields, and although the
financial rewards are

gating

the deal.

instincts, the company
nevertheless went along with

An unprecedented loss on
the company's side will,
of

course, be written off as tax
deductible in the parent country.
Therefore, on the whole, the
arrangements were attractive
because from
discovery of petroleum in commercial
qunatities, NNPC shall pay

currently its share of all investments,
costs and expenses, 64

and

Occidental won the right of management
and "as operator" of the

joint venture.
In general,

the outcome of negotiations
leading to agreements

tend to depend on the nature of
demands made or not made by participants.

However,

crucial

variables alter the bargaining situation
and strength of

I

submit that the presence or absence
of certain

either participant in the negotiation
process.

It

is

evident that

company's operations in both resource and
product markets are
often influenced by impositions made, or
not made, by the government
of Nigeria.

Conversely, it is clear that company's operations

in

the country is dependent on how favorable
the country's commercial

and foreign investment laws are to it.
in bargaining between actors

This situation, thus, results

in which each negotiating agent is

intent upon obtaining the most preferred conditions.

Nigeria, investment and commercial
oil

However, in

laws have been most favorable to

companies who are exempted from the several rounds of

"indigenization" decree.
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This is, of course,
not to argue that
negotiations and

arrangements in Nigeria's oil
industry have been smooth
and
of conflicts demands
and factors.
Intense bargaining and
characterize it, and usually
bargaining in these situations
the perception of a desired
position or an outcome
dually
to negotiators.

"maximizes"

a

Participants juggle for

a

devoid

negotiations
involves

acceptable

position which enhances or

"desired state of affairs"
in which the perceived

benefits outweigh costs.

This realtionship which
approximates the

direct-response phase of negotiation,
is typical of the
bargaining
model developed by several
65
writers.
The central focus of the bargaining model is upon the impact
the variables of impatience,
flexibility, dependency and
reciprocal demand intensity have
on
the cost-to-benefit ratio
established in a bargaining situation.
The suspicious nature of government
officials, initially

unaware of the many complexities
surrounding the international

petroleum industry, have combined lack
of oil experience with

very

a

justifiable feeling of rationalistic
caution regarding foreign
exploitation of
not

a

a

depleting natural asset.

This view that oil

is

"lasting natural asset" and- therefore one has
to make the

maximum out of it dominated the mentality of
Nigerian oil planners
and negotiators.

Because oil is

a

much needed commodity, Nigerian

negotiators were extremely patient in negotiating oil
deals with
international oil companies operating within the country.

Nigeria is first and foremost

a

In addition,

rich agricultural country, 66 and

this fact gave the Nigerian authorities added boosts and
more

bargaining chips in the
negotiating process.

They know that if
the

sector falters, recourse
to agricultural
sector is inevitable
Unfortunately, the faith
placed on agricultural
production has been
0,1

-Placed

and distorted.

Agricultural sector is
performing dismally

Poor and paradoxically this
sector has proved to be
the Achilles Heel
of Nigeria at the
negotiation tables.
Nigeria has to feed her

teeing millions;

the authorities know this,
the oi, company

are made to reach agreements
with these companies with
the necessity
for averting national
catastrophe. The perils of
not reaching

agreements are compounded by the
fact that Nigeria is
nation and hence needs every
dime of the oil revenue.

a

developing
Nevertheless,

efforts are always made at
extracting the maximum concession
from
the oil companies by insisting
on reaching the "bargaining
reference"
(that which is reasonable to
seek) based on internal and
global

conditions of the oil industry.
Nigeria's entrance into OPEC was

a

giant step into

realizing substantially the dreams,
power and wealth which comes with
ownership and production of petroleum,
but she has, on several

occasions, broken ranks with this
organization fundamentally on

matters affecting national interests
and security.

On the fence

posture of Nigeria regarding her membership
in OPEC reflects the

acrimonious fact that membership has "remained
an issue of public
debate" and very controversial ever since the
country joined the
"cartel."

This shaky relationship has been largely so
because of
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the topsy-turvy nature of the
international oil

industry and because

Nigeria which has, since the
"oil boom" depended
precariously on the
oil sector as the major
source of foreign exchange and
development
finance, have on several occasions
experienced "many ups and downs"
in the oil enterprise.
Dependence on OPEC (an organization
dominated
by Arab states) for crucial
and sensitive policy decisions
simply
did not augur well for Nigeria.

And right from her inception
into the

organization, skepticisms, debates and
controversies have characterized
her membership, and occasionally,
questions from respectable
quarters have been heard on whether Nigeria
needed OPEC membership,

dismissing in effect, the benefits and
costs inherent in being

member of OPEC.

Clearly,

as an institutional

a

a

necessity for choice exists; dismissing OPEC

burden is not

a

logical

step or alternative to

follow in situations calling for reflection.
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC)
was formed on September 9, 1960 as "an act of
protest... a revolt against
67
the highhandedness of the multinational oil
companies,"
who

have kept oil prices "artificially low."

One of the functions of

the organization is therefore to ensure a fair price to
oil and

"such price shall

that oil

is

be determined by the government.

and will

1,68

Realizing

be an important commodity to advanced industrial

nations and that the supply of this commodity is limited, the

thirteen countries which make up the Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries have been bargaining from positions of enormous
strength.

In

addition to possessing the preponderant share of the
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Free World petroleum reserves
and accounting for nearly
ninety
percent of the oil moving
into world markets, the
OPEC countries
"have banded together to
form a highly effective
bargaining unit in
dealings with major oil companies.
However, OPEC nations may or
may
not be able to maintain their
cohesiveness in future years." 69

But what is OPEC? and why has
the organization been a
fascinating subject of study for
political scientists, economists
as well as statesmen?

We shall begin to answer
these questions by

mentioning the various stages of the
development of that organization,
its behavior within these
various stages, taking into
consideration
four fundamental theories explaining
behavior.
Conventional wisdom
endorses the view that OPEC is a
cartel.
But what kind of cartel is
it?

We make the distinction between
ordinary commercial oligopolies

or cartels and political cartels
organized by intergovernmental

solidarity.

We believe although international oil
has undeniable

economic consequences, economic considerations
tend to serve
political

goals.

Depending on how one characterizes OPEC and
the

consuming nations, events in global oil

is

best understood as an

interplay of competing interests and we would wish
to emphasize on
the uncertainties and complexities which characterize
the global
oil

industry.

Following

a

conference held in Baghdad in September 1960,

the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was

established by the then five major producer countries:
Iran, Kuwait,

Iraq and Venezuela.

Saudi Arabia,

Events that led to the formation

.
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of this organization included
the realization that the
price of oil
has been kept "artificially
low" by producing oil
companies.
Producer
governments became gradually aware
also that substantial economic
rents from the world oil market
could accrue to them if they
pressed
demands.
In addition, and perhaps
the most important feature
in explaining OPEC behavior is that
"OPEC would no longer allow
its fate
to be tied to the world oil
market but rather would insist
upon
being insulated from the market." 70

Hence the use of "shadow prices"

as a basis for tax payments to
producer governments.

Market conditions, as James

M.

limited" OPEC's set of possible action.

Griffin pointed out, "greatly
71

A surplus of oil

flooded

the world market and the emergence of
new oil producers aggravated
the situation further.

Thus neither OPEC protests, nor
subsequent

negotiations with the oil companies restored
prices to the former
level

s

By the early 1970s, however, demand of oil
outstripped

supply and OPEC's strength increased dramatically.
systemic developments were put in motion:

Thus three major

Participation

(1)

arrangements, (2) Production controls, (3) Changes in
the tax
structure.

Libya, under Colonel Gaddafi, spearheaded the drive for

more government revenue.

In

order to strengthen its bargaining

position, the Libyan government ordered

a

series of production

cutbacks, and won out over Occidental Oil Company which was "singled
out" for pressure.

Libyan success sent waves of protests over the

entire Gulf region and "leap frogging" became

a

regular feature
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of oil negotiations.

The Libyan negotiations
thus were of critical

importance to the entire
structure of international
oil pricing. 72
Between December 9-12,
1970, OPEC countries met
in Caracas,
Venezuela and adopted Resolution
Number XX 1120 which called
for a
fifty five percent tax rate
for all member countries
as well as various

other adjustments.

Major concessions were won
from the oil

companies under the terms of the
following negotiated agreements:
Date

Agreement

February 1971

April

1971

June 1971

Countries involved

Teheran

Abu Dhabi, Iran, Iraq
Kuwait, Qatar, and
Saudi Arabia

Tripol

Libya

i

Mediterranean

Saudi Arabia and Iraq

January 1972

Geneva

Abu Dhabi, Iran, Iraq
Kuwait, Qatar and
Saudi Arabia

December 1972

OPEC Participation

Abu Dhabi, Kuwait,
Qatar, and Saudi
Arabia

March 1973

Iranian Consortium

Iran

June 1973

Geneva Supplemental

Abu Dhabi

Kuwait,
,
Iran, Iraq, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia

The Teheran agreement provided for an average

immediate increase in government take escalating to
In addition,

30<t

50<t

per barrel

by 1975.

"its provisions constituted a "binding settlement"
on

the parties for five years for the purposes of establishing
security of

supply and stable financial arrangements.

This agreement lasted for

only six months after which fresh negotiations
started.

li

Teheran
Tripoli

Agreed

settles

governs

was closely followed
by

which resulted in an

take of 65* per barrel.

Mediate

a

March 20, 197,

increase in Libyan

This increase is
on the average

about 20« to 30. per
barrel higher than what
the government achieved
in September and
October of 1970.
The Geneva and OPEC
participation Agreements
were unique
and very much unlike
Teheran and Tripoli,
Geneva agreement
adjusted for the ,971 U.S.
dollar devaiuation. The
Supp,ementa,
version increased the posted
price to adjust for the
second U.S.

do„ar devaluation.

The Participation Agreement
provided the host

countries with a twenty five
percent equity in the companies'
operations to be increased gradually
to fifty one percent by
1982.
These percentages act only
as guidelines; members
of the organization
retain the right under Djakarta
Agreement of 1963 to demand what
percentage suited the national
interest.
Thus in Nigeria, this

percentage escalated to sixty
percent while in Saudi Arabia it
is
one hundred percent.
On October 16,

1973, just days after the outbreak
of the fourth

Arab-Israeli war, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Iraq, Qatar, Iran and Abu
Dhabi declared themselves to-be
"sole arbiters" of price and

unilaterally raised their crude oil
posted price by an average
of $1.99 to $5.00 per barrel.
the Teheran Agreement.

This increase effectively nullified

Other OPEC members subsequently announced

similar increases.
In

November 1973, the international oil companies
protested

this unilateral OPEC action.

But it was clear that the era of negotiated

189

Pricing had come to an end.

Shortly after this,
there was

one

a

hundred thirty percent hike
in the posted price
of oil to $11 65
While the origin of the
Arab oil embargo was
political, the international
supply crisis it created
drove up market prices
and while OPEC did
not raise international
oil prices in 1974,
member countries
continued to raise international
oil

prices.

revolution and the subsequent
Iran-Iraq War

By 1980, the Iranian

sent prices to over $32

per barrel and considerable
differences of opinion, arose over
the

appropriate price increase among
OPEC members.

OPEC, argues Fereidum

Fesharaki, has never any clear,
long term policy but to get
the best
price it could given the various
systemic constraints, 73 and neither
did the members agree on any
unified pricing schedule. The
question
of differential pricing schedule
has been a very difficult one
and despite millions of dollars
and uncountable computer time

devoted to this issue, there never was
answers.
Inspite of these problems, OPEC recognizes
immediate and
long term prospects of the global oil
market.

dangers of flooding

a

Realizing the

soft-market with oil, OPEC has prudently

instituted production cut-backs and quotas to
shore up
market.
until

a

sagging

The present $29 per barrel of OPEC oil seems
to hold

1985, however,

the OPEC group must contend with non-OPEC

producers who are increasingly cutting. into the market
once held by
OPEC.
This brings us to the question of OPEC behavior.

really

a

cartel?

We think it is

a

Is

OPEC

cartel with the same goals as
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any other but
cartel

a

different sort.

An exhaustive analysis
of OPEC as a

is well

beyond the scope of this
work, but we do believe
that
several energy experts have
argued it is not. Several
theories have
been advanced - some useful,
others merely polemical explaining
OPEC behavior.
We examine some of these
theories while conceding that
theories designed solely to
predict behavior have inherent
limits
to success or failure.

For these purposes, we
examine models of OPEC

behavior, advanced by James
th61> b00k

>

Griffin and David

J.

OPECjm^eha^^

the authors categorize model
(1)

M.

Teece in
(1982)>

behavior into two major groups:

Wealth-maximizing models and,(2)

Nonweal th-Maximizing

Models.

These categories are further broken
down as shown:

Monopoly: Dominant Producer M o de 1
Weal th-Maximizing Models

Competition: Property Rights Model

Target Revenue Model

Nonweal th-Maximizing Models

/

NPol itical Models
The monopoly or dominant producer model sees Saudi
Arabia

OPEC member with the largest oil reserve

-

in

-

the

the role of setting

price allowing the other producers the option of selling
"all they

wish."

Thus essentially, Saudi Arabia is the "swing producer"

capable of absorbing fluctuations on demand and supply in the world
market in order to maintain monopoly price.

The Property Rights model
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attributes the dramatic increase
in the price of oil
before and after
1973/74 to the change in ownership
patterns which began in the
early
1970s.

However, it could not explain
the equally dramatic

doubling of oil prices in
1978/79.
models for answers.

Thus we look closer to
other

Target revenue model posits
that production

and pricing decisions are
made with reference to the
requirements
of national budgets.
But we do know that several
OPEC members

including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
have produced oil in excess
of
what they need to meet national
development budget. This model
is a more

adequate description of OPEC behavior
in the short run

than in the long run.

models.

This brings us to the last model

-

Political

While economic wealth or determinism
is important, it

the sole factor in guiding decisions.

is not

From the view of OPEC

nations, while wealth maximizing models
seem

a

guide through global

oil market, the overriding factor
in the disposition of their oil

political

influence and security.

is

Theodore Moran makes this point

in the context of Saudi Arabia
political

decision-making process. 74

We argue that although wealth-maximizing
models seem

important in determining energy policies of
producer-governments, they
only serve long range political goals
models.

-

goals which embody political

Dealings in international oil is thus generally political

in nature.

These models should attempt measuring not so much wealth

an OPEC member might make in the world oil market, but the power
to

control, to nationalize, and the power to cut production and set
prices.

OPEC nations, unlike other cartels with rigid agreements on
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Prices, production controls
and market shares,
merely agree on
production quotas and on
the price of OPEC
marker crude oil.
Ordinary
commercial cartels can
easily incur the wrath
of puhlic consumers
and the disciplinary
p owe rs of governments
under which they operateOPEC cartel is an
association of sovereign,
independent nations with
no central authority
to account to, and with
a large segment
of
world public opinion in
support of the call for
a New International
Economic Order.
The formation of OPEC largely
meant the effective control
of
"ember nations over their
natural petroleum reserves
and this control
has been translated into a
success in achieving their
objectives.
OPEC is essentially a cartel;
a coalition of a
group of oil producers
whose intention is the control,
and maximization of benefits

derivable from their commodity.

In

this,

there was an implicit

assumption that there is an advantage
in banding or coming
together
over a declared purpose.
In a sellers market where
great advantage
lay in forming cartels, any
seller "who fails to attempt a
coalition
in such circumstances will
lose or, more exactly, will gain
less.
On the economic premise that
man seeks gain,

must attempt to form a coalition." 75
is

it follows that he

Coalition, in this sense,

based on "cooperative agreement" or
arrangements which assume

the possibility that two or more players
will cooperate to beat
the rest.

However, arrangements for coalition does
not

necessarily mean or imply integration of decision-making.
all,

it means

If at

integration of functional decision-making, which in
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the case of OPEC, has
occasionally been fragile.

The "logic of

isomorphism" which is understood
to underlie most need
for
77
integration
exist in OPEC only to the
extent of forging a
united front against the
"highhandedness" of the international
oil
companies.
Using as a major indicator,
the "volume of transactions"
as advocated by Karl Deutsch, 78
to determine the extent of
integration in OPEC's decision-making
structure, one finds that
volume or level of transactions
as indicators may be
misleading

because members largely act or
reach decisions on issues
largely from
the perspective of national
interest.
When decisions are mutually
or collectively arrived at, it is
not always an indication of the

harmony of national

interests; rather it is an indication
of solidarity

behind the organization which is
susceptible to "break up" when
crucial and difficult issues face her.

This single assumption

explains why the organization is presently
going through
period.

best

a

a

rough

The assertion that OPEC is about to
break up is at

premature prognosis; worst of all, it could be

anxious consumers eager to see the cartel fold
up.

I

a

cry from

submit that the

present crisis is temporary and strategical; one
where advantage
lay in gradual

transformation.

Identifying OPEC's long and short term strategy in detail
is beyond the scope of this study,

but one point is clear

-

that

major decisions reached must reflect the collective interests of the
members of the group which in many cases replace the interest of
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individual .e.bers.

In a collective
sense, OPEC,

rivalry and differences,
has managed to catalogue

despite inte,irnal
a

list of

objectives and achievements.
First, the OPEC countries
have sought to gain
control over
production and pricing decisions
of their crude oil.
These have
usually taken the for. of
service-contracts and production-sharing

agreements with each nation's
petroleum companies.

Arrangements
have been termed "innovative"
because of emphasis on "control."
In

pursuance of this, Resolution 90
demanding participation was
passed by OPEC in 1968, however,
serious negotiations to this
effect
started in 1972.
Resolution 139 permitted other
member nations
to independently negotiate
their own

"participation percentages."

Second, a remarkable success was
achieved toward increased

government revenues.

The rising royalty and tax payments
per barrel,

coupled with growing volumes of output,
are occasioning some very
large increases" in the total financial
income of the OPEC countries.
Mr.

John McLean, chairman and chief executive
officer of Continental

Oil

Company, has estimated that "in the
15-year period (1971-1985),

the total

least half

funds
a

flowing

to the OPEC countries will

trillion dollars

-

approximately nine times the amount they

received in the prior 15-year period." 79

represents the

"mos't

aggregate at

This huge transfer indeed

dramatic expansion of wealth and financial

power" ever transferred to

a

"small

group of countries."

Thirdly, the creation of what

I

have earlier termed elements

of independence gave added impetus to the need for control

.

OPEC
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countries are increasing
training their own
nationals in the
technical and managerial
skills required for
the intricacies of
the
OH business. Today, most
OPEC nations reguire
that the oil
companies employ nationals
in key operational
activities and in
prescribed percentages.
Fourth, on several
occasions, OPEC countries
have sought to use
their oil resources as a
weapon for political
purposes. Most
notable of these are the
-ceaseless agitation against
every vestige
of colonialism, neo-colonialism
and white racism" and
of the
"humiliation of the colonial
past." In some cases,
these are more
than rhetoric.
Agitation and reaction carries
weight and for the
Arabs, Nigeria and Venezuela,
the early 1970s served
as an

appropriate time to apply
"excruciating economic and
political pressureon the west.

For the Arabs, the main
beneficiaries are Israeli's

adversaries, including the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO);
in Nigeria's case, insurgent
blacks in South Africa.
Its early
effect was primarily to make
80
North-South relations even more
tense.
There are reports of Libya's
nationalization of British Petroleum

Companies
in

properties in Libya allegedly for aiding
the Shah of Iran

the "takeover of three small

islands at the mouth of the Arabian

Gulf," claimed by Arab countries.

British Petroleum was punished

because oil was used as a "weapon of Arab
self-defense."
a

No less

personality than Sheikh Zaki Yamani, the Saudi
Oil Minister, who

proclaimed openly that his country may

not expand production as

"programmed to meet the requirements of the
United States and other
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free world countries over
the next decade unless

suitable
political climate prevailed"
over the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
a

Inspite of these achievements,
which was largely possible
because of the collective will
of its members, "pronounced

differences" among OPEC members
in terms of pricing
decisions,
allocation of production "quotas,"
economic conditions and
political

ideologies, threaten the survival
and even the existence

of the organization.
More importantly, external forces
apparently would like to
see the cartel weakened or preferably
dead.

which consumes

The United States,

more than forty percent of OPEC's
oil, has

engaged extensively (both covert and
overt actions) with allies in order
to weaken the cartel.

'destroying'

damage it."

Says M.A. Adelman,

"instead of talking about

the cartel, we should take measures
to contain or

81

Although the means of inflicting damage on
the cartel

vary, a fundamental agreement among western
industrial nations is

that OPEC's power must be curtailed and contained.

Cooperative

arrangements through the International Energy Agency
(IEA) and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD),, it
was argued, could ease individual member nation's energy

difficulties, albeit temporary, and organized policies instrumentally

executed through these organs may act as
OPEC's policy.

a

united front against

197

Peter Odell reports that

By 1975, the United States conscious
of the near future
likelihood of the enormous strains in
the Western
system - has reversed its earlier,
pre-1973 policy
of seeking cooperation with the
OPEC countries.
Instead
it began to see confrontation
as the required - and
indeed the only - alternative. The
formation of the
International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974
was related
llCy aim
WaS constit ^ed as a means whereby
SnriSc richh oil-importing
tL worlds
i
the
nation's strategies and
tactics could be coordinated and strengthened
and this
indeed, is what has happened in the six
years that
have now passed since its creation. 82

U

-

In fact,

the policy aims as embodied in the IEA, inter
alia

invites policies which are geared toward exploiting
the differences
and diversity within OPEC with the aim of sowing
seeds of discord
and animosity where possible in order to ensure OPEC's
demise.

Diversity in this sense has worked precisely well to the
advantage
of the creators of IEA.

Containing OPEC's economic and political

power was the game; the strategy to this end was effectively

exploiting the internal weaknesses of firstly, the organization,
and secondly, the member nations.

And OPEC, despite avowed

solidarity and commonality of interests, became
squabbles and intrigue.

As

I

a

victim of internal

argued elsewhere, the present crisis

within the ranks of OPEC should not be readily interpreted as
leading to its demise.

To do so would mean rendering hasty judgments

devoid of concrete judicious analysis.
reveals

a

Moreover, the present crisis

period in the history of OPEC through which they must pass.
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Although divisions within OPEC run
deep, such divisions
are inevitable in one stage of its
life; this is the stage and
it should
not be confused with the possibilities
of the cartel "losing its
clout."

A day hardly passes without the
international petroleum

industry and OPEC making news.

Recently, news was that OPEC's

failure to agree on production quotas and
prices "could bring it
down."

While this has been largely true, it
reflects the needs

political and economic conditions of member
states

-

-

and the state

of global economy which has contributed its
own quota of "oil glut"
and falling prices.

Member states of OPEC have on most occasions

based their decisions and judgments on matters
affecting the

organization
at several

solely on the dictates of national interest.

Although,

points, there was a need for centralized decision-making

within OPEC on specific issues, such as the allocation
of production
quotas and the maintenance of specific or established prices,
and

although each member "agreed to
a

sham."

a

quota," the "pact proved to be

Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Venezuela and Iran all exceed their

ceilings.

Desperate to boost output and revenues, they started

cheating on price as well.
In

this context,

I

dwell on Nigeria and her role in the

organization, exploring and analyzing the advantages and costs of
membership, taking into consideration recent debates and controversy

over the nation's membership in OPEC.

Debates and controversy arose

in part because Nigeria has recently experienced a series of upheavals
in the oil

industry which repeatedly threaten its development plans

and indeed political stability.
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In

terms of decision-making within
the OPEC organization,

Nigeria has essentially followed

a

two-track and, at times,

multi-track system whereby contingency
plans are drawn up to be
followed should an OPEC decision
outcome prove to be detrimental
and inimical to the interests of
the nation.

This strategy has

consistently underlined the strategical
behavior of Nigeria on
matters of crucial and important OPEC
decisions.

During the

Arab-Israeli War of 1973, when Arab countries
inflicted an oil

embargo on the industrial west, Nigeria
broke ranks with mainstream
policy and supplied the United States, Holland
and other interested
buyers of her oil.

Production quotas set by OPEC including price

levels have on several occasions been broken by
Nigeria and other

members including Indonesia and Iran when not
compatible with the
national

interest.

Difficulties in keeping faith with OPEC

commitments and resolutions arise in part because of what
factors of vulnerability.

I

call

OPEC members who have consistently reneged

on commitments are those who have "teeming populations," are
engaged
in massive development projects and hence need every
revenue they

can get from their crude oil, and in general whose economic fortunes

are closely linked with developments in global oil industry.
Indeed, Nigeria has experienced unprecedented upheavals and

crisis after crisis in her dealings with the international oil industry
As global oil
"oil

sales took a beating and swung downwards, and as the

boom" gave way to oil crisis, "it will be recalled that in

1977-78, the crude oil market was so depressed that we have to
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resort to barter.

COmmitmentS

''

84

We gave oil

^

in
>

1n

in

^e

settles

for some of our

first quarter of
,982, Nigeria

"confronted formidable problems
on both the external
and domestic
fronts" because a sharp
decline in output resulted
in "serious cash
flows" which had a disruptive
effect on her Fourth
National Develops
Plans.
On the domestic front,
the oil companies
"agitated for a higher
profit margin" threatening
to abandon new oil
fields if the
.

government did not respond
favorably to their demands.
Industry
sources said the action was a
sequel to the increasing
high cost of
production and failure of the
Federal government to review
the
profit margin due to oil companies.
One oil company reportedly
halted the development of an
oil field in the Otuo area,
which
could increase Nigeria's output
by about 4,000 barrels per
day, unless
the official profit margin on

a

barrel of oil is improved. 85

Similar measures extend to companies
operating in Escaravos in the
south-east, off-shore areas. On these
matters, the Federal
government has maintained "inexplicable
silence" suggesting deep
and comprehensive policy measures.
the government receives

By the present equity share,

98.2 percent of the profit while the

companies get 1.8 percent, based on
In February of 1982,

a

a

60/40 joint venture agreement.

slackness in the global oil market

developed which was unexpected by oil producing
nations, including
Nigeria.

Slackness was in part due to the global economic
recession

and massive conservation measures adopted by the oil
consuming
nations.

Nigeria was forced simultaneously to cut prices and
reduce

Production.

She was generally
believe d to be .

»

tW

when , n
the British National
01! Company (BNOC,
cut he. North Sea
oil of

comparability.

Nloeria, fro m

$ 3 5 per barrel

^
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to S3,

the lead set by Britain
and Norway, cut the
price of her low
sulphur
hi g h q ua 1 i ty oil
by$5 5 o
perbarrelto$30perbarreK AlthQugh
9reat d lp lomatic maneuvers
usua, ly underlie
these price-cutting
wars
was general,, reasoned
that With a huge but
poor population to
feed and the eight -two
y
oillion dollar Develops
P,an to
.

n

and break the OPEC line. 86
The fact is that Nigeria,
including

for. the "weakest link

in the OPEC chain."

a

few OPEC nations

The y possess factors

of vulnerahility in the
magnitude far greater than
other memhers.
Thus, they are vulneraole
and are liable to suffer
costs imposed
by external events even
after policies have heen
87
altered.
Memhers
of OPEC who constitute the
weakest link are also susceptible
to be

"sensitive" on policies enacted
outside their borders because

"responsiveness" within the OPEC
policy framework usually is swift
and geared towards the avoidance
of transiting changes in a
member
country into costly changes in
another.
Interdependence within the

organization is thus seen as

a

means of securing the benefits of
the

cartel while minimizing costs by
transforming the position when

national interest demands it.

Although "sensitivity involves degrees

of responsiveness within a policy
framework," vulnerability is

1982
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particularly important for
understanding the political
structure of
interdependence relationships
because in one sense it
focuses

on which
actors are the "definers of
the ceteris paribus clause,"
or
can set the rules of the game. 88
On this score, Saudi Arabia,
which
controls the preponderant portion
of OPEC production output,
and

which has developed
is

a

"special

relationship" with the United
States,

in a

unique position to influence prices
and hence production limits.
This is of course not to say
that the Saudis are not vulnerable.

They are, and recent developments in
the oil industry prove it.

With

substantial cuts in oil price by Britain,
Norway and Nigeria, the
Saudi Oil Minister, Zaki Yamani has
made it clear that his government
will

do everything possible to maintain
the established price of

crude oil and defend the country's wealth.

The point to make within

the policy framework of OPEC is that
the degrees of sensitivity and

vulnerability displayed by each member nation varies
with factors of
vulnerability, and in turn, generally explains the
tendency toward
reneging on concerted policy actions.
Nigeria remains vulnerable within the policy framework
of OPEC,
and although she has gained tremendously in terms of huge
price

increases of her crude oil, she is still nevertheless perched on
the
fence.

The idea of production quotas and price ceilings set within

the policy of OPEC was thought on several occasions to breach her

sovereign authority.

A nation that has not suffered a loss in

policy authority finds it almost difficult to accept one arising
from

a

central organ because acceptance means

a

loss in sovereign powers

"
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which in ma ny cases have
been considered
dangerous.
After bei
targeted by British diplomacy
to reduce its crude
oil price
Nigeria came under "tremendous
financial pressure" and
was forced to
hold the line by other
OPEC members.
She decided to hold
the
price line and accepted on
her volition the 1.3
million
barrels per day production
quota alloted her by the
OPEC March 19
Vienna agreement.
Soon after production
slumped to 600,000 barrels
Per day "oil tankers were
leaving her shores empty
because of the
prevailing price" and major oil
companies operating domestically
served her "phase out" notices.
Even third party buyers who
normally buy at arms-length prices,
"simply walked away from their
contracts
.

Tremendous pressure put on Nigeria
forced her to reexamine
her role and relationship within
OPEC, and more importantly,
the

nature of commitment made to this
organization.

In the

making of

certain commitments, it was thought
that some strategical interests
were also lost to OPEC, and strategical
game played by government
planners increasingly assumed

a

defensive posture.

This is so

because the success of game theory in
providing rigorous normative
solutions to decision-making problems does
not hide the fact that
some realism has been sacrificed in the
process.

It has

been

proposed that the concept of commitment be used to
bridge the gap
between the normative formulation and the typical
behavioral process
89
in decision-making.
This theoretical process of commitment in

policy-formulation has been

a

cornerstone of Nigeria's idea of
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^-^^

the OPEC

inery

The nature of the game to
be played was one of
tea. play; moreover,
it was one which does not
risk everything on a
quick check m ate.
Rather
it was deliberate and
purposeful, one where the
advantage lay in the
gradual transformation of the
position.

However, the necessity for
collective action embodied in
OPEC
Resolution (XXIV-134) offered
attractive forum on which the

government of Nigeria thought it
could gain and muster knowledge
needed to control her oil industry.
Collective action also offered
collective security and risk-sharing,
but this has, through experience,
been tempered by a necessity for
choice.
Participation by member
countries in oil production stipulated
by Resolution 90 of 1968
became for most OPEC members

a

control of their oil business.

formidable instrument for initiating
This resolution was further strengthened

by Resolution XXV-139 which reaffirms
"the determination of member

countries to take immediate steps towards
the implementation of

effective participation in the existing oil
concessions.

The

results of such negotiations shall be submitted
to the conference for

coordination and in cases that "negotiations fail
to achieve their
90
purpose" objectives will be enforced through concerted
action.

Participation by producer-governments
is

judged generally successful as

a

in

their oil

industry

means of gaining eventual control,

but the "coordination and unification of the petroleum
policies of

member countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively" in light of
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experience is proving to be perhaps
far from successful.

Resolutiion

VIII-55, establishing the
"commission," and promising "to
examimle
the position of petroleum prices
on a permanent basis" has
not been
very successful because the market
as well as political
developments
have tremendously influenced what
was once thought as

organization.

formidable

a

OPEC's charter has not completely
lived up to

expectations and this loophole has afforded
several members reasons
and avenues for departure.

Several members, including Nigeria,

have come to base OPEC decisions on
"opportunity" costs

-

the values

which must be sacrificed in order to achieve
some other values. 91
In

the process, rules of the game are usually
bent, introducing

a

situation of conflict because instructions and
arrangements previously

ordained have been breached.

The rules of the game are now the

rules of nature, i.e., survival in the game of international politics, i.e.,

national

interst.

The new rules thus are invariably dependent

and legitimized on the assumption of unequal distribution of
factor

endowment which subsequently forms part of the new rule.
From

sociological point of view, the concept of coalitions

a

may be very important in theory of games of strategy.

Although the

idea is that often two players or more in combination can gain more
by playing together as a unit, the actual

coalitions is

a

competitive one.

process of forming

92
"As a rule a great deal

bargaining will precede the determination of
profits among the members of the coalition."

a

93

of

system of gains or
Thus, as Nigeria

experienced production cuts and later in the second quarter of 1982
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recovery came and production
c,i mbe d up once more,
some Gulf producers
led by Saudi Arabia
demanded that Nigeria
increase the differentia,
on the price of her
"sweet" crude from
50* per barrel to $3.00
per
barrel.

This move of course
would make the price of
Nigeria's Bonny
H9ht crude $37 per barrel,
meaning that the crude is
much less
competitive than the North Sea
crude, which sells at
$34 per barrel.
The implication simply is
that the sale of Nigeria's
crude win

stagnate, leaving others,
including Saudi Arabia, to
reap the
profits of extended sales.
The proposal by the Saudis
on the

price differentials is obviously
unacceptable to Nigerian authorities
who have taken appropriate
measures to safeguard the sale
of the
nation's crude oil.
In a sense, the determination
of the distribution
of payments within OPEC might
be considered an "auxilliary
game or
subgame" since emphasis has been
laid on political solidarity
and
unity, however, normative
deviations have occasionally been met
by

induced collaboration and sometimes
threats.

Solutions have usually

taken the forms of alternatives
formulated so that they withstand
"upsets from outside," while maintaining
stability.

Collectively,

alternatives eliminate the danger of revolutions
but the balance
struck is most delicate and unstable and
even becomes more sensitive
as the number of players increases.

The rationale of group decision-making primarily
assumes that

each member ranks "motions" („

a

definite order of preference. In

this sense, the member in question will always try
to maximize the

mathematical expectation of his gain or utility in a game
involving

"Sks.

But there is abundant
evidence that individua,
decisions in
situations involving risks
are not always made
in ways that are
compatible with the
assumption that decisions
are made rationally
•nth a view to maximizing
the expectatjon Qf
example, recently slashed
the
«-r«e price of her
her low sulphur crude
oil
fro, the OPEC benchmark
„ f $34 per barrel
tQ
pfir
the British and Norwegian
lead.

^ ^^
^ ^

Al

"

though she can rational
ly exoect

to maximize her gain
by sticking with
OPEC's benchmark price

nevertheless chose to cut
price, triggering

a

she

chain of price cuts

from other members.

Decision to cut price
strictly was not made
with profit maximization
as a goal.
Rather, it was dee m ed
most
appropriate in a situation
involving risk to her
domestic policies
because OPEC proved unreliable
as a guarantee of
continuous, tolerable
flow of oil revenue.
Milton Friedman and L.J.
Savage have correctly
Pointed out that the rejection
of utility maximization
as an

explanation of choices among
different degrees of risk was
a direct
consequence of the belief in
diminishing marginal utility. 94
In

Nigeria, there is the belief
among policy makers that

strategies on oil matters must
always be planned within an
institutional framework which will
at least take into judicious

consideration the internal needs of
the nation.
"fortunes of the economy.
oil

.

And because the

.are closely linked with
developments in the

industry,... my administration expects
to maximize the value of

our crude oil resource." 95

Maximization of value has on several

occasions taken the form of political
and ethical considerations.

significance of political moves and considerations
may be explained

The
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m

an

Section year, whe „ the
incumbent Shehu Shagari
professes

the

desire of getting re-elected,
he needs an infusion
of oil revenue
at any cost, in order
to execute the passive
develops projects
at hand.
Loss of oil revenue
moreover, is bad news,
no .after how
Justified, in an election
year.
Therefore, optimization
of gain
took the for. of price
slash to win customs
of crude oil
The
logic of the policy was
undoubtedly optimization in
the face of g,obal
adversity; its strategy and
success was mostly pol
itical ,and
.

political

victory represents the optimal
choice.

When strategical relationships
within OPEC are examined,
one
might be tempted to conclude
that Nigeria's actions are,
on the whole,
a bluff.
Strategical relationships limits
independent action,
but does not do so in situations
where a choice between different
risks have to be made especially
in a game where players
are

unpredictable, even in terms of
probabilities.

In situations

of

strategical competition, the best
move of an actor usually depends
on the move of one's opponent
and his actions; but the decisive
move
is made
in

independently of the opponent.

Independent moves are necessary

order to forestall any move by the
opponent where advantage lay in

the transformation of the position,
even when this implies bluffing.

Bluffing in itself is necessary in strategical
situations and even

desirable to create uncertainty in the opponents
mind as to the
motive behind
real

a

particular move.

In

this sense, Nigeria has shown

resolve and false impression of strength in position
of real

weakness by misleading her opponents in the
international oil industry.
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I^essions

such as these secure
the desired gain,
however, a
converse design may mean
disaster and isolation
fro. both friends
and foe alike - a result
of incorrect bluffing.

The destruction of pure
opposition of interest
within OPEC
be said to be a prime
reason for several
strategical moves made
by Nigeria and some
OPEC members, including
Iran.
On most occasions
these moves are based largely
on bluffing, and the
importance of
"bluffing" lies not in the
actual play, but in the
protection which
provides against the opponent's
potential deviations from
the
good strategy.
This is essentially a
"defensive" bluffing and
used
widely against opponents who
are far more powerful.
Bluffing, when
used wisely, ray be largely
interpreted as a law of survival.
However,
in some games the pay-off
function is of such a nature
that secrecy
or bluffing or outright
deception would not help any
player.
Knowing
what an opponent was going to
do would not improve one's
bargaining

n^t

U

position.

Situations such as these are called
games with complete
information; and they are said to
be determined. 96
In the global
oil

industry, games are played with
incomplete information, and the

outcomes are usually not determined
except of course on politically
arranged games.

And therein lies the sources of
advantage and costs

of membership to OPEC members.

Agitation and conflict within the OPEC is borne
of diversity
including ideological differences which have
on several occasions

threatened the solidarity, and viability of
the organization.

Several

periods in OPEC's history have witnessed
the forces of reaction and

^

.
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agitation within its ranks
threatening disintegration.

^wn

as one of the

^

in the international

oil

turbulent „ because Qf

indust™
industry.

^

1982 will

_

i+
It ...
saw the seller's
market of

the ,970s turned into
the buyers market of
the early ,980s, while
lingering internal dissension
and schisms raised
fundamental
questions about the very
survival of the organization. 97
This scenario set the
stage for renegades and
internal
dissension among the ranks
of OPEC, precipitating,
in the process
occasion on which to assess
advantages and costs of
membership. On
this regard, I assess the
costs and benefits of
Nigeria's membership
It has been asked
"What does Nigeria gain by
being a member nation of
the OPEC?"
Indeed, it is a question
worth asking and it is
necessary
to state there are inherent
costs and benefits of membership
which,
of course, may not be equally
and rationally allocated.
The crucial
question for all coalitions
then arises:
how to divide the coalition's
gains and losses between two or
more members? In Von Neumann's
game
he has turned up some extraordinary
revelations, for the price

of remaining in the coalition for
any one player must be no less
than
the cost of defection that the
opposed single player could pay to
break the coalition. 98
weak members

Cost of defection may sometimes be high
for

"but under certain conditions weakness
is not

a

disadvantage," and for that reason, it
does not always follow that
the fittest will survive.

Within OPEC

this principle has taken

the form of big actors, encouraging
small. ones to hold the line for
the sake of the organization's
survival.

Thus for Nigeria, when times
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were tough, Saudi Arabia promised
interest free credit bail out.

a

one billion dollar, six
month

But "for some curious unexplained

reasons," assistance never materialized.

Nigeria was

forced to

"solve" her financial crisis
independent of the big brother

Saudis.

-

the

Emotions ran high on disappointment
and other OPEC

failures, however, this is not to say
that gains and losses have
not characterized Nigeria's membership.

Gains from Membership
In theory,

two or more sellers or buyers of

a

form coalitions if there is an advantage
in doing so.

commodity
Nigeria's

policy to join the organization is not far from
this assumption.

A

major problem facing it and indeed the other
members of the group
is one of determining exactly what the
rules of the game are or

should be.

This is a sticky issue within the organization
presently,

but on the whole, members have benefited tremendously.

Nigeria has gained enormously in several ways:

1)

the

bargaining strength of Nigeria has been greatly enhanced in
negotiations with international oil companies, because of knowledge
derived from international experience.

This is reflected in the

"confidence" she now possesses leading to the creation of what was

earlier in this study referred to as elements of independence.
2)

Membership has meant the enormous increase

in the nation's oil

revenue in some cases by three hundred percent and between April 1979
and February 1980, oil prices increased from an average of $19 per
barrel

to $34 per barrel, an increase of ninety percent within a
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Period of ten months. 9 *

Betore 1973,
Before
1973. the tnn
a n+„ d
top «,.
quality
Bonny crude was

selling for less than $3 per
barrel; in January 1981,
it hit the
record high of $44 per barrel,
on the spot market.
As a result,

Nigeria reaped huge foreign
exchange revenues from the oil
sale.
Between 1977 and 1980, she earned
$53.4 billion in hard currency
as
100
oil revenues.
In May 1971, royalties and
taxes due to the

government per barrel of crude oil
were substantially increased
in
an agreement that became effective
in March 1971.
The agreement
increased the posted base price for
Nigerian crude by $0.36

per

barrel and at the same time eliminated
many previously permissible

corporate deductions.

The annual escalations of 2.5
percent and

$0.05 were precisely the same as OPEC provisions. 101

3) A

giant

step was taken when in 1973, NNOC, now NNPC,
requested thirty five

percent participation arrangements from operating
oil companies.
This is in accordance with OPEC Resolution
90 of 1968 calling for

producer government participation in the oil
industry.

This

resolution gave the government an added impetus
when in early 1972
she announced that "henceforth no concessions
would be given

under the terms of Petroleum Decree 51."

Henceforth, rights

obtained are to be through the government's National Oil
Company (NNOC)
Participation meant in effect "the right to be consulted by the
oil

companies in all matters" of oil activity.

4)

Through

membership, Nigeria gained access to "valuable" strategic intelligence
information.

Information on the international oil industry is

particularly important because of its strategic nature, and because

213

intelligence information is

a

meaningful statement which
has been

selected, evaluated, interpreted,
and finally expressed so
that
its significance to a current
national policy problem is
102
clear.
In this,

the OPEC's secretariat
"promotes many authoritative
studies

on all aspects of the oil

industry and offers special
technical

advice, economic and statistical
analyses," at "minimal cost" to
its members.

Strategic Intelligence production
is therefore

essential to

a

nation's foreign relations particularly
where

"manipulation" is possible due to lack of
information or lack of

coordinate activities.

5)

Another major objective of the OPEC

which might benefit Nigeria include the
coordination and unification
of petroleum policies of member-nations
which would discourage

renegade and independent action; the stabilization
of crude oil
prices and the defence of an established price,
hence the

permission of

a

"steady" income to producing nations.

provisions also include Petroleum Profits Tax
as amended.

Fiscal

Ordinance 1959

These amendments include Petroleum Profits Tax Decrees

of 1967, 1970, 1973, and 1975.

The 1975 amendment raised Nigerian

tax and royalty rates to the "standard OPEC" rates of
eighty five

percent and twenty percent respectively.

6)

Nigeria would gain

tremendously from the OPEC's goals to "gain control." of down-stream
operations.

Thus,

"she can share the experiences of others in the

areas of refinery establishment and management, marketing organization
and oil

transportation.

It's ambitious program on Liquified Natural

Gas (LNG) and the establishment of petro-chemical plants would benefit

because her membership to OPEC would "ensure reasonably fair and

.
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equitable deals" with the
international oil companies.

consequence of her membership in
OPEC.

Nigeria's

7)

prestige in the international
oil industry is elevated
as

a

Successive regimes since

have all enjoyed international
recognition among bankers around
the world and on the strength of
this recognition, Nigeria has
run
1971

up serious foreign debt.

Nigeria's external debt has been
estimated

as high as $14 billion but
compared with other financially
troubled

countries, such as Brazil, "its small
potatoes."

Because of its good

credit rating, the government has also
accumulated huge trade
debts, which totals to an estimated
$5 billion.

these nonbank debts is being handled by

advisers
S.

G.

-

New York's Kuhn

Warburg of London.

a

group

Rescheduling for
of financial

Loeb, Paris based Lazard Freres and

However, the new military government of

General Mohammed Buhari apparently intends to
honor agreements

made by previous administrations.

Special relationships, where

desirable, have also been developed.
of Nigeria

For example, the governments

and the United States have embarked on forming special

relationships of mutual interests.

Most important of these include

the recently formed "Joint Agricultural Consultation Committee"

which will trade excess American agricultural products for
Ni

geria

'

s

oil

Costs from Membership
In coalitions,

the introduction of conflict and competition

usually arise when questions of how to allocate the market, how to
divide the coalition's gain and partition or absorb loss because

4
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OPEC COUNTRIES. RESERVES AND PRODUCTION
Pmv#*H
1
III*
Reserved

Bn

Production^) million b/d

bis

Potential

1982

1985

1990

167 4

10.5

6.5

6.0

6.5

8.0

j.j

3.0

1.9

3.5

3.5

4.0

L.j

0.9

3.0

3.5

2.5

(4.2

2.5

UAE

0.7

1.2

1.5

1.5

2.3

2.5

1.2

l.S

2.0

2.?

Qatar
Neutral Zone

0.6

0.3

0.5

0.5

0.3

<.8

0.6

0.3

0.5

0.4

0.2

S.

Arabia

Iran

-

Iraq

1

Kuwait

Total above
Venezuela

3'. 4.

c

21.2

2000

l.S

16.5

17.9

19.0

21.5

2.4

1.9

2.0

2.0

1.5

Nigeria

!6.7

2.4

1.3

2.0

2.0

1.5

Libya

21.5

2.0

1.2

1.7

1.7

1.5

Indonesia

9.5

1.6

1.3

1.6

l.S

1.4

Algeria

9.4

1.0

0.7

0.9

0.7

0.5

Gabon

0.5

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.!

0.1

Ecuador

1.4

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

4 14.9

31.0

257

OPEC

total

Domestic consumption
Export availability(c^
(a)

(b)

25.1

26.4

2.0

3.2

4.2

S.O

16.0

21.9

22.2

17.7

IS.

Proved

reserves arc reserves proved by drilling and recoverable at
present prices and with existing techniques.
Production includes naiural gas liquids; potential means volume of
output sustainable with present facilities; 1982 figures partly

estimated;

(c)

1

last

three columns arc projections by the East-West

Centre, Honolulu.
Includes natural gas liquids.
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members more often than not
are of unequal strength.
This organization feature emanate from
their general economic
and political
strength and aspirations.
The outcome of how to
reach an agreement
is highly unpredictable.
Economic theory has not
been able to
offer any substantive explanation.
If there is an agreement,
it
usually involves costs and within
the range of what Professor
Pigou
calls
"the range of practical bargains." 103
This observation

certainly
1)

characterizes OPEC relationships.

What Nigeria losses by being

a

member of OPEC is essentially

one of sovereignty within the
framework of OPEC decision-making

machinery.

Although as

a

member she has

a

voice and

a

in theory decisions arrived
through the collective will

organization is legally binding.

In this sense,

casting vote,
of the

she lost the power

to make production and pricing
decisions independently.

The nature

and character of the international oil
industry makes it necessary
that on occasion members strictly adhere
to the organization's
rules and decisions and sometimes to independently
arrive at one.

The issue here is when and how to optimize
decisions which do not

clash and which are not contradictory.
2)

Petroleum is the single most beneficial and most strategic

natural

resource for Nigeria, the "freedom forgone" to unilaterally

determine production and price margins could be very painful,
because
it means the abdication to a foreign body the inherent powers
to

dictate the pace of economic, social and political progress in the
country.

Recent renegade policies of the government towards OPEC

and the international oil

industry is

a

direct challenge and
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'
.

reversal of this trend.

Nigeria wants to set
policies regarding

her oil

independently, based on national
interest, and this is
where policy clashes with
those set by OPEC which
represents
the collective will of the
organization. Opponents of
Nigeria's
membership have termed this
situation the "loss of Nigeria's

sovereign power" to an external
power.
3)

As a member of OPEC,

Nigeria's foreign policy suffers
considerably

when OPEC fortunes dwindle because
the strength and posture of
the
nation's foreign policy depends to
a large extent on the
flow of

crude oil and therefore "petro-naira.

"

The nature of foreign

policy which the nation wishes to
maintain is incumbent on the
prestige and power which the possession
of oil invariably confers.
As a function of foreign policy,
domestic policies suffer as well

because

a

strong domestic front is

strong image abroad.

a

necessity for

Petroleum has provided

a

Nigeria in the international arena, and if
such
to the whims and caprices of an external

a

stable and

"solid basis" for
a

fortune is tied

regime, it is inevitable then

that the nation is vulnerable and sensitive both
in her domestic
and foreign relations.
4)

Within the OPEC regime, Nigeria may be vulnerable to
strategic

behavior and interactions of its various members.

Strong groups

exert strong influences on members toward conformity, and for
those nations, bedevilled with what is referred earlier as factors

of vulnerability, this could be dangerous.

These pressures may

be directed either toward uniformity of thinking and behavior or to

.

the fostering of heterogeneity
of views.
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Acceptance of either of

these conformity pressures
may satisfy the
political, economic
or emotional needs of
some members while
frustrating those of

others. 04

in each case,

members may be forced to
become

"victims of group think."

Cost-benefit analysis of Nigeria's
membership in OPEC has on
several occasions been
misunderstood, and in some cases,
outriahtly
misinformed. Analysis has, on
the whole, been an exercise
in
muddling through. Arguments are
characterized by high emotional
content making it indeed very
difficult to base decisions on

concrete rational grounds.

It is

important to keep in proper

perspective and focus the real nature
of the issues at stake.
real

The

issues which need informed attention
is how the country could

maximize the benefits from her oil
resources while minimizing
costs in the process.

OPEC has, in most cases, provided
the

vehicle toward optimization of gain
while offering or shielding
members from rough

times.

The argument, then, should be to

what extent has OPEC offered the above
goodies and protection.

answer is definitely open to debate.
place

a

to set in a comprehensive manner the pros and
cons of

membership.
study.

Certainly, this is not

Such an attempt is well beyond the scope of this

Suffice it to say that any nation, or organization or
individuals

for that matter, who decides to form coalitions for some
common

benefit must expect and accept
powers

The

a

measure of erosion of sovereign
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Another argument to the
contrary based on
safer scenario, is

a

different but

regime or arrangement in
the international oil
industry where sovereign
nations take over crucial
negotiations
affecting the oil industry
with oil companies playing
complementary
and peripheral roles. This
regime will offer alternative
bargaining model to the current
company-government approach. The
need for alternative arrangements
and choice is based on
a

experiences and concrete lessons
derived from the history of
the
international oil industry.

Alternative Model:

Gover nment-Government Approach

Transnational oil companies no longer
play the traditional

dominant or hegemonical role in the
international oil system, which
they once did.
to the oil

During the 1930s, oil concessions were
granted

companies largely by Middle East countries.

This type

of concession gave these companies the
right to develop the countries'

petroleum resources and full ownership of
oil produced.

Outright

ownership of any oil produced thrusted enormous
decision-making powers
in the hands of the companies concerned,

and participation in oil

matters by producing countries was minimal and in
most cases inferior.
Today, production and pricing revolution begun
by the

events of 1973 to 1974 signalled the demise of the
era of negotiated
price in the international oil

industry and throughout the Middle

East and other major oil producing regions, the traditional
concessional

system appear

to be coming to a rapid end.

such as production-sharing

Innovative agreements,

arrangements, service-contracts or
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management agreements and
someti.es outright
nationalizations have
replaced the" outmoded
concession system.
Sweeping transformation of
the international oil
industry
triggered massive revision
in the modus operandi
of major oil
companies and led to unprecedented
"unsettling shift" among
them.
Recent "mega mergers" among
oil companies point
accurately to the
fact that oil wars which were
largely fought in the oil
fields

of the Middle East and other
third world producing regions
before
the 1970s, have now been shifted
to the home fronts of the
oil

majors.
oil

Thus in January 6, 1984, Texaco
seeking easy and profitable

reserves, gobbled up Getty Oil with
estimated reserves of

1.9 billion barrels of oil, for $10.1
billion.

Combined annual

sales at merger is estimated at
$53.1 billion.

Closely following

the Texaco deal, Standard Oil of
California (SOCAL) by March 5, 1984

completed its acquisition of Gulf Oil for

a

the biggest offer in merger history
to date
at merger of $57.3 billion.

announced
Oil

a

reported $13.2 billion
-

with

a

combined sales

For its part, Royal Dutch/Shell Group

$5.2 billion purchase of the thirty percent of
Shell

Company that the Dutch Oil Group did not already
own.

There

are rumors circulating around corporate
boardrooms of yet more

impending oil mergers with the apparent blessing
of the Reagan

Administration.
A major reason for this unsettling shift in the
industry

one which should be taken seriously

-

is the

widespread producer

government displacement of oil companies from their traditional

-

-

activities of "upstream" as
well as "downstream
operations around
the world.
The oil crisis had
indicated the myth of
the
invulnerability of multinational
oil corporations to
national
sovereignty.

In 1973,

for instance, ninety
three percent of OPEC

production or 27.9 million
barrels per day, went to
the oil majors
on a long term basis.
By 1979/1980, this dropped
to around fifty
percent of OPEC exports and
forty two percent of world
oil trade.
This decline is directly
related to the outcome of
the 1973 oil
crisis, the oil embargo which
followed and most importantly,
to the
political transformation affecting
the international oil industry.

Displacement of oil companies indicates
strongly that politics
can still override Pronnmirs.

We cannot afford to underestimate

the changing politics affecting
world petroleum markets.

Stripped mostly of their concessionaire
reserves around the
world, the major oil companies are
swallowing up each other through

mega-mergers.

Recent examples are

a

tip of the iceberg in an

economic activity which promises more
intense concentration than

either the steel industry or the big
automobile conglomerates.
Declining oil reserves, slack demand and
depressed oil prices

-

contributed to the consuming desire of major oil
companies to
-cannibalize each other ostensibly for the achievement
of

efficiency of production and the control of scarce
reserves.
One observation should be remarked in the recent
wave of

merger-mania:

the big oil companies have begun to "detect the

whiff of death" and the only avenue of escape from the imminent

all
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catastrophe is to retreat to home
base, rethink their
bullish
instincts and strategies, and
concentrate through merger
struggles
what oil reserves remain in
home territory and friendly
regions.
We dare predict the fight among
the oil companies has
just begun;
it will be a bitter one pitting
the strong against the weak.
We
also predict that as the fight
progresses, the smaller or

"independent" oil companies will be
gobbled up,
of the oil

a

high concentration

industry will ensue and governments
will be forced to

intervene to restore competition by
directly negotiating with

other producer governments for access
fo crude production and sales.
The changing structure of the international
oil

industry,

the doctrines of sovereignty and "changing
circumstances" and the

rapid industrialization of certain parts
of the globe since 1930,
the creation of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC)

and the emergence of "national

resource ideology," all have contri-

buted to alter the bargaining positions and strengths
of actors
in the international

oil

industry.

Changing circumstances have

posed numerous challenges to both consumers and producers
of oil.
I

submit that

a

new approach based on government-to-government

relationship (with oil companies acting

a

minor role)

is

needed to

maintain order, stability and legitimacy in global oil industry.

The Arguments Stated

Negotiations between sovereign governments on matters

affecting global oil activities is desirable and indeed necessary
because of the breakdown of the traditional arrangement whereby
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oil

companies controlled decision-making
powers and producer
governments granted access. This
is no longer so; there
is,and
continues to be, significant
power shifts in favor of
producergovernments creating as it were a
situation of tacit response
and acquiescence from oil
companies. The oil crisis of
1973-1974
provides a good example.
The price of a barrel of crude
oil,
largely politically determined,
skyrocketed.

On October 16,

1973,

OPEC announced immediate increase in
posted prices from $3.00
to $5.11

per barrel

representing

a

seventy percent increase.

Subsequent embargo and production cuts of
ten percent by Saudi
Arabia led to $17.00 per barrel in the
spot market.

Spurred by

this unprecedented increase in oil price,
the Gulf Committee led
by Iranian delegation fought for higher
producer revenue.

result was

a

The

one hundred thirty percent hike from $5.11
to

$11.65 per barrel.

On the whole, the price of a barrel of oil

quadrupled.
Traditional regime in the international oil industry is

unstable and dangerous to the actors concerned.

Petroleum is

a

precious commodity with wide application and uses both in industry
and the military.
national

It therefore affects directly or indirectly the

security of most nations.

Entrusting petroleum matters

to the discretion and whims of 'international

myopic,

oil

companies is in fact

unstable and generally damaging to national security.

Government-to-Government arrangement, offers

a

more secure, more

balanced approach to international oil negotiations.
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The arguments in favor
of this approach are:

Fundamental dealings in
global oil are political
in nature.
Strategic decision-making,
arrangements and conflicts
are politically
managed and resolved.
Increasingly, crisis mark
the international
oil industry and oil
companies are ill-equipped
for crisismanagement.
They lack foresight, skill
and statesmanship which
governments are presumed to have
on matters requiring
largely
diplomatic maneuvers and settlement.
1)

It has been argued that some
governments (especially the

United States) keep hands off
company negotiations "on the
grounds
they are commercial in nature."
The fact is that international
oil

negotiations have undeniable political
repercussions and consequences.
Even the General Accounting Office
(GAO) in a report to Congress,

disagrees with U.S. policy makers on
the "hands off" policy.

It

concluded that oil negotiations have
"undeniable political elements"
although it "considers it premature" for
pation in the negotiation process. 105

a

direct government partici-

This study considers it timely

for governments to take direct charge
of oil negotiations which

ultimately will affect the nation's consumers
and security.

Unsettling

shifts in the international oil industry and
recent wave of

"mega-mergers" sweeping across the industry proclaim

a

distressing

and unstable period for oil companies who, largely
displaced from

traditional activities by producer governments

(NOCs), are

currently fighting for oil reserves within their reach.

With oil

exploration now deemed economically unfeasible, oil companies are now
gobbling up each other.
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Given the interests at stake
and the political climate,
some degree of increased
government involvement seems
inevitable.
The question is how much and
for whom because the oil
companies,
whose once-privil edged positions
are under mounting attack
from
foreign governments, are beseeching
the [U.S.] administration
to
come to their aid. 10 *

It is rea sonable to assume
that under

conditions of mutual equality, the
call for sovereign aid should
not be made.

Oil

companies are vulnerable in this
aspect and

only sovereign deterence would help.
2)

I

call

for government-to-government interaction
in the

international oil industry because it is
now the custom within

international oil system.

In

early 1974, immediately after the oil

crisis, throughout the Middle East and certain
producing regions,
the concession system appeared to be coming
to

a

rapid end.

This is

evidenced by the decreasing share of the world oil
trade for the
international oil majors from ninety percent in 1970
to less than
fifty percent today.

In addition,

direct state to state sales of

crude oil by OPEC members rose from 1.5 million barrels
per day
in

1973 to about 8.5 million barrels per day today.

This was

largely made possible in part due to the fact that OPEC nations'

ownership entitlement of crude rose from two percent in 1970 to
almost eighty percent in 1980.
oil

•

Consequently, the international

majors reaction was to satisfy internal demands reducing sales

to third parties.

In 1970,

the oil majors sold between six to seven

million barrels per day to third parties; this amount dropped to

"
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3.7 million barrels per day in 1978
to less than one nrilH,
ion
barrels per day in 1980. Oil
companies are undoubtedly
detecting
the whiff of death, without
government a ssistance to ensure
access.
Access to energy and policies
designed to ensure this,
should
be considered a major
instruments of a nation's foreign
policy.
As instruments, oil companies
have failed to live up to
global

challenges.

For instance,

"at home in America,

Exxon or Mobil

may loom as Big Oil, but in their
dealings with national oil

companies of the [13] OPEC organizations,
the U.S. companies
are proving to be weaRl ings

!

107

Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn)

recently complained that the United
States companies are "in an
unequal contest" against the "combined
bargaining power of OPEC." 108

Evidently, companies are afraid of direct
governmental control an
"political management" according to Mr. Alvin
J. Wirtz, special

consultant of Petroleum Reserves Corporation.

Fear of political

management and government control may stem from
the fact that the
basic goals of the companies such as profit
maximization in an

integrated global operation, may not be met.

They need not and

should not be so in the opinion of Mr. Wirtz, who
stated that

If the government coul'd control certain of the
fundamental
policies of the company which were affected by the
public interest, that there should be no basic difference
between the ownership of a control "and the ownership of a
minority, in so far as the achievement of the basic aims
of the corporation were concerned 09

In effect,

what we are saying is not that companies cease

to exist, or forego its profit motive;

rather what we are saying

is that governnents
assume .ore important
and

landing positions
with other governnents on
.atters dealing with oil
,„ such a .anner
as to reflect and take
into consideration the
dictates and needs of
changing circumstances.
3)

It has been argued that
oil

by private enterprise." 1

™

^

development "can best be
handled

Arguments include (a)

reduce the political dangers
inherent in the international
field.
The fact is that while
private operations reduce
political dangers,
they are weak and dependent
in situations where
there already exists
political pressures and "dangers."
Energy policy is more
tractable
and better coordinated when
governments' make their policy

directive more pronounced and clearly
stated.

Concerted national

energy policies would guard
against any major oil crisis in
periods
of political upheavals.
Presently, the international oil
system is
fraught with political considerations
and conceivably cannot operate
without the political component,
(b) That private enterprise is
the
best source of the venture capital
required for the undertaking.
fact is that in the past few years,
oil companies have "faced

triple assault":
demand.

The

a

declining oil reserves, depressed prices and
slack

Although increasing channels for capital is
abundant ani

available to oil companies, uneconomic activities
will be translated

directly to increased prices at the gas pumps.

On the other hand,

most nations can comfortably arrange finance and
are capable of doing
so.

For the poorer nations, there are several sources
of gaining

capital

including the World Bank, and regional financial institutions.

As a matter of fact,

private enterprise is not the "best" source of

.
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"survival through preserving
the minimum necessary
of Internationa,
trade and other exchanges
and of course, the
prevention and

avoidance of a major war. 1 "

As a me ans of fostering
meaningful

interdependency among nations,
bilateral relationships
have been
developed based on the notion
of linking issues which
demand
concerted action from interested
nations. Internationa,
oil companies
are i„-equipped to handle
linkage issues which go
beyond their
immediate goal of profit maximization.
Governments, on the other
hand, understand their mutual
needs and can usually,
through
bilaterial deals and policies,
provide for them. Examples
of
bilateral agreements abound;
U.S./Saudi Arabia cooperation
on oil
matters and the U.S./Nigeria
agreements on Joint Agricultural

Consultation Committee offers nations
the forum and opportunity
to
trade off commodities.
The East bloc nations also
engage in
bilateral deals, based largely on
agreements concluded between

and among nations whereby, for
example, energy is supplied by the
Soviet Union to nations who need it
for those commodities the
Soviets need.

It is my argument that stability
of access to oil

will

be ensured and maintained when cemented
by bilateral arrangements

based on mutual economic and political
interdependence of sovereign

nations
4)

International oil companies acting as "middlemen"
or agents are

no longer attractive to many nations including
those of the

"third world."

Peter Odell argues that:
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venture capital because of the
enormous risk in global oil
activity.
They cannot absorb the costs
easily as governments could.
(c) That private enterprise
can best supply and develop
the requisite
managerial and engineering techniques.
Although this may be generally
true, several nations on several
occasions have solicited the

advice and services of the United
Nations Department of Technical

Cooperation for Development.

Furthermore, regional cooperation
on

"information" sharing now seems possible
and useful.
(d)

That oil operations involve exploration,
production, transporta-

tion, refining, and distribution.

Governments entering the oil

business in one area will soon find
themselves extended. .into
.

far-flung complex of international complications.

a

The fact is that

the present state of international oil is
indeed complicated and

needed the visible hand of the
government in untying the knot.

Today,

several nations are seriously engaged in every
facet of the oil

industry from "upstream" to "downstream" operations.

For example,

in "down-stream" activities OPEC members are
pushing forward:

million barrels per day of refined products was

1.5

exported in 1980

and the volume is expected to quadruple over the course of the

decade

-

3.5 million barrels per day by 1985 and 5.7 million barrels

per day by 1990.

Marketing of refined products

major source of profits for OPEC

is

promising as

exporters challenging the oil

companies whose aggregate profits since 1973 has fallen by more
than twenty five percent.
5) Dependency and interdependency characterize the modern

international system "as

a

condition of their existence" and

a
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The role of oil companies as
agents in international oil
industry
is on the wane.

oil

For the oil majors, decreasing
share of world

trade is indeed obvious:

fifty percent today.

ninety percent in 1970 to less
than

Again, as said earlier, direct
state to state

discussions and sales is on the rise;
in effect decreasing the
share
sold by the oil majors to third
parties.

In pursuit of the creation of
instrument of economic policy,

most nations including the most industrially
advanced (except
the United States) have formed state
owned petroleum corporations.

These corporations are largely responsible
for concluding arrangements
with other state-owned corporations on
petroleum matters, while in

most cases, bypassing the international oil
companies who are

accused of "exploitation" and cost adding agents.
It is- therefore necessary that governments
in oil

arrangements.

"assert" pressures

This option has been given impetus by the

increasing presence in international petroleum affairs today
of
both producer and consumer government-owned companies.

Such option

argues Robert B. Krueger of the law firm Nossaman, Waters, Krueger
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and Marsh in a ,974 study
for the U.S.
French exa.ple, would
"create
oil

policy."

a

governs,

and" citing the

vehicle for realizing a
national

113

Although is has been argued
that "government-to-government

crude oil acquisition agreements
have been tried by

a

number of oil

importing countries without any
particular success," 114

I
submit
that such approach is necessary
for lower crude pricesbecause
OPEC as an intergovernmental
organization, no matter its failures,
sets prices to its crude oil,
moreover, the major international
oil

companies "lacked the will and
resources" to resist demands made
on them by OPEC members and other
oil
6)

producing nations.

The exercise of permanent sovereignty
over "their" natural

wealth and economic activities by the
developing countries (where
a

substantial and disproportionate amount of
global oil lies), means

economic nationalism and oil companies are
known to meet demands
arising from this ideological convictions.

They cannot do much

to change the situation; their threats
are mostly judged not to be

effective, except on occasions where government
backing is

expected, for example the U.S. government involvement
in International

Telephone and Telegraph's (ITT) case in Allende's
Chile
A government-to-government interaction will

in 1973.

therefore offer

situations where mutual deterence, mutual threat and
mutual respect
under international law will prevent the abuse of the "sanctity of

contracts."

It will

also prevent the unilateral

abrogation of

previously concluded contracts by threatening retaliation backed by
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sovereign resolve.

Indeed, what this approach
seeks is not

confrontation but rather cooperation
among actors involved
noting
in the process that
global oil is politics in
an interdependent world.
It will

7)

be exceedingly difficult
to break the tight grip
which

OPEC has over global oil
market without direct
government

participation in oil negotiations.

This in part is due to the

radically changed bargaining
strengths in international
oil
industry favoring producer
governments.
Present relationships

between actors "serve to reduce
competition among those governments
for market outlets." And
"alternative measures" are needed
according
to the Federal

Energy Administration, to modify
existing

relationships between the companies and
OPEC governments. 115

Alterna-

tive measures will greatly benefit
from the advantages of enhanced

government role in the negotiation process.
will

Government participation

considerably reduce the anxiety and suspicion
held by most

consumers that oil companies are simply
agents of OPEC governments
and would expend tremendous efforts to
maximize profits benefitting

both parties.
"At one point," Secretary Connolly (of the Department
of Treasury,

Nixon Adminstration) made the remark that the
"U.S. qovernment

ought to be more aggressive in oil negotiations." 116
in

This would be

response to the huge government budget deficit, .among other

problems, which massive oil

import has largely contributed.

Most

nations realizing the great havoc huge oil cost might inflict on

their balance of payment position, have taken steps to include
meaningful government participation in oil negotiations.
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8) Multinational

companies are mostly able to
negotiate with

producer countries on the-basis of
economic rather than political
objectives. Company objectives are
largely based on making or
achieving the greatest return on
investment.

On the other hand,

producer governments would prefer
economic aid and assistance tied
to oil

activities.

On this linkage issue, for
example,

"it would

be difficult" says Jerry McAfee,
Chairman of the Board, Gulf
Oil

Corporation, "to eliminate political
considerations from oil

negotiations between the U.S. government and
the Middle Eastern

governments."

117

On this basis, for instance, the
United States-

sovereign power might be used to negotiate on
behalf of the U.S.
companies where "they are unfairly disadvantaged."

This power could

also be employed into investigations aimed at
testing whether
or not company negotiations with OPEC governments
are in fact

consistent with individual national interests.
Yet another major reason for

a

government-to-government

bilateral or multilateral negotiation "would be

one or more producing governments indicated

a

a

situation in which

strong preference for

dealing directly with consumer governments" and not with private
international oil companies.

Such

a

preference might arise from an

ideological distaste of private enterprise or, more likely,

a

desire

to deal with pruchasers who can pay for petroleum in arms or

other goods and services which cannot readily be provided by

petroleum companies.
9)
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The language of global oil

representative

is diplomatic; oil

company

are in theory not diplomats and therefore not in

9

Proper positions to conduct
negotiations which largely
demand
diplomatic skills and decor™.
Although every move would
be seen
and interpreted "in a
political
iucai contevt"
v
context and every agreement
would
be called into question
if "political
disagreements" between
actors arise, it is necessary
to point out that the
process of
conflict and cooperation of
crisis management and crisis
resolution
are politically instigated
and on most occasions
politically resolved
For instance, if OPEC members
should be persuaded to
reduce the
price of their crude, this will
have to be done by governments not
by oil companies.
It has been argued that major
oil

10)

companies have historically

"acted as a buffer" between
governments in international oil
matters.
C.C. Garvin, Jr., Chairman of
the Board, the Exxon Corporations,

argues that:
By concentrating on commercial
matters, International oil
companies have deflected political
pressures
This is
not to say that political developments
have had no impact
on the international oil industry.
Clearly, they have,
btill, I believe that the buffer
exists and that it is
relevant to the suggestion that longterm
contracts be
approved by the U.S. government. H

.

Governments are increasingly attacking and hence violating

the "buffer" zones in the international oil

violation is
oil

a

industry.

Attack and

result of vast disruptive developments in global

and the necessity to adjust to the changing
circumstances.

Moreover, governments, especially those of the developing
world,

would rather generate political moves in global agenda
concerning
the issues of the "new international economic order" based
on
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their new powerful positions
in the global
economic arena.
I n
thi s
sense, buffer zones provided
by the oil companies
are weak and
ineffective and might be
disruptive in alternative
arrangements and
regimes.
In terms of "commercial
give and take, the companies
are reasonably well -equipped,"
but however when linkage
of issues
characterize major negotiations,
the need for, and the
advantages of
government participation becomes
evident.
In these circumstances,
Mr. Garvin of Exxon
Corporation believes that
"guidance from the

government is frequently useful and
sometimes essential." 120
The view from Europe also
supports the necessity of
government

participation in matters concerning
oil negotiations.

In

pursuance of this objective, almost
all industrial nations of the
continent have either created a
state-owned oil corporation, or are
in the process of creating one.

It is believed

that bargaining can

only be carried out within the existing
national framework and

cannot be dictated from
a

a

distant point.

Although explicit calls for

government-to-government negotiations are not made, Mr.
Geoffrey

Chandler, Director, Shell

International Petroleum, Ltd., London,

apparently believes that the invitation of governments
to the
negotiation table is necessary since in the event of

a

dispute, for

whatever reason, it must be apparent to all that the
sovereign
power of government

defensive

1

22

is

paramount.

121

The deterent offensive and

power of an aggrieved nation could be brought to bear on

the offending nation in several ways, barring the invocation of
the

calvo doctrine, or

a

recourse to the requirement of exhaustion of

.
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national readies.

It should be noted
that companies of the
Royal

Dutch Shell group have been
nationalized in Somalia,
Ethiopia,
South Yemen, Zaire, Guinea,
Congo Brazzaville, Morrocco
to mention
a few.
Recently, Shell-British
Petroleum (Shell-BP) was also
nationalized or "nigerianized"
by the military government
of
Nigeria
The wave of company
nationalizations by governments
engaging
in punitive expeditions
indicates the vulnerability of
oil

companies who are without the
deterent backing of their
respective
home governments.
I

proprosal

have attempted in the above
paragraph to present

a

for government intervention and
participation in inter-

national oil industry negotiations
with oil companies playing
an executionary and peripheral

role.

have also presented and argued

I

why this should be so through reasoned
analysis and through lessons
and experiences derived from history.

could be very controversial, however,
least dangerous and most stable in

a

I

I

realized this suggestion
submit this approach is the

changing world.

It will

lead to "endless political and international
complications."
the contrary,

it will

based on global

usher in

a

not
On

new era in international cooperation

interdependence and justice.
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Schematic Presentation of
Government-to-Government

Approach to Negotiations in
International Oil
Industry
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n terms of "innovation" concession
agreements, Nigeria
hac largely
J
has
relied on agreements reached elsewhere with
oil
companies, as a framework for negotiation
text.
For example
the concept of "production-sharing" was
taken from Indonesia'
and service-contracts" from Venezuela and
other oil producinq
Latin American nations.
Presently, production-sharing
and service-contract regimes dominate Nigeria's
oil negotiation
strategies.
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m re informa tion on "non-territorial actors," see
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Galtung, n?r
The Non-Territorial System" in The Multinational
CorporationA Collection of Essays published in the International
Humanist and
Ethical Union, Utrecht, Holland, November 1976,
19-27.
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Major industrialized nations of Western Europe, including OECD
nations, have established state-owned oil corporations to coordinate
and supplement the efforts and policies of the major
international
companies supplying them with oil.
In most cases, these state
owned corporations have displaced to a large extent the traditional
activities of the "majors." This is in recognition of the changing
bargaining positions of actors in the global oil industry favoring
producer-governments. Governments realized the vulnerability of the
oil majors in the international oil system, especially immediately
after the events of 1973. Although the U.S. government was equally
vulnerable, its trust on the oil majors was not strongly shaken.
5

Time classification are not mine.
They appear in a study done
by the United Nations. Centre on Transnational Corporations entitled
"Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and Mining Agreements."
I
adopted
them for ana-lytical clarity and convenience. However, phase classificaremains mine.
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Corporations, New York
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Oran Young, ed., Bargaining:
Formal Theories of Neg otiation
r
(Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1975). Se e especially
the section on "Strategic Interaction,"
5-19.
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,

pp.
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This observation is indeed right! As the struggle
for the
restoration of posted price of Middle East crude oil
was won by
producer governments, a gradual shift from economic
determinism of
global oil was made in favor of political demands.
Events leading
to 1973 oil embargo and the "quadrupling" of oil price;
the struggle
for a "new international economic order," all were
politically motivated
See "Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and Mining
Agreements, op cit
p.

2.
1

Report to Congress, op. cit.,

p.

5.

14

Consultation was by the invitation of the Republic of Iraq,
and composed of representatives of the Governments of Iran, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Venezuela.
These countries are known as the
"founding members" of the OPEC organization, after having met at
Baghdad (capital city of Iraq), from 10th to the 14th September I960.
For details on deliberations, see Resolutions of the First OPEC
Conference, Baghdad, 1960, in OPEC Official Resolutions and Press
Releases, 1960-1980, op. cit., pp. 1-3 and p. 182.
15

.

Ibid., and "Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and
Mining Agreements," p. 2, especially on the assertion that "the
traditional concession was by its nature a state within a state."
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Overall

" of Production-sharing
contracts aremanagement of petroleum operations by
the stateCost recovery by the company of all
exploration, development
and production costs from a portion
of the production-

and
3) a "profit" split of the remaning production
between the
state and the oil company.

'

(Adopted from the "Main Features and Trends in
Petroleum Mining
Agreements," Ibid., p. 12). The key point or
provision in
production-sharing agreements is the "overall management
of petroleum
operations by the state." Thus the important
point to bear in mind
is state control, which is largely
political, not technical.
21

Like production-sharing agreements, service contracts
are
innovation concession regimes. Unlike production-sharing,
the
^distinctive feature" of service contracts is that the companies
typically get only the right to buy 20 to 50 percent of
the oil
produced, at discounts from market prices ranaing
between 3 to 10
percent, for a specified period.
For more details, see "Alternative
Arrangements for Petroleum Developments," op. cit., p. 55.
22
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.

See Barrow's Petroleum Legislation, op. cit., Supplement 5,
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Ibid., p. 41.
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actors in the global oil industry,
the creation of
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FeatUr6S 3nd Trends in Pet ™leum Mining
Agreements,"
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bee r
for example, Raymond Vernon's Sovereignty-at-Bav
Ny and Keohane > ed s- Transnational
Relation, and
S^iTS^-l"
World Politics ?,
(Cambridge:
Harvard University Press 1971)- see
also Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Mueller,
Global Reach:
The
Power of the Multinational Corporations (New
Y ork:
Simon and
Schuster, 1974)
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Tne events of 1973 were traumatic to designated
countries
and the international economic system in general.
Although Nigeria
benefitted enormously from the "quadrupling" of oil prices,
she
was not part of the Arab oil embargo against several
western
industrial nations.
.

32

Complete state ownership of petroleum operations within a
state s jurisdiction necessitated "nationalizations" of
certain
petroleum operations due to strategic considerations as for example
in Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, or simply as a punitive measure
as in
Libya and Algeria.
In all, nationalizations are consistent with the
trends of the 1960s continued in the 1970s" reflecting in large
part the growing strength of OPEC and producer-governments in general
33

For details, see "Alternative
Development," op. cit., p. 9.
34

Arrangements for Petroleum

Recently however, the U.S. government officials and
pronouncements agree that confrontation strategy may be useful and
productive in dealing with OPEC after the earlier emphasis on
cooperation failed. But it is reasonable to assume that on oil
matters, a two-track negotiating -strategy has been adopted by U.S.
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Peter R. Odell
Oil and World Power
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Published by Penguin Books, Ltd.! Harmondsworth
naswortn
Middlesex England.
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For details, see Oil Negotiations, OPEC, and
the Stabili ty
ntl>e hean n9
P
y
eSpecially those in A °Pendix
VIII ?p 2 72 '281-282)
'

40
41

Ibid., p
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282.
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Oil company/producer-government cooperation is still
a
fact in the 1980s.
The question is:
To what extent?; and whether
cooperation is strategic or not.
The fact is that presently both
actors in the international oil system need each other; neither can
do without the other unless alternative arrangements are worked out.
See Odell, op. cit., p. 230 for more information.
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Shell/D'Archy Exploration Parties, a consortium owned equally
Dutch Shell and British Petroleum, has grown enormously in
both operations and logistics and today it is known as Royal Dutch
Shell /British Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd.
Presently
Shell -BP (now African Petroleum) has the largest share of production
figures in Nigeria.
by Royal
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From "Mining, Fuel and Power," Quarterly Econom ic Review
of
Nigeria., Annual Supplement, 3rd Quarter, 1978, p. 11
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Indeed, calls for a "restraint" in crude oil production have
been made, however these remain a rhetorical proposition.
Government policy is based on pumping as much crude oil as possible
for financing her huge development plans.
The call for a restraint
could only be heeded to when the governments purse is comfortable
enough to meet increasing demands on it. See Curry and Rothchi Id,
op. cit., p. 180, for more information.
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Strong groups exert strong influences on members
toward
conformity.
In OPEC, some members, notably Saudi Arabia
do
occasionally exert pressure over other members.
However the
effectiveness of influence-peddling on members is
questionable
For example, strong pressures on "renegade"
Nigeria did not stop her
from unilaterally reducing the price of her crude by
$5.50 to
$30.00 per barrel.
Neither did it stop other members notably Iran
and Venezuela from cheating on "production quotas."
For more
on group pressure, see Dorwin Cartwright and Ronald
Lippitt,
Group Dynamics," International Jour nal of Group Psychotherapy
t^
1957, Vol. 7, pp. 86-102.

^Report
1

p.

Qg

Oil

to Congress, op.

cit., p.ii.

Negotiations, OPEC and the Stability of Supply, op. cit

281.

:
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This assertion attests to the sovereign power of the state.
or weak a state is, it is still theoretically
more powerful than the biggest corporations.
In this sense, it is
the multinational corporation who is "at bay" and not the nationstate.
Ibid., p. 282.
No matter how small
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ibid.
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Ibid., p. 61.
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Odell, op. cit., p. 190.
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and OPEC:

1

decision-making environment of each
system.

Report to Congress, op. cit.,

p.

As a matter of fact

77.
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The U.S. government has relied mostly
,
on subtle covert
A
diplomacy
in oil negotiations with OPEC.
It has been a policy of
the government to back international
oil companies acting on her
interests in international oil negotiations.
However, on some
occasions demanding it, U.S. government have
been aggressive in
F< r Sec etar
y Connally's remarks, see Oil Negotiat ion
?
Voir™
OPEC and?£!v,
Stability of Supply , op. cit., p. 159.
.

/

~
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From Multinational Oil Companies and OPEC:
U.S. Policy, op. cit., p. 36.
1 1

Implications for

o

Ibid., p.
119

120
iaJ
121

163.

Ibid., p. 280.

Ibid., p. 281.

See Statement of Geoffrey Chandler, Director, Shell
International Petroleum, Ltd., in The Multinationals:
The View from
Europe, Munich, 1975.
Report on the Seventh Meeting of Members of
Congress and of the European Parliament, April 1975. Printed for
the use of the Committee on International Relations, September 1975,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975.
p. 81.
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CHAPTER

VI

NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION (NNPC)

The existence of Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation
(henceforth NNPC) enables the
Nigerian government to play
a direct
role in the petroleum industry.
Its establishment was
based on a
complex set of economic and
political considerations and
factors,
which is of crucial and immense
importance to national security
and
interest.
In essence, NNPC serves
as a strategic instrument
of
.

national policy.

Petroleum Act 1969 vested in the
State of Nigeria the entire
ownership and control of all oil and
gas upon any land in Nigeria,

under its territorial waters and
continental shelf.

1

In early 1972,

the government announced that
henceforth no concessions would be

given under the terms of Petroleum
Decree 51, but that petroleum
"mining leases" obtained must be through
the state-owned corporation
in the form of service contracts.

This requirement in effect means that:

.all right to oil and gas in place within all areas
over which Nigeria has ownership and control,
excepting those
areas comprised in existing grants of petroleum
rights, but
inducing all areas subsequently surrendered, relinquished
or
forfeited by holders of petroleum rights, were reserved
by the
Government for the Nigerian National Oil Corporation.
One
effect of the reservation is that 6,267,220 hectares of
Nigeria's on-shore and off-shore sedimentary basin areas are
under oil mining leases operated by foreign owned oil companies
while the remaining areas became vested in the NNPC." 2
.

.

251

252

NNPC is first and foremost
an instrument of
government
policy in the petroleum
oil industry, both
at home and abroad
Decree 18 of 27 April
1971, Nigerian National
Oil Corporation
now

was established.

By
[(NNOC)

It was empowered to
prospect for, mine

and market oil, and
engage in all other activities
associated with
the petroleum industry.
The corporation was also
empowered to
56 3CqUire 0r take over
*11 of
any
any'of
ot trie
the^sse'tf
assets, ousinesses, properties
Driv-ilpnoc
contracts, rights, obligations
and liab?? ties oflnv'
ny
business engaged in by the
corporation. "4

h,^™

These powers are indeed politically
potent and are devised to
reflect
the importance attached to the
goals of this corporation by
the state
and the satisfaction of the
state's divergent needs.
The establishment of national
oil companies "flows from
the

doctrine of state ownership" and
sovereignty over its natural resources and have "played

a

central

role in the expansion of the

state's control over the conduct and
management of petroleum operations."

5

For instance, since the 1970s,
the government of Nigeria

has engaged in a policy of direct
negotiations with the oil companies

operating within her borders and territorial
waters, and

a

direct

participation in the operations and activities
of the petroleum industry to protect its interests.

The government attempts to do this

firstly by "laying down sets of rules" and
requirements to "regulate

petroleum operations on its soil" and secondly by
establishing NNPC
to act as an

instrument of national petroleum policy, both at home

and abroad.

The National Petroleum Corporation has served the State

of Nigeria in OPEC proceedings since her inception in July
1971, and
as of June 1979, all

thirteen OPEC countries had established their

national oil companies. 6
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The main impetus to the
establishment of national
oil companies during the ,950s
and the ,960s was
the growing maturity
in the
evolving petroleum po,icies
of the producing
countries.?
Nigeria
tins "impetus" came in
the early , 970s when
she joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), and when
the government began yielding to
the highly nationalistic
pressures to establish what I referred to
earlier as events of
independence, created
by NNPC.
Moreover, the early ,970s
ushered in an era when
the government embarked on a series
of nationa, policies
aimed at gradually
transforming the nation's
economic and political
positions.
Because
of the "vital role" played
by the oil sector in this
transformation
and because of the fact that
oi, sales provide almost
90 percent of
the nation's foreign exchange
earnings, and about 83 percent
of the
gross domestic product (GDP),
the government therefore
relied pre-

m

cariously on this sector and on the
state owned oil corporation in
charge of it as a crucial instrument
in the execution of domestic
as
we,, as foreign policies.

In fact,

on occasion, this corporation

has played a decisive role in
policies because in the long run the

government depends largely on it for
oil revenues.

In effect,

NNPC

may be considered as purse holder
and earner of the last resort.
As

a

long term policy of the Federal
Government of Nigeria,

the state-owned oil company may be
viewed as an instrument of gradual

and eventual displacement of the role
of international oil companies
in the downstream as well

country.

as upstream petroleum operations in the

NNPC is definitely being groomed for

a

replacement role
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and hence enormous
resoonsih-n
it,,
esponsibUity,
ambitions and goals have
been
thrust upon her.
,„ this respect, "the major
aim of the Government's
oil policy is the
eventual and compete
national control of al,
aspects of the oil industry"*
previously run by the
international
Oil companies.
The strategy was control
based on ownership and
the
need to use the industry
as a vehicle for the
"rapid economic development of the country; however,
its success depends
to a considerable
extent on how effective
transformation machinery is.
,„ other words
how prepared is the nation
to tackle the enormous
challenges posed by
the intricate operations of
the oil industry? The
answer is that
presently, she is, through the
NNPC, very much il 1 -prepared.
Although
given the "enomous progress"
made so far by the corporation,
it may
not be long before she reaches
a stage of competency
and maturity.

So far, NNPC has performed a
supporting role for major oil

companies operating within the
country.

Although the government,

through various participation
agreements, has acquired majority
shares
(60%)

in the major foreign producing
companies

in the country,

its

performance ratio has been indeed very
insignificant compared to
those of the companies.

Several

"seismic" missions have been under-

taken by the NNPC for the "search and
discovery of new reserves" in
all

parts of the River Niger Delta Region and
some parts of the

Anambra River Basin and in the Chad Basin,
known as "Bornu Trough"

without much encouraging news and developments.

In fact,

the NNPC

operates only one producing oil field on its own at
present and that
is

the Izombe Oil

Field situated near the Oguta Lake in Anambra State.

She is, however, engaged through participation with
major oil compa-

mes

in Joint venture
arrangement, on several
major oil

si tes

2

5

productio ;

As an instrument of
qovernmpnt
nnhv,
yuvernment policy,
therefore, the main
e"o r t of NNPC .,as been
directed at obtaining
a larger
snare of the oil revenues
.
.
the activities of
thus essentia!!,

success^

^

.

co-erda!

^

and administrative.

They do not yet displace the functions of
the multinational oil
firms or the1r spec .
1al

^foreign

subcontractors to any significant
extent

(Ton, Forrest,
The government and senior
officials of the corporation
are
faced with the awesome
task of building the
corporation to a level

1977).

commensurate with its mandate.

Presently this is not happening
and

may not happen in the near
future.
and the know-how to operate
it.

One major obstacle is
technology

Transfer of technology has
proceeded

very slowly; management and
technical know-how

is

still

in

its ele-

mentary stage and manpower
requirements are all but fulfilled.
The
second obstacle is political and
paradoxically so. The National Oil
Corporation has been kept weak;
"selected foreign interests had been
served," and the alliance between
the state and Shell -British
Petroleum (the highest oil producer
in the country) has worked
to

strengthen Shell-BP at the expense
of the National Oil Corporation.
Gowon's regime acquiesced to the
demands of the multinational oil

companies strategically calculated to
weaken the state corporation.

Consequently, for a period, the nation did
not have
sistent oil policy designed to give NNPC
role.

a

to one of

coherent, con-

decisive and commanding

The policies of the oil companies prevailed.

consequently was relegated

a

The role of NNPC

joint venture as junior nartner

with major foreign
oil-producing multinationals.
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Actors for the most
part engage in •joint
venture" because
of the presence of
common objectives and the
view or promise that
each win benefit fro,
such an arrangement.
This type of arrangement
is the "most efficient
form of extending
technical aid to developing
countries" where the need
exists for the transfer
of technology and
technical Know-how.
In the oil industry
and especially in
developing
nations, where the oi,
technology patents belong
largely to oil multinational s, joint ventures
present themselves as the
logical alternative to either buying
patents (which is highly
expensive and controversial), or gradually developing
one (which in most cases
is slow
and inefficient).
A typical reason, however,
for joint venture
"marriage" is the "sharing of
risks" and of course advantages
and

profits which the arrangement
makes possible.

Joint ventures sub-

stantially reduce, by the amount of
the partner's contributions to
the
venture, the political and economic
risks that are the principal

obstacles to direct foreign investment. 10
In the international
is

oil

industry, the "usual joint venture

an arrangement" in which state
owned oil companies (acting on

behalf of the state), and the foreign
oil company "share equity

in a

joint operation to explore for, develop
and/or produce petroleum
deposits."

11

For those countries who have not built
up competent and

efficient organizations for monitoring oil
operations, joint venture
establishes the importance of having an organization
within the

industry

1n a

pos1tion to provide

^

^ ^ J57

rellabTe Infomatlon gathered
through experience in
the field
Furthermore, these governments
wish to protect the
strategic interests
of the nation which
obviously is not served
when major international
011

copies

are ,eft alone in the
conduct of petroleum
natters and

activities.
Joint venture enterprise in
the oil
the

governs

industry has offered

of Nigeria the necessary
opportunity for acquiring

(through arrangements with oil
companies) the technology
needed to
run her oil operations.
Petroleum Act 1969 requires
that oil companies operating within the
country ensure that within ten
years from
the grant of a lease:
1)

the number of .Nigerian citizens
employed in connection

with the lease in managerial,
professional and supervisory grades shall reach at least
75% of the total
number of persons employed in these
grades;
ii)

at least 60% of employees in any
such grade shall be

Nigerian citizens; and
iii)

all

employees in lower grades shall be Nigerian
1

ci

tizens.

?

Acquisition of petroleum technology, "related
to the goal of skilled
manpower" is being vigorously pursued by
the government oil planners
to

reduce the nation's vulnerability on foreign
oil technology.

this end, excessive reliance on the merchants
of oil

international oil companies--!"
and feasible.

s

To

technology-the

avoided wherever doing so

is

possible

Technical assistance programs, instead, have been
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vigorously sought.

with the

governs

For exa mple> an
ag.ee.ent was concluded
by NNPC
of the U.S.S.R. and
Rumania to supply the
state-

owned corporation with
some technical specialists,
to be phased out
within a specified period
of «».
In addition to this,
the government commissioned consultants
fro. Great Britain-COMERINT-to
survev
project by project, the manpower
needs of those aspects
of the Development Plan which deal with
oil.
The consultants

recorded

the train-

ing of 7,000-7,300 Nigerians
in different sub-sectors
of the oil

industry within the 1977/1982
period.

In pursuance of these
needs,

government negotiators in the oil
industry require from oil
companies
operating within the country the
commitment to train and staff
quali-

fied Nigerians in responsible
positions.

This requirement forms a

crucial part of several agreements
on joint ventures reached
with

major oil companies.

The success ratio of this requirement
is mixed,

depending on the company involved.

In the case of

Shell-British

Petroleum (now African Petroleum Nigeria
Ltd.), the success ratio is
somewhat high.

Though

the company is increasing in personnel

,

most

expatriate management positions are now gradually
filled by qualified Nigerians.

This policy is in accord with recent
government

indigenization decrees.

As an indication of Shell-BP's success

ratio in the indigenization exercise, at the
end of 1975, the company
had 3,400 employees (200 expatriates, 1,050
Nigerian management staff
and 2,150 junior staff).

In

fact expatriate staff have declined from

429 at the end of 1968 to about 200 at the end of 1975.
is

expected to reduce to about 100 by 1985.

This figure

During the period of

1968 to 1975, Nigerian management staff increased from 100 to over
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This figure is Tikely
to increase in the
coming years
This
so because the aim of
most joint ventures
(as seen by government
Planners), is the gradual
but eventual displacement
of foreign staff
by qualified indigenous
personnel.
1.000.

"

Joint ventures provide avenues
for participation for
a nation
interested in certain strategic
economic activities within
her territory or outside of it, and
previously controlled and
managed by transnational corporations.
Realizing the strategic
importance of petroleum production, the government
of Nigeria has insisted
only recently
on joint ventures with major
oil companies operating
within the
country.
"As of August

1 ,

1979, NNPC holds an undivided

80%
in the joint venture
operations conducted by Shell

E^IT"^

intent

Nigeria Limited "das of July
1,
NNPC holds 60% interest in the
joint venture operations
f
Nigeria Gul? Company
oTnNigeria
Of
aer
l° J^VLimited,
Elf Nigeria Limited, Nigerian
Agio Oil
Company/Limited/Phillips Petroleum, Texaco/Chevron
and
Pan Ocean Oil Corporation.
NNPC participation in the petroleum operations of these companies
is as a consequence of
PC a ui
tion of Interest in the concessions
!S
and a's^Sc
producin 9 companies between 1972 and
°
1979 "13

wS

'

t

^
£

'

'

^ ^

Participation, of course,

is

consistent with OPEC Resolution 90 of

July 1968, calling for participation by
the operations of her oil

industry.

a

member producer-nation

Participation has meant dif-

ferent things to the various member-nations
of OPEC.

Agreement

14

in

The Djakarta

of 1965 provides that each member is free to
spell out

the nature of participation and how this may
be carried out without

any binding strings from OPEC, although
required.

a

minimum percentage

is
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I" Nigeria,

participation in the nation's
industry

nizee as necessary and
essentia!.

is

recog-

The process of
participation has

been one of gradual
transforation depending on
specific needs and
strategies laid down by the
government and executed by
the NNPC
In general terms, NNPC
was charged with the
task of undertaking all

activities of the oil

industry but in practice,
the operations of

the corporation were
restricted to oil and gas
exploration.

NNPC
(then NNOC) had no statutory
duty to regulate or even
supervise the

operations of the oil industry
in Nigeria.

Regulation requires

trained and skilled government staff
to be effective.

Nigeria had

only a handful of these, mostly
engaged in NNPC operations and
trying
to regulate or even control
the oil companies this period
was deemed
virtually impossible and ineffective.
However, efforts were stepped
up to train indigenous manpower
through overseas scholarships and

through institutional arrangements with
the oil companies within the
country.

The aim of these programs is to
reinforce government con-

trol over petroleum operations by
participating directly in the

management of petroleum activities.

Moreover,

a

direct role in

management enhances the ability of the government
to control the
operations of the oil companies by obtaining
detailed and useful
information and knowledge of the international
petroleum industry.
Recent practice in Nigeria with regards to participation
has

taken the form of control and ownership of petroleum
resources, with
the oil companies acting as service contractors or production-

sharing partners.

For example, in 1979 the state-owned oil corpora-

tion, acting on behalf

of the government, announced that all open

areas for petroleum
production would henceforth
be "opened" for
vice contracts and invited
bids for oil company
exploration. Terms
were not specified indicating
the innovative nature
of this new

Z

arrangement and the willingness
of the government to
sit down and
negotiate with oil companies
on
details.

continue to have Decree

51

However, these contracts

as a basic statute,
and offer the govern-

ment up to 51% (later scaled
to 60%) participation

'

in new

grants

and contain "substantial new
requirements" for bonus, buy-back
arrangemerits, tax incentives, etc.
It is necessary to point
out that an

important component of recent
participation practice is just not
only
one of control, but also one of
regulation.
Government Petroleum
Decree 1977 established a "Petroleum
Inspectorate" charged with

regulating the activities and operations
of the oil industry.
Inspectorate invariably confers more
power on the NNPC

in

The

petroleum

matters, which previously was not the
case.

Petroleum Decree 1969: Strengths and
Weaknesses
A Major strength of this decree is
that the "entire ownership

and control of all oil and gas in place
within any land in Nigeria,"

under its territorial waters and continental
shelf is vested in the

State of Nigeria.
The essence of Petroleum Decree 1969 was based
on the need

felt by the then military government of Yakubu
Gowon for

a

rapid

transformation of the government position on petroleum
matters within
the country and abroad.

Its strength and success depended to a large

extent on repealing some of the previously scattered petroleum
legislation which are regulatory and not fiscal.

Fiscal

provisions
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in Nigeria are covered
by the Petroleum Profits
Tax Act, as amended,

and by provisions in
individual concession
agreements. 15

Published with revised
regulations on 27 November
1969 as
Decree No. 51, Nigeria's
Petroleum 0ecreel969 ushered
in the era of
her participation in the
oil industry.
Decree 51 provided that
"special terms and conditions"-including
government participationmay be "imposed on a prospecting
license or mining lease" if
con-

sidered to be "in the public
interest."

This decree provides the

ruling military government with
a very potent instrument
of dealing
with the transnational oil companies,
who, following the NigerianBiafrian Civil War, were confused
as to which government to
pay taxes
and oil royalties.

As a consequence of Decree No.
51, the position of

the Federal Government of Nigeria
was strengthened and the conflict
of interest was settled in her
favour.

that a major reason why Decree No.

51

Indeed, it might be argued

was enacted by the Federal

Government was to make it clear to the oil
companies that petroleum
resources within the country belong to the
Federal Government of

Nigeria and not to the Government of Biafra
headed by Emeka Odumegwu
Ojukwu.

Consequently, oil revenues should be paid to
the Federal

Government.

Moreover, the need for oil revenues to finance
the civil

war became more acute, and government policy-makers
and planners were
forced to devise means through government legislation
of making international oil companies operating within the country responsive
federal government demands.

In addition,

to

it was thought that with the

enactment of Decree No. 51, the Government of Biafra would eventually
give up her claims to the oil wells within her territory.

Seen from

this perspective, Decree
No. 5, was a smart
legal move by
gQvern _
««t of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria to wrest oil
concessions and
hence oil revenues fro.
the Biafran government
while simultaneously

^

cultivating legitimacy and
justification in the eyes of
the oil
companies.
Petroleum Decree 1969, Decree
No. 51, positioned
the government for the future role which
she envisions to play in
the domestic
and international oil industry.
Decree No. 51 was indeed a
harbinger
or forerunner of events to
come.
It gave endorsement and
conferred
legitimacy to subsequent government
"sovereign acts" in her oil

industry made possible by the
doctrine of sovereignty over
natural
resources.
Although ownership does not
automatically confer the
means to control, it made possible
the exercise in gradual transformation practiced by the government in
oil negotiations. 16

It also made

possible the creation of the state-owned
oil corporation (NNPC) as the
sole government representative (and
hence an instrument of government
policy) in the oil

industry.

As a result of the Decree, no new oil

prospecting license since 1972 has been
granted to privately-owned
oil

companies.

In effect,

it meant that all

since that date have been "cancelled."

pending applications

However, the NNPC is author-

ized by the government to negotiate contracts
with foreign as well as
local oil

companies for any part

-of the

"assigned area."

In

all,

Petroleum Decree 1969 has had tremendous effects on the
Nigerian oil
industry because it is the only document of its kind
before Nigerian
National

Petroleum Corporation Decree of 1977, which sought to

coherently and clearly articulate the wishes and policies of the

governs
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on petroleum matters.

Although It represents
a strong

document of its kind,
Petroleum Decree

1

969 nevertheless
has some

noteworthy weaknesses.
A major weakness of
Petroleum Decree

1

969 could be that

although it vested the
entire ownership and control
of all petroleum

m

the state, it did

not clearly establish
the means of control
as

did its later version-the
Nigerian National Petroleum
Decree 1977.
There was no institutional
instrument or arrangement
whereby the
regulations made by the "conxnissioner"
of petroleum resources
governing petroleum operations
may be translated into an
effective policy.
The implication of this failure
was that oil companies were
given the

opportunity to engage in numerous
activities which
should be regulated and controlled.

in the first place

Sound exploratory practices,

including the conservation of
petroleum resources, were necessary
and possible; the prevention of
pollution of waterways; the keeping
of accurate records and statistics
were not properly carried out, or

carefully checked and upheld.
Inasmuch as the commissioner represents
the government

in

its

negotiations with oil companies, the powers
conferred on him by
Decree

51

were vast and excessive.

In a

country where the ruling and

political class finds it exceedingly difficult
to articulate policies,
the grant of excessive power to a bureaucrat
and subsequent reliance

therefrom, is politically unwise and, in fact,
dangerous.

It could

have been a deliberate move on the part of
the Military Government

Council to strengthen the position of the commissioner
in the nego-

tiation process, however, it unwittingly undermines the
powers of the

«.

•

.
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,

i
Military
Council which was charged
with and responsible for
formulating policy.
The co^issioner, under any
circumstances, should not
decide which oil company
will operate in the country
and under what
conditions, but Petroleum Decree
1969 confers on him these
powers.

In the words of the
Decree,

the Commissioner shall not
give his con-

sent to an assignment unless
he is satisfied that
(a)

-

"the proposed assignee is of
good reputation, or is

member of

a

group

or is owned by

a

a

of Companies of good reputation,

Company or Companies of good

reputation." 17
The commissioner also "may revoke any
oil prospecting license or
oil

mining lease if the licensee or lessee
becomes controlled directly
or indirectly by a citizen or subject
of, or a company incorporated
in,

any country which is
(a)

a

-

country other than the licensee's or
lessee's

country of origin, and
(b)

a

country the laws of which do not permit citizens

of Nigeria or Nigerian companies to acquire,
hold
and operate petroleum concessions on conditions
which
in

the opinion of the Commissioner are reasonably com-

parable with the conditions upon which such concessions
are granted to subjects of that country." 18

These powers in effect mean the granting of large discretionary
powers, and the power to conduct international relations, and judg-

ment thereof, which of course should be the domain of the ruling
Military Council.

Arguments may be made that the Military government
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decides on matters of broad
concern and leaves the
execution of substantive choices to the
concessioner as a matter
of discretionary

Politic.

United

It should nonetheless
be made known that
discretion

is not

to substantia, choices
but extends to procedures,
methods,

form, timing, degrees of
emphasis and
national

on the whole to
questions of

interest and national security.

security suffers terribly
when one man

is

National interest and

made to decide on issues

directly impinging on the
instruments of national survival.
Excess
powers, needless to say, breed
corruption and the ills
associated with
it.

In this case,

power seemed absolute because
there was no clearly
defined institutional check on
it by the Military government.
This

particular institutional weakness,
including others mentioned earlier,
occasioned a careful revision of the
Decree and a subsequent enact-

ment of perhaps

a far

stronger 1977 NNPC Decree.

Petroleum D ecree 1977: A Stronger Invnr.at.inn
Decree No. 33 of

1

April 1977 promulgated by the Federal

Military Government created the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)
.

Decree No. 33 was

a

more powerful government enact-

ment in that it sought not only to coherently
articulate government
policy on petroleum matters, but also to
consolidate firmly the gains

made since the 1969 Decree, by eliminating
several institutional weaknesses of the later decree as described above.
The establishment of the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) offered the government an instrument
for policy enactment

and implementation which the 1969 Decree
clearly lacked.

Concurrently,

the state-owned oil corporation became a vehicle by
which the govern-

ment sought to break into thp n-n
the oil mdustry and
her subsequent control
of petroleum operations.
The government decided
through Decree 33
,•

i

that its presence in the
national and international
oil

industry is
urgently needed if she is
to ensure the national
interest and security
so precariously dependent
on petroleum activities.
This was done

firstly by laying down rules
to regulate and control
petroleum operations, and secondly, by
creating a state-owned oil
corporation to act
as an instrument of national
petroleum
policy.

In

this sense,

Petroleum Decree 1977 acted
as an instrument of
government transformation from a position of
inferior partnership to one
of controlling
interest.
Petroleum Decree 1969 was unable
to achieve this goal
because it lacked institutional
arrangements whereby government
presence
is felt, i.e., the Decree
did not create a body or
organ which sought
to project government
demands to other actors in the
oil industry.

Certainly, it did not attempt to
control or even regulate petroleum

operations within the country.

Petroleum Decree 1977 seeks to carry

out these requirements as institutional
necessity.
The establishment of a department
to be known as the Petroleum

Inspectorate (an integral part of the
corporation) acts as
tory agency."

a

"regula-

This is a non-commercial branch of
the NNPC and is

responsible for issuing permits and licenses
for all activities
connected with petroleum exploration, exploitation,
refining, storage,
marketing, transportation and the distribution
of petroleum and

petroleum products.

In

addition, the Petroleum Inspectorate "enforces

the laws governing oil and gas operations,

initiates regulations

relating to such operations and supervises the
operations of companies

engaged in any one or
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-sures reiating to the generai
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sector
The enforcement of
regulatory measures
reguires that the
inspectorate
be an "independent
department" within the
Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation. An independent
status means the
minimization of conflict
among the various department* wi+h-f« *u
aepartments within the
corporation, which is indeed
endemic in any organization
that

«

large.
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Such powers are presumably
granted in furtherance of the
administrative
tasks of the corporation which
is elephantine and which
threatens to

swallow and make

a

mockery of the administrative
organization of the

corporation.
Admi nistrative Org an ization
of the NNPf

The creation of the state-owned
oil corporation "marked

a

remarkable change in the administrative
structure of the public sector
of the oil

industry" by merging the several organs

formerly respon-

sible for the various
state

petrol

affairs.

As a consolidate

organization, the NNPC, a
m0 n g other things,

is according to
"Article
and
21 0)
(2) of the decree, the dissolution
of bot h the Nigerian
National Oil Company
(NNOC), for rae d by the
Decree No. 18 of ,971
and
the Federal Ministry of
Petroleum Resources," and
their merger to
for. the new organization,
the NNPC.
The belief by the
government
that a coherent, unified
control of petroleum
activities will result
including a better understanding
and cooperation among
member staff,
prompted the unification of
the former NNOC and the
Ministry of
Petroleum Resources to form
the present Nigerian
National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC). The formation
of this corporation meant
the more
efficient and effective use of
scarce, skilled indigenous
manpower
and the improved coordination
and unification of petroleum
policy.
Unlike the NNOC which reported
directly to the Ministry of
Petroleum
Resources, NNPC reports to the
government directly, reflecting the
more powerful position of the
corporation.

Administrative organization of the NNPC
reflecting to

a

(1)

division.

indeed complex,

large extent, the numerous and often
diversified

tasks it is charged with.
NNPC:

is

There are two broad divisions of the

the commercial division, and
(2) the Petroleum Inspectorate

The commercial division is charged
with carrying out the

operational and commercial activities of
the NNPC, including purchasing and marketing petroleum, its
products and by-products.

Petroleum Inspectorate division is essentially

a

regulatory, "enforce-

ment and supervisory agency of the
Government" in matters of oil and
gas operations.

For the sake of functional clarity, and the "avoid-

ance of doubt, the
Inspectorate shall not
exercise any commercial
functions in respect of any
activities of the Governs
of the
Federation relating to the
„ 23
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.
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^

^

Petroleum Conservation
Department responsibie to
the chairman of the
corporation. The reason for
creating this department
is not entirely
clear.
Conservation measures apparently
fall within the purvey
of
Petroleum Inspectorate and
it is only logical
to incorporate petroleun
conservation department into
the inspectorate.
Supposedly, for purposes of
clarity and functional
differentiation, NNPC has been
classified into functional
categories or levels:
(1)

the Planning Level;

tional Level.

(2) the Service Level, and
(3) the Opera-

The Planning "level" organizes,
coordinates, unifies

and controls petroleum
activities and operations.

The Service "level"

is

responsible essentially for providing
"management" with corporate
services.
This level includes the Treasury
and Accounting Departments,

management administration offices,
Office of Legal Affairs, and so on.
The operational "level" is involved
with
the nitty-gritty, or details

of field petroleum operations.

These levels of the corporation are

answerable through their sector chiefs to
the chairman of the corporation in an intricate network of
sometimes overlapping functional

classification.

A casual

look at the organizational chart of
NNPC

portrays an elaborate, well-mapped out
corporate framework through

which organizational tasks and duties are
executed.

A closer analysis

reveals an overburdened, badly arranged
institutional framework,

poorly adapted to the execution of essential
and even the most primary
tasks.

Although the "organizational working plan" carefully laid

.

«own ., ffice ,. and
toon's tas ks
,

„

departmms „

J

needed fQr executjng
thecorpo

so me of these
offices and

departs

have not heen

inevitable result is
inefficiency, ineffectiveness
and organization.l dysfunction,
because the smooth flow
of activities so elaborately described by the
organizational flow chart
is indeed unoperational

The Petroleum Act of
1977 provides for the
NNPC a Board of
Directors, consisting of
the Chairnnan, appointed
by the President of
the Federation, and the
following members, including:
(1) the Permanent Secretary Federal
Ministry of Finance
(2)

the Permanent Secretary
Federal Ministry of Economic

Development
(3)

the Managing Director of
the NNPC, and

(4)

three other members to be
appointed by the President.

Appointment is made, also by the
corporation, of
not

a

a

secretary, who is

member of the Board.
The administrative structure of
the NNPC is unwieldy,

inefficient, and on the whole
ineffective.

A reorganization

is

indeed

necessary to save the corporation
from complete chaos and bureaucratic
breakdown.
And although there is a general
agreement on the overhal,

there is not at the moment

done.

a

stated policy on how this will be

President Alhaji Shehu Shagari, on
the occasion of the opening

of NNPC's third refinery in
Kaduna on 25 October 1980, declared:

"From all observations it has been
clear that a major
reorganization of the NNPC is not only
desirable but
also inevitable.
Its present structure is so unwieldy
as. to render effective management
virtually impossible."

Following the allegation
that the sum of 2.8
billion nairf
"OH money" was missing from
the coffers of the
NNPC, the President
of the nation ordered a
public inquiry. A
tr1bunal m%
up
that purpose and in the
course of the inquiry"
exposed the bureaucratically disappointing
structure of the NNPC.
The tribunal recommended, among other things,
a funda„,ental
reorganization of the NNPC.
This recommendation and
others arising from the
inefficiencies
and ineffectiveness of
the corporation, prompted
the passage of a bill
by the Senate on 27 November
1980.
This bill provides for
the forma-.

^ ^

Hon

of five wholly-owned
subsidiaries of the NNPC so
that the

responsibilities for exploration and
exploitation, refining, and
pipeline transportation, gas,
petrochemicals, marine transportation
and
marketing activities of the NNPC
will be apportioned among
five
subsidiaries.
The creation of subsidiaries would
mean less of
the overburdened, bureaucratical
ly unitized NNPC.

a

burden to

It would also mean

functional division among the five
subsidiaries and the concurrent

separation of powers.

In

the former arrangement, enormous
powers were

conferred on the chairman, prompting

a

Report by the tribunal criti-

cizing the "single entity structure of
NNPC and the inevitable con-

centration of responsibility" and power
NNPC.

In addition

in the

chief executive of the

to decentralizing functions and powers,
a reor-

ganization would ensure

a

proper focus on objectives and goals and

the most appropriate means of attaining
them.

It would ensure also

that corporate programs and activities do
not overlap and tnat scarce,

manpower resources are not wasteful
ly applied to duplicative programs.

Ultimately, the success of
this reorganization
will depend
considerably on how NNPC carries
out its duties.
It was argued
earlier that the state-owned
oil corporation is
saddled with enormous
tasks and responsibilities
which the corporation in
its present
structure and condition cannot
undertake.
Administrative tasks must
be commensurate with
corporation abilities. And in
the case of NNPC,
the tasks, to be fulfilled
as required by the
government, is well

beyond the capacities and
orientation of the corporation.
Organizational power struggle
between the various State
organs
responsible for petroleum matters
made it virtually impossible
for

effective and comprehensive
coordination of petroleum policy.

Evi-

dence of serious and protracted
power struggle emerged when by
the
early 1970s, the NNPC backed up by
a cadre of professional
technocrats was locked in

a

.

fight against other players in
the State oil

machinery for the implementation of
the State's new policy of economic
nationalism.

The cast of players included the
powerful Ministry

of Finance under Abdul Atta, who
consistenly advocated
role in the oil

a

strong state

industry, the Ministry of Mines and Power
which was

passive and remained in the background of
events-its main function
was the regulation of foreign oil companies,
although on several

occasions, it displayed resentment on encroachments
made by the Ministry of Finance into what was thought as
its "sphere of interest."

Other players of lesser importance included the Ministries
of Economic
Development, Trade and Industries.
The field of play was ill-defined and rules of game hardly

established.

Concerning oil policy, the interests of the Federal
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Government were handled by
different ministries
whose conception of
oil policy assumed
bureaucratic imperatives.
Thus the different
Ministries acted in accordance
with what seemed
appropriate to them
and not according to
coordinated, consistent
and comprehensive
guidelines established by the
Federal Government.
Today, competition has
largely made ways for
coordination and

accomodation of the interests
of various minitries with
the NNPC perhaps as
the pHn^s

inters

in the nation's oil

industry.

Administrative Tasks: An

El

ephantine Prob lem?

A closer analysis of
the tasks of NNPC indicates
that it is

faced with an elephantine
problem in attempting to execute
at least
some of these tasks.
The corporation is created
on the assumption
that it should be a fully
integrated corporate actor, engaging
in all

aspects of the petroleum industry.

Its

"general duties" include the

fol lowing:
(a) exploring and prospecting
for, working, winning or

otherwise acquiring, possessing and
disposing of
petroleum;
(b)

refining, treating, processing and
generally

engaging in the handling of petroleum for
the manufacture and production of petroleum products
and its

derivatives;
(c)

purchasing and marketing petroleum, its products
and
by-products;

(d)

providing and operating pipelines, tanker-ships or
other facilities for the carriage or conveyance of
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crude oil, natural gas
and their products and
derivatives, water and any other
liquids or other commodities
related to the corporation's
operation;
(e)

constructing, equipping and
maintaining tank farms and
other facilities for the
handling and treatment of
petroleum and its products and
derivatives;

(f)

carrying out research in
connection with petroleum or

anything derived from it and
promoting activities for
the purpose of turning to
account the results of such

research;
(g)

doing anything required for the
purpose of giving effect
to agreements entered into by
the Federal

Government with

a

Military

view to securing participation by
the

Government or the corporation in activities
connected

with petroleum;
(h)

generally engaging in activities that would
enhance the
petroleum industry in the overall interest of
Nigeria; and

(i)

undertake such other activities as are necessary or

expedient for giving full effect to the provisions of
this
decree.

26

Some of the duties of the corporation are explicit and
clear,
but some are simply ambiguous and reflect the ambitious
tasks prepared
by the government for NNPC.

By implication, it could be argued that

direct state participation in the oil industry was based not only
on

economic and strategic reasons, but also on political and social con-

siderations as well.

There was

a

widespread public outcry for govern-

m

nent pa.tldpat.on In the
nation's oil industry
based on ,
role to be played by
the state-owned oil
corporation.
In the
Process, competing and
diversified demands were
made on the oil
corporation.. A thorough
analysis of these tasks
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and the 1977

Petroleum Decree mandate
that accompanies It,
Indicate that the
responsibilities and powers of
NNPC are enormous,
guite different
scope and content from
its predecessor-the

in

NNOC.

This giant leap in government
policies indicates that
the
9 overnment has, and intends to
retain, complete ownership
and control
of the nation's oil industry,
pursuance of the policy of
complete
ownership and control, the
government has demanded from
the NNPC that
it work towards an

m

(1)

increase in the Nigerian
participation

ment of oil or petroleum
resources.

in

the develop-

This decision

must be seen in the context of
the worldwide evolution
of government involvement in
oil.

It does not,

for any

reason, mean the readiness of
the government to manage

singly her petroleum operations;
(2)

acquiring from various means
oil

a

better knowledge of the

industry, necessary for performing
the different

tasks as needed.

Knowledge also included strategic

intelligence production, sophisticated enough
to act
as guidelines for Government action.

by the NNPC will serve as

a

Information provided

measure against which the

Government could judge private oil companies'
performance;
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(3)

The NNPC is required
to serve as

for the

Governs

international
(4)

(5)

in

"

a

useful

instrument

internationa, energy
otters and

institutions, such as
the OPEC;

increased efforts and
emphasis on Research and
Development, including the
utilization of Nigerian
personnel
and services, and the
training thereof of
adequate and
skilled indigenous manpower
to manage the nation's
oil
industry;
The creation of NNPC does
not represent

a

step toward the

nationalization of the oil industry;
rather it represents
Government's presence in the
industry and fosters national
pride and satisfaction,
reduces vulnerabi 1 ity-a
result
of dependent development and
on the whole secures the

nation's interests.

Although it is clear that these
goals are worth achieving, it
is equally clear that the
NNPC is terribly ill-equipped
to achieve
them.

The responsibilities thrust upon
the corporation are enormous,

only the creation of independent
subsidiaries as

Brazilian Oil Corporation, 27 and

a

national and international oil

the case with

more focused system or areas of

responsibility will bring order and
efficiency to
and disarrayed organization.

is

a

largely chaotic

The growing importance of NNPC in the

industry provides added impetus for an

effective reorganization based on
diversification of functions and
responsibility.

Perhaps in pursuance of this goal, prior provision

as contained in the Nigerian National

Petroleum Corporation Act 1977,

was furnished for any future creation of
subsidiaries.

Provision for

.
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subsidiaries W ere made on the
assumption that "a single
entity" su-h
as the NNPC will with
time be very unwieldy,
uncontrollable and
inefficient. The assumption
was essentially right.
Today,

the state-

owned oil corporation is a
crawling, highly inefficient,
overgrown
bureaucratic structure, incapable
of implementing some of
its essential mandates.
The government, on several
occasions, stated objectives
which
it would see the NNPC achieve.

plete functional
vities of the oil

One of these objectives is
the com-

integration of the oil corporation
within the actiindustry.

Integration will include engaging

in

downstream as well as upstream operations
in the oil and gas industry.
Direct participation by the state-owned
oil corporation in oil and gas
exploration activities constitutes

government and

is

a

fundamental mandate from the

consistent with policies already formulated
under

the Nigerian National

Petroleum Corporation Act (1977).

NNPC has made

an "encouraging start" in the field of
oil exploration, although, as

stated earlier in this chapter, achievements
have been minimal and

insignificant.

However, "exploration success ratio" has been placed

at an encouraging 67% range. 28

The bulk of exploration and exploita-

tion work, however, remains in the hands of major
oil producing com-

panies in the form of service-contracts and production-sharing

arrangements
The need for integration also has been largely predicated on
the government's policy of self-reliance and self-sufficiency in those

areas of petroleum production which are of strategic importance to
the nation.

The aim of this policy is to minimize dependency, first

on the major oil companies
and second, on foreign
imports.

Self-

sufficiency is defined as having
sufficient domestic production
to
meet domestic demand.
Complementary to this, is
the ambition of the
Nigerian government's industrial
policy of "exporting more
and more
processed products rather than
mere raw materials.
To this end the
NNPC will

increasingly displace the export
of crude petroleum with
the export of petroleum and
petrochemical products." 29 My
argument on
this policy initiative or
pronouncement dwells on the issue
of

whether the NNPC
In

is

capable and ready to carry these
mammoth tasks.

the main, my arguments have
been that the state-owned
corporation

lacks the institutional capabilities
needed for an effective and

efficient execution of stated objectives.

Although subsidiaries have

been created for this purpose, evidence
shows that objectives remain

unfulfilled.

New subsidiaries are needed, tasked
with attainable

goals, personnel

and institutional

capabilities, with NNPC as the

"holding company."

Downstream operations carried out by NNPC
show

a

serious

dependency on foreign imported materials as
well as technical personnel.

Although downstream operations such as crude oil
refining,

pipeline transportation, marketing of petroleum and
its allied
products, etc., are indeed engaged in, they suffer
terribly from
occasional

shortages of needed construction and management materials

and most importantly, on skilled manpower.

Some of these downstream

operations projects never got off the ground because of these shortages; those that did, had

a

high content level of foreign participation

For example, NNPC owns 60% in National Oil

Company of Nigeria Limited
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(formerly Shel , -Marketing
Company),

African Petroleum (formerly
British
Unipetroi

(formerly Ess0 ,

adequately compensated,
was

10M

of the

Petrol

^

The
a

equUy shares

in

^^

Marketing Company, and

political move, short
of strict standards

of indigenous performance
in the enterprise.

governs was
forced to acquire these
shares pursuant to her
policy of economic
indenization and "interna,
self-sufficiency," and of
course her
desire to reduce and when
possible to eliminate entirely
dependency
on foreign petroleum
products.
So far, this policy
seems to bo effective and working; however,
success must be measured
in terms of independence from foreign participation
and input, and also on
performance
measured with the passage of time.
This will be so because

a

The

major drawback in the
implementation

of these projects apparently
is the lack of, or rather
the inconsistency of, the flow of finance
capital.
Government's precarious

dependency on her oil revenues seems
troublesome, since revenues are
tied to oil sales and the state
of global economy.

Recent difficul-

ties encountered by the government
towards executing some projects

reflect these facts.

The construction of the petrochemical
complex,

for example, slated for the 1980
Development Plan period, was parti-

cularly affected.

Some of these programs have either been
revised,

cut back, or simply dropped.

But presently, the NNPC has a "monopoly"

on oil refining and the distribution
of petroleum products.

Although

monopoly promotes inefficiency and waste,
the government has made
policy of protecting the NNPC from competition.

a

Acute shortages of

refined petroleum and petroleum products are,
from time to time,
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experienced in the country due
to inefficiencies
and monopol istlc'
practices promoted by the
entrenched m0 nopoly position
of the stateowned oil corporation.
Shortages still haunt the
Nigerian consul
even though the NNPC "owns
and operates three
refineries at the
present tine" and has also
built a "comprehensive
network of pipelines
and 19 storage depots
strategically located around
the country," but
only eight of these depots
are currently operational.
The government is expending
tremendous efforts toward
finding
solutions to the problems that
face its oil company,
especially in
the field of downstream
operations.

the oil

The importance of this sector
of

industry is constantly being
emphasized by the government.

Addressing the occasion on the opening
of the NNPC Refinery at Kaduna
on 25 October 1980, the President,
Shehu Shagari, declared that:
"No doubt the Kaduna Refinery
... is a milestone in nnr
1
n ' tl0
t0ward
self-reHance
"
° selfhe e Can be no val1d defence i f
y
Nigeria, which
lf2
i
r
today ranks number six in the line of
world's crude oil
$ t0 SSt1Sfy h6r d ° meSt1C
demand for P et '°leum

Kenrv T"' M \
U
,

products":

]"

In order that shortages

"remain an experience of the past" the
govern-

ment has commissioned other refineries, including
the newly constructed Warri refinery, and has also declared
a "policy of permitting
independent businessmen to construct and operate
petroleum stations,

with the hope of combatting the shortage by
making.available even to
the remotest part of the country, petroleum and
petroleum products.
It is fervently hoped that NNPC operations will

"springboard" for other development projects in Nigeria.

provide

a

The Presi-

dent, speaking on the role of the state-owned corporation in
national

development and Industrialization
referred to this hope
when he said-

^

yMrs Wi " be
period r^lne^Mnduttrvt
* b
S5
C° Untry
0ur
mr <*
toward industria zation wil , I*
a " d the oil sect
will play a major role
°r
1
!
our National P^ro^eum'corLraH^f ° re
" er
that
fU ' ly 96ared t0
participate fuH and effectively "
y

I

T

-

m
"

^

The extent to which NNPC
fully participates
efficiently and effectively
in the oil industry
remains
to be seen.

.
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the functions of an arm of the National n?i
Company was clearly stated and
focused.
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My interview with Mr. Martin Olisa,
Solicitor and Barrister
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Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation,
Lagos, Nigeria.
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Brazil has a long history of new developments,
new arrangements and experiments in her national oil
industry.
Brazil's stateowned oil company, Petrobras, represents a
good example of the diverse
and interlocking roles played by national
oil companies.
Braspetro
petrobras Internacional ) has participated in exploration
ventures in
several countries which include Colombia, Iraq,
Iran, Libya, Algeria,
and Angola. Petrobras Quimica (Petroquisa) is
responsible for the
"

'

Petrochemical sector while
Petrohrac r„.
bras) was set up in
1976 to develop
Trends ,n Petroleum and
Mining Agreements!

•
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Part III

CHAPTER

VII

THE TRANSNATIONAL I ZATI ON
OF NIGERIAN SOCIETY

In this chapter,

I

examine the phenomenon of
transnational ism

and its impact on developmental

issues and processes, especially
on

the "developing" nations, with
a particular reference
to Nigeria.

I

also explore and examine the
different approaches to economic
growth
and development- "world system/dependency"
approach (orthodox Marxist

theories and neo-Marxist views)-in favour
or against certain develop-

ment strategies and issues.
I

argue that transnational ism represents an
epoch of new global

imperialism where direct colonial exploitation,
domination and sub-

ordination are largely absent; the modus operandi
of contemporary
imperialism is subtle and disguise and does not
involve the imoairment of national sovereignty to any serious degree.

I

also argue that

imperialism through the transnational ization process,
constitutes

a

"system of privilege" involving exploitation, inequality and
dependency.

A system of privilege is created, cultivated, nurtured and

protected by the alliance between foreign capital and domestic elites
and in some cases,

Finally,

I

in

concert with the state apparatus.

examine the logic of state intervention in Nigeria's

economy and argue that crucial public policy issues are analyzed and
resolved by the state acting as the site of class interaction.

This is

also true when analyzing certain "prominent features" of the Nigerian
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state.

The

09 1c of state intervention
i„ the economy
has the advantage of relating state
institutions, and policies
to civil society
a larger scale,
to the outside
world.
This lo ic can
,

—

then he

g

examined not simply
,„ instrumental, universal
terms like growth
welfare and efficiency,
or in terms of a single
class, hut as the
resolution of certain economic
and social forces
(Tom Forrest,

,977;

taanuel Wallers tein, 1975;
Richard
In most developing
nations,

L.

Sklar, 1979).'

the state is seen as
the main agent

of societal development,
including economic progress.

Host often,

scholarly analysis on development
issues and planning overlook
the
crucial role played by non-state
actors (whether internal or
external
to it)

in the system;

conflict of interests based
on Cass and class

interaction are not recognized,
and when they do, their
role

is

institutionally obscured by the
ubiquitous presence of state
machinery.
Moreover, the state acting to
control domestic economic and
political
processes often ignores the
international component of economic

development which usually operates
in alliance with domestic
transnational forces.
Transnational relations

is

characterized by contending perspec-

tives on the part of scholars as
well as practitioners (Nye and

Keohane, 1976; Samuel Huntington,
1973; James Rosenau, 1980; Barnett
and Mueller, 1974; Kissinger,
1975, etc.).

Differing perspectives re-

flect the diverse use of transnational
phenomenon by actors in explaining new global

issues and events.

There is not much to grumble about

these perspectives except the broad-based nature
of their treatment.
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However, in this chapter,
as it affects international

I

am concerned w1th
transnat1onal ism

political econo.y of
development.

More
specifically, em phasis will
be la1d on the issues
Qf
dependency and what Peter Evans
has aptly labelled
dependent development and how they direct
DP^inho^i
i
lpheral capitalism
y affect pe,
and accumulation,
social formation and
transformations.

^

•

Dependent development

is

said to characterize those
newly

industrializing peripheral countries
(NICs) who are emerging from
"classical dependence" to dependent
industrial development on the

more advanced "centre" nations
for those goods and services
needed
for economic development.
A number of
the larger and richer peri-

Pheral nations no longer stand at
the edge of the international
div-

ision of labour, exporting primary
products to the centre and re-

ceiving manufactured goods in return.

They belong instead to

a

dis-

tinct category, which Wallerstein
has called the "semi-periphery"

(Peter Evans, 1979).

Nigeria, as well as

Mansour Farhang calls them "subimperial
ists.
a

1,3

handful of other rapidly industrializing
"third

world" nations, belongs to this distinct
group.

Dependent development cannot be understood properly
unless the
global machinery and network of imperialism
is first analyzed and

understood.

It has been argued

that neither the work of orthodox

Marxist theoreticians nor the non-Marxist views,
which define imperialism as

a

relationship of domination/subordination between actors,

provide an adequate model for describing the transnational
realities
of contemporary imperialist relations.

transnational relations created

a

It has also been argued

that

system of privilege which undermines
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peripheral development and
instead fosters its
underdevelopment due
to interactions based on
class structure and
interests, and, of
course, on the structural
relations among nations
based on imperialism.
Mansour Farhang writes that
"what is clear in the
present
situation of international
relations is the growing
confluence of
interests" between elites in
the center, that is
industrialized
world, and the "ruling elites
of the class-ridden societies
in the

underdeveloped world." 4

Mansour goes further to state
that

The coalition of elites across
national boundaries perceive economic development in
the poor nations as a necessitv
"
not only in terms of market
expansion for WesLrn PprSduc?
e h
f enlarging
G
smal1 midd?e c^ ss Is
n? legitimizing
> °? ° the rule of the
a way of
the privileged few
This
kind of economic development has
nothing to do with justice
or equity because the distribution
of accumulated wealth
takes place in the context of the
existing class structure. 5

IS

T

This observation is precisely correct
in the context of those

developing capitalist nations where state
intervention

in the

economy

has ostensibly been carried out for
the purposes of redistributing
the national wealth to the grassroot
citizens.

Efforts directed

toward these ends have been partially successful
and on most occasions
have suffered defeat in

interactions.

a

system of class-ridden and class-conscious

Nigeria, for example, represents such

a

system.

Efforts geared toward indigenizing the economy and
spreading out the

economic benefits to the less fortunate have been minimally
successful

due in part to the portent and formidable class alliance of inter-

national capital and the local elites.
beer,

The role of the state, which has

seen as one of control and "correction," seemed incapable of

breaking the alliance which thwarted its policies; instead the state

bureaucracy machinery on
several occasions had
joined the aliiance as
a balancing actor.
Discussion of this trlpl,
alliance wil, be made in
the latter part of this
chapter, hot now, it is
necessary to resurrect
the argumentative Marxist
interpretations of economic
imperialism.
Doing this is necessary
in order to justify
the future discussion
on
dependent develops and how
imperialism creates class
structures and
class relations resulting in
economic exploitation and
domination.
The literature concerned
with imperialism and related
phenomenon is immense and most of
the competent writers are of
the Marxist
school of thought.
These writings are opposed to
earlier theories of

economic imperialism, for example,
the works of J. A. Hobson
(Imperialism. 1900, 1902), and disagree among
themselves on certain issues,
however they maintain agreement on
fundamental thoughts about economic
imperial ism.

Marxist analysis and interpretations
of economic imperialism
(based on the pioneering works of Marx and
Lenin) center on the

development of the forces of production and
production relations within the system of capitalism.

of capitalism, forming

a

Imperialism is seen as an inherent part

specific stage in capitalist development

(Kemp in Owen and Sutcliffe, 1972,
pp. 17-22, and Sutcliffe, Ibid.,
p.

172).

inequality

Imperialism involves domination, exploitation, dependence,
ajid

subordination.

Domination is primarily economic, but

may overlap into the political and social structure,
of "backward" by
"advanced" nations, based on the relative levels of development
between
the areas, specifically in productive forces and production
relations

(Bronfenbrenner, 1972;

J.

O'Connor, 1971;

R.

Zevin, 1972; Tikhomirov,

1981).

Contemporary imperialism
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is based on the

"exercise and
extension" of control by
economic means and mechanisms
rather than by
direct formal political
control, otherwise called
colonialism.
Although some developments may
occur in the dominated areas
(or the

Periphery), it will be
ment.

dependent rather than independent
develop-

a

This type of dependent
development characterizes, to

a

large

extent, the newly industrializing
nations whose developmental

projects are fed extensively from
the outside.

Advanced capitalism

works to ensure that dependent
development is preserved and, if
possible, perpetrated in order to
sustain and guarantee the very
survival of capitalism.
to this process

"Neo-colonial ism" is the term often
applied

(Nkrumah, 1965; O'Connor, 1971; Barratt
Brown, 1974).

A genuine development of the
political

development suffers from

a

economy of under-

lack of "responsibility" on whom
to

blame, partly because of the nature of
neo-colonial istic arrangements

which underlie and legitimates global
political and economic relations
This arrangement is unlike colonialism
where, as Kwame Nkrumah argues,
is

subject to "public accountability."

The new phenomenon of neo-

colonialism lacked this inner constraint of accountability,
making it
the most irresponsible form of imperialism.

ushered in

a

However, neo-colonial ism

stage which foresaw the disappearance of the most open,

direct form of dependence.
The features of contemporary imperialism which commands general agreement among Marxist scholars are:
(a)

The development of

within capitalism;

a

monopolistic market structure
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(b)

unequal development between
nations;

(c)

the need for the advanced
capitalist nations to con-

tinually expand and control
markets, raw material
sources and investment outlets;
(d) growing international

rivalry between capitalist

nations stemming from their
support for home-based

multinational corporations;
(e) a fear among capitalists
that socialism will

strict the area for capitalist
expansion.

re-

6

(A.Hodgart, 1977).

Around these features, Sutcliffe
presents three points around which
Marxists debate economic imperialism:
I.

II.

Developments within and between capitalist
nations;
The interaction between advanced and
backward

nations within the world's capitalist system;
and
III.

Developments within the "backward" nations, parti-

cularly class relations and the mode of production. 7
The impact of transnational ization on

a

nation's economy can

best be understood in terms of external dependence
on the develop-

ment process for factors of production and exchange
mechanisms, as
well as technological

and management expertise, and the formation of

external and domestic alliance structure which cements the
interests

of actors.

This is made possible by imperialistic links between

elite interests in the advanced "centre" countries and local elite in
the periphery nations, and from the point of view of the developing

countries' future development, this link is crucial and increasingly
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instant.

It is then

iterative that

a

thorough analysis be m ade

of internal development
mechanism, taking into careful
consideration
social conflict and social
formation based on class
structure and how
the interests of class
alliances shape the politics
and economics of
national development.
Tamas Szentes writes that
'

n

1

5

s

!

«

lf - evi'dent that the
movement of the world

W
rH area? inn " 3 ' °0 n" theP ° 1UicS
internal life and external
relations of the
tlJ/JT
developing countries, but the
direction
and intensity of this influence
will depend
1
to a deci
P
gr
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results of
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r

1

1

^

5 ° f the in ternal chan
s
It transformation
the
of the inherited

In Nigeria,

f

structure.

8

the inherited structure from
British colonialism

was based on an economy characterized
by classic dependency.

External

trade relations and the internal
economic structure reveal that

-

Nigeria is primarily an agricultural
country despite the inroad to

industrialization, assisted heavily by the
petroleum sector.

consequence of this assisted development is
that the economy

The
is

"dis-

articulated," is skewed without any meaningful
linkages between the
various sectors of the economy.

In essence,

there are two economies

existing side by side: agricultural and the
petroleum sectors.

These

exist virtually without much structural relation
prompting the
labelling of it by the World Bank as "economic
dualism."

The petro-

leum sector remains essentially an "enclave"
industry with only

marginal links with the rest of the economy (Nigeria:
Economic Memorandum, June 1976; Document of the World Bank).

Because Nigeria is essentially an agricultural country,
patterns cf global exchange of goods and services have historically
placed Nigeria among those nations which exported

a

large portion of

th-ir agricultural products
in exchange for
manufactured goods from
industrially advanced "metropole"
nations.
The colonial state encouraged and regulated the
trade in agricultural
products and on this
basis, the state supported
foreign capital accumulation
in commerce,
finance and metropolitan industry.
The colonial state, moreover,
had

monopoly over economic activity
and processes of state
capital
accumulation.
Private indigenous capital
accumulation was, in fact,
a

minimal, and even discouraged, and
capital formation suffered
as a
result.
Marketing Boards were set up by
the colonial state to appropriate "peasant surplus" which were
eventually transferred to the
colonial

state.

Sir Percival Griffiths wrote in
1955 that this

"means that the Development Board
which operates Marketing Board surplus funds in Nigeria, is in fact
the only potential African inves-

tor."

Griffiths went on to show how control
over the network of

capital enabled metropolitan capital to
monopolize large-scale com-

mercial activity.

However, the rise of nationalism and the
conse-

quent shifts of power within the Nigerian state
after 1952 increased

nationalist demands for

a

share in the distributive trade.

9

This

weakened the position of British commercial capital,
and opened up
opportunities for local entrepreneurs and hence competition.

Local

entrepreneurs, lacking finance capital and management technology,
were unable to compete effectively with foreign capital.

Trade was dominated by subsidiaries of multinational companies
based in the metropolitan countries.

Industrialization and the manu-

facture of goods were virtually non-existent and needed manufactured
goods were routinely imported from the metropole. Therefore, "the
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pattern of foreign investments
which resulted underscored
investments in the extractive
and distributive trade
against manufacturing
industries. " 0
As Nigeria gained
independence from Great Britain
in i960,
there was an immediate
emphasis on economic
industrialization geared
toward the rapid transformation
of the nation's economy
from one of
classical dependence to dependent
development.

The push for an industrial
economy in Nigeria, as elsewhere
in West Africa, was a
direct consequence of the
nationalist agitation

during the 1950s.

Although the growth rate of the
manufacturing

sector has been impressive, it
could be argued that since
independence
the manufacturing sector remains
highly underdeveloped relative to
the

overall size of the national economy,
and in comparison with other

countries at

a

similar stage of development.

11

The Nigerian state needed to hasten
the industrialization

process and has provided finance, generous
tax concessions and incentives in the early stages of industrialization.

In

addition, relief

from import duty for capital goods and raw
materials have been granted
by the government.

Considerations of market strategy, various types

of state subsidy and tariff escalation
due to balance of payment diffi-

culties in the early 1960s, all encouraged the
expansion of foreign
capital

from its commercial base into manufacture and prompted
the

flow of new investments abroad (Tom Forrest,
1977).

Despite direct

state intervention to build an industrial base for economic
activity
and growth, "there is

a

pervasive sense of disappointment among many

officials, academics, and informed journalists at the little that
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has been achieved." 12

Lack of industrial
progress and results can
be explained
partly on the basis of
dependent development and
what James A.
Caporaso describes as
"asymmetric international
relations." 13 The
external sector of the economy
mostly shaped and dominated
by the

multinational companies has had
on the domestic economy.
on industrialization,

tremendous and "central

a

influence-

And as Peter Evans argues,
given the forms

there is no way of avoiding
the multinationals

(Peter Evans, 1979) as agents
of dependent development.

Dependent development is

a

special

instance of dependency,

characterized by the association or
alliance of international and
local capital.

The state also joins the alliance

triple alliance is

a

...

the resulting

fundamental factor in the emergence
of depen-

dent development (Peter Evans,
1979,

p.

32).

Dependent development

also involves "capital accumulation
at the local level accompanied
by increasing differentiation of
the economy" based on varying de-

grees of effective industrialization and
supported by foreign input.
This type of dependent development usually
involves "dependency" on

the part of developing countries for factors
of production from the

more developed countries.
Since developing nations depend to

a

considerable degree on

the imports from the more advanced nations for
development, this

dependency 14 usually shapes strategic behaviors of all
actors involved, and invariably, affects considerably the
processes of development.

Dependency by its very nature means "asymmetrical international

relations" resulting from global structural arrangements and promoting

:")<)

Internationa! division of labor.

Thus with this
arrangement, the

underdeveloped nations function
on the one hand as

source of raw
materials and on the other as
"limited" markets for
manufactured
goods from the industrialized
countries.
The resulting outcome is
that developing world's
commodity are undersold and
manufactured
goods from the industrialized
world overpriced in the
process which
Emmanuel Aghirri has termed
"unequal exchange." 15 Unequal
exchange
is made possible by the
international division of labor
rooted in

dominance, dependence and imperialism.

Galtung

a

16

sees this "vertical

division of labor" and the structural
distortions therefrom as

essentially one of dominance and economic
exploitation made possible,
of course, by "penetration" and
"fragmentation" which are essentially

political means of perpetrating dependent
and exploitative economic

relationship (Galtung, 1973).
the minimal
ment.

Exploitation, therefore, works to drain

resources needed badly by developing nations
for develop-

And despite the drain created and nurtured
by the process of

unequal exchange, "development" as perceived
by Third World nations

usually and unfortunately is based on dependent
relationships with

industrialized nations, because dependent development
essentially
means structural integration with the outside world.

Considering the nature of global economic systems, structural
relations invariably and inevitably lead to "symmetries" and

asymmetries among national economies precipitating dependence.

More-

over, structural relations create structural linkages based on

sectoral and class interests.

J. A.

Caporaso argues that this de-

pendence orientation explains and seeks to
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The politics of transformation in
Nigeria envisage stages of
gradual and occasionally drastic
progression in the economic develop-

ment and growth of the national economy.

It

was thought by policy-

makers and the ruling political class that
the stage has arrived

when the economy should be propelled from
its historical position of
classic dependence to one of dependent development
based on rapid

industrialization.
is

In this case the principal

agent of development

the multinational corporation in concert with
domestic economic

forces conditioned by state presence and intervention,
and con-

ditioned also by structural linkages to the international
economy.

Throughout the analysis of Nigeria's dependent development,
imperialism will provide

a

framework for investigation into the

nation's link to worldwide system of capital accumulation and the con-

crete relations which this entails

in

terms of social formation and

disintegration, class alliance and its solidification and the role of
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the state.

The role of the state may not
be seen in terms of repre-

senting the interests of

a

single class, but as the
resolution of

certain economic and social forces.

Although state intervention
in

the economy ostensibly was designed
to correct the structural
fm-

balances between the domestic economy
and its international branch,
and to ensure domestic control of
economic activity, it is nighly

debatable whether this policy was
successful or not.

The measure-

ment of success or failure seems, at the
moment, premature and unwarranted.

However, one thing is certain-structural
relation of the

domestic economy to international finance
works to undermine the
policy measure of controlling the domestic
structure.

imperialism

I

submit that

is an offshoot of an internationalized
economy and

of dependent development which influence
internal politics in order
to

further their own interests at the expense of the
good of the

society.

Hobson (1900, 1902), provides

a

precedent for this argument,

which also has roots in Marx's classification of politics
as part of
the "super structure" which is influenced by the economic
substructure.

I

argue also that the cost of this imperialist policy,

in

general, is borne by the working class in Nigeria, exploited and

dominated by the network of the alliance of commercial bourgeoisie,
foreign capital and curiously enough, the state apparatus.
last point (see pp. 245-246

Sutcliffe's

of this study) dwelling on particularly

class relations and the mode of production is very pertinent.

Manifesting itself most clearly immediately after Nigeria's
civil war,

the alliance between indigenous commercial bourgeoisie and

foreign capital, created on its wake

a

new distinct elite—the
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nouveau-riahe, who owe their vast
wealth and power to the
"oil boom"
and to links to foreign
capital
and interests.

The Alliance: Commercial Bojjrg
eojsie
The State and Foreign Capital
In an effort to speed up
industrialization and transform the

economy, Nigerians became aware that
this could realistically be

achieved only through dependent development.

Although Nigeria's

economic nationalism "does not imply
restriction of international

-

trade, but the progressive elimination
of foreign dominance in the

national economy," it became increasingly
clear that the multi-

nationals are the main characters in an economy
based on dependent
development.

It also dawned on most government officials,
and the

"ruling class" that multinationals can at the same
time be
for development and agents of imperialism.

were therefore faced with

a

a

machinery

Government policy-makers

dilemma— a dilemma of choice which

in-

volves careful analysis of cost-benefit ratio, and one which
demands

diplomatic tact in negotiations with multinational companies.

Policy

measures were arrived at, analyzed and choices were made which to
large degree reflect private and class interests.

a

Analyzing dependent

development in Nigeria must therefore, first recognize agreements
concluded which take interests of class alliances into consideration,
and second, which see the role of the state principally as resolving
the dialectics of this class interaction and alliance for the good of
all.

Shortly, it will be explained why state intervention

in

the

national economy taking consideration of class alliances and foreign
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interests could eventually
prove to be

a

dismal

failure.

The politics of transformation
postulates that the alliance
between the state, foreign
capital and local commercial
enterprise
is perhaps the only
realistic approach to economic
and political
development in Nigeria. To what
degree of dependence on foreign
factors of production and their
involvement in developing the
economy
is exactly not known, but
it is usually taken that
political considerations will eventually be decisive
in such a calculation.

Although Nigeria is

a

country "groping its way out of
classic

dependence," the country fits the
essential characteristics of

a

nation marching uneasily toward the
path of dependent development

made possible by the deliberate guiding
arm of the state.

Moreover,

the social structural basis of dependent
development-the alliance

of the multinationals, local commercial
bourgeoisie and the state are

present in the Nigerian development scenario.

allied actors is
development.

a

necessary condition for dependent capitalist

The exact nature of this alliance remains to be
clearly

defined and the actors identified.
is

The presence of these

What is known about this alliance

that relationship between them is not confrontational.

as Tom Biersteker (1982) observed,

essentially harmonious." 19

Instead,

this relationship "appears to be

Harmony has been carefully sought and

cultivated by government policy-makers in order to achieve its

goals—rapid industrialization albeit
development.

on the basis of dependent

Secondly, it was inevitable that harmony is sought

considering the lack of realistic alternatives available and the
primitive, unencouraging level of existing industrialization

in

the

national economy.

Surprisingly enough, elite
class solidarity within
the
national economic structure
has worked to

promote and then cement
the

harmony which the triple
alliance seemed to enjoy.

In
Nigeria,
tribal allegiance has
traditionally precluded the
possibility that

competing economic groups of
different tribal background
would identify their common interest
and form tri bo-economic
bond to defend it.
This process certainly
represents the dawn of

a

new era which promises

the disintegration of tribal
allegiance and bonds and the
emergence
of class structure and social
formation based largely on
the recog-

nition of class interest.

Historically, local accumulation
of capital

and the means of production were
based mostly on tribal lines.

The

Ibo man strictly identified
with his fellow tribesman on matters
of

accumulation and had cautious faith in
the interaction; so did the
Yoruba man to his fellow tribesman and
the Hausa man to one of his
kind.

Today, class alliance based on class
interest and the need to

protect these, have brought diverse but
obviously united entrepreneurs together.

However, this process of social formation
has not

and perhaps will not eradicate hostile
feelings and antagonism be-

tween the diverse elites.
is

What promises unity and class solidarity

the implicit recognition by this group that
thoir interest is at

stake.

Moreover, the state through its several policies of indigeni-

zation of the economy opened up opportunities for tribal
cooperation

based on class identification and class interest.

Although social formation based on class interest tends to
dampen and obscure tribal allegiance, the existence of "class" and

.
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elite structure was seen by many
as

dependent development.

a

nationally divisive upshot
of

Immanuel Wallerstein
argues that this has,

in the African context,
been handled by "firmly
denying its existence,

or at least minimizing its
significance;" however, it remains
a
20
"divisive concept."
it remains indeed a divisive
concept in

Nigeria where the success or
failure of recent government
indigenization schemes depend to a considerable
extent on the role played by
local

commercial elites and their foreign
counterparts.

This is so

because class, on the whole, is defined
in terms of relationship to
the means of production and in
Nigeria's political economy, class has

assumed an important level of recognition
arising as it were from

class-consciousness and the institutional necessity
to identify with
foreign counterparts.
the alliance,

Whatever the forms of class consciousness
in

it is argued that both are expressions
of class

interests
"Given this condition," argues Richard Sklar, 21
"it

is

widely

believed that privileged groups and those who conduct
the business
of government in non-industrial countries, are
knowingly or not,
local

agents of foreign domination."

The expression of class inter-

ests inevitably leads to exploitation and domination of
lower classes
by local elites for the benefit of the alliance.

However, this

process does not readily manifest itself within the state.

In

general, as Immanuel Wallerstein noted,
In peripheral areas of the world-economy, however, the
primary contradiction is not between two groups within
a State each trying to gain control of that state structure, or to bend it.
The primary contradiction is between
the interests organized and located in the core countries
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It is a contention of
this study,

however, that in addition

to the contradiction
between interests based in
the "core countries"

and those in the periphery
over "anti-imperialist
nationalist

struggles," there is another
primary contradiction in Nigeria's
political economy-one observable
in Wal 1 erstein s words,
over the
ambiguous and ambivalent role of
the state structure, control
of
'

which is sought by different groups
within the nation.

I

argued

earlier that class formation in
Nigeria has been cemented due to
the
presence, recognition and therefore
protection of class interests.

However, this "class analysis" does not
portray the essential contra-

dictory nature of the alliance arrangement.
shaky from its inception.

This arrangement was

Although the local elites managed to

drown their ethnic and occupational differences,
the struggle for
control of state machinery rages on.
as a powerful

The state is essentially seen

institution with the right over the allocation cf

national resources and therefore, whoever controls
the state apparatus

controls access to resources.

The result of this struggle will

ultimately decide the actual composition and formation of
class alliances equipped to deal with foreign forces of production.

Resolution

of this struggle also would inevitably determine the eventual
outcome
of recent indigenization exercises in the country.

Indigenization Decrees: A New Economic Order for Nigeria
The agitation for the indigenization or "Migerianization" of
the national economy has a long history and dates back to the late

fifties before the achievement of independence.

It is not surprising

then that the gradua!
transfer to Nigerians of
..control" over the
economy has always been
a major goal of
governs policy since independence.
It is a policy conceived
of the conviction
that a veritable
new economic order
should be introduced in
the nation's economy,
including also activities
external to it.
In other words, the
extensive classic dependence
which historically characterized
and defined
economic activity within the
national economy should be
brought to a
halt, or at least minimized.
The attainment of political
independence

offered a congenial platform
on which to sound this
intention.

Before
then, capital accumulation was
mostly undertaken by the
colonial state
and its agents which included
a sizeable number of
large, mostly commercial multinational corporations
such as the United African
Company
(UAC), John Holts, Patterson Zocharis
(PZ) and A. G. Leventis.

These

companies largely were engaged in
commerce; buying raw materials from
local

pole.

production and in turn sold manufactured
goods from the metroNo visible attempt was made on
their part for the domestic

manufacture of goods; industrialization
enterprises were shunned and
never became part of policy.

The policy of non-industrialization was

largely due to the lack of adequate
infrastructure necessary to support

large-scale industry and perhaps most importantly,
due to policy decided by headquarters in the metropole.

Therefore, commerce became

the main occupation of these companies and in
the process of commercial

exchange, preempted local capital accumulation

anci

hence local

control of the economy.

Indigenous capital accumulation which took place during this
period was done by the marketing boards which was agent to the
colonial
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state and itself impeded
capital formation and
accumulation by transferring surplus funds to
Colonial State's treasury.
It was not long before
proposals for increasing
Nigerianiza-

tion of the economy was
demanded by local elite
groups.
Pressures
were piled on the colonial
government by the "ruling
class" and in
1956, a national committee to
promote indigenization of
business

enterprises was formed.^

economy as

A fl>st

^

^

^

result of the creation of
this committee was to "dilute"
the commercial dominance of
the multinational companies,
and simultaneously increase and support
the role of indigenous
entrepreneurs.
a

Encouragement of local entrepreneurship
took the form of "generous
tax concessions" for "pioneer
industries" and loan capital from
the

government.

In addition,

the government saw to it that
Nigerians were

allocated equity shares in the activities
of the multinational companies.

Tom Biersteker writes that

958 TaX Rel ef Act re <?uired transnational
corporation
J
pioneer" company status to both increase
Nigerian
ownership and personnel, and to use
Nigerian materials in
production
However, it was not until after independence
that significant legislation was passed.
After beinq
supported in principle in both the first
national developmental plan and in a 1961 House of
Representatives resolution, provisions for increasing
Nigerianization were codified
into Law in the 1963 Immigration Laws. 24

I^Jseeking

.,

Maintaining the policy to take control over the national
economy does not, however, imply aversion to foreign
participation.
The state has generally supported the influx of foreign
capital.

Although indigenous control of the national economy occupied the
minds
of Nigerian politicians immediately after independence, care
has

always been taken to balance this need with the invitation of foreign

agents of

develops.
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The nature of this
arrangement was essen-

tially contradictory and
with the constant inflow
of foreign capital
throughout the 1960s, the
contradiction between these
two policies
became increasingly evident.
The pressures for indigenization
of the economy won out
being
a product of the policy
of transformation embraced
by the ruling class
and elite, and put into
concrete formulation by the
high-level government bureaucrats.
Phillip C. Asiodu, former
Permanent Secretary in
the Ministry ofMines and Power,
suggested that "it was in the
period
between 1968 and 1971 that the
widest consultations were undertaken,

leading to the promulgation of the
Enterprise Promotion Decree of
25
1972."
This statement from one of the few
"super permsecs" around
then, confirms the view that Nigeria
seriously embarked on the politics

of transformation immediately before
and after the civil war.

Indigenizing the economy represents one
phase of this great
transformation.
tial

Political transformation (parliamentary
to presiden-

system of government) represents another phase.

However, between

these two, indigenizing the economy had perhaps
the greatest impact
on the developing process and in turn, had
the political

processes.

a

tremendous influence on

International political and economic devel-

opments, military rule spanning the course of some
thirteen years,

a

more powerful and articulate bureaucracy, oil surpluses
and the
"bitter experiences of the civil war" occasioned
revival and transformation.

a

period of national

These new developments "provided the

context for efforts to restrict the sphere- of foreign capital and
secure a more self-reliant pattern of development (Tom Forrest, 1977).
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Restriction of the sphere
of foreign capital
took the for ra
of successive indenization
decrees of ,972 and
,977, designed to
fight and weaken excessive
re,iance on foreign means
of production
whi,e simultaneously
strengthening the position
of local capital
formation and accumulation.
The ultimate aim of these
policies is,
of course, the eventual
indigenous control of the
national economy'
which in itself does not
remove the haunting spectre
of dependent
development. The re,ationship
between indigenization policies
and
dependent development is clearly
one that needs careful
investigation
and analysis.
It is the contention of
this study that the success
or failure of Migerianization
exercises depend to

a

considerable

extent on the links of domestic
economy to foreign forces of
production.

Before this is substantiated,

a

look at the Nigerian Enter-

prises Promotion Decrees of 1972
(revised in 1977) will prove useful.
(See Appendix 1)

These decrees are the products of
increased public

pressure on the Military government for
indigenization of the national
economy.

The evidence was that during the civil
war, the federal

Military government became increasingly
distrustful of foreign capital
and especially the multinational corporations
operating within the

country.

Indigenization decrees represent

genous control of the economy,

a

a

national

quest for indi-

national desire to introduce

a

new

economic order in the nation's economy and above all,
to reduce dependence on external forces of production and distribution.

pendent development is seen as

a

De-

product of decades of colonial

exploitation and economic linkage to the metropole.

It is also seen

as a source of the nation's
economic vulnerability
and sensitivity

but one whose importance
will diminish
tion of the nation's economy.

government planners, represents

^^

graduai

Dependent development,
according to
a

stage through which the
nation's

economy must inevitably
pass, subsequently ushering
in periods of
dependent-led growth. Economic
nationalism became a "sustaining
force" first under Genera,
Gowon and reaching

a

high pitch under the

brief leadership of General
Murtula Muhammed.
A general distrust of foreign
capital

(contradictory to

official policies) basically
precipitated indigenization
exercises
which on several occasions bordered
on xenophobic reaction against
foreign presence.
Biersteker postulates the central
objectives of
the 1972 decree reflected the
dual sources of support for
indigeniza-

tion from government and local
business community.

"The central ob-

jective of the Federal Military Government,"
he writes, "was to obtain
Nigerian control over the economy in
general, and over strategic enterprises, in particular."

Control

is

necessary in the words of Former

Head of State General Yakubu Gowon for
"consolidating our political

independence."

Paul

Collins maintains that the decree was meant
to

give Nigerians greater involvement in economic
and commercial affairs. 26
In

mid-1972, the Federal Commissioner for Trade
said the goal of

indigenization was to "make the country's economy truly
27
Nigerian,"
and later the University of Ibadan Professor E.O.
Akeredolu-Ale

suggested that indigenization was inspired by
Nigeria's external dependence.

a

desire to reduce
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If there is any lesson
to be learned from
these

indignation

exercises, it is that the
nation's external
dependence is on the
rise-a factor of dependent
development and, of course,
of the
alliance between local elite
groups, foreign capital
and state
machinery.
Indigenization of the economy
has not to any appreciable
extent raised the level of
industrialization needed to drag
the
nation from classic dependence.

Peter Evans argues that
Nigeria

barely deserves to be considered
part of the semi-periphery.

Except

for the oil industry, which
is an enclave industry,
Nigeria is primarily an agricultural country. 28
The minimal level of industrializa-

tion taking place supports the
contention that without the multi-

nationals and dependent development,
the country would not presently

experience and achieve this level of
industrialization.

This is unlike

Mexico or Brazil which boast of residual
technical and industrial

capability before the advent of dependent
development.
Some investment in manufacturing is designed
to preserve

Nigeria as

a

market and the evolution of the role of
the state, the

shape and nature of alliance with multinationals
and the rapidly

emerging position of local capital apparently are
moving toward
partite elite structure which will have

a

a

tri-

decisive voice on Nigeria's

dependent development and on how successful indigenization
programs
wl11

De

-

This triple alliance works to undermine the

spirit of indigenization and where possible perpetuates
dependent

development because it is in the interest of the alliance to do

so.

Although the Military government under General Obasanjo was

more strongly committed to an ideology of economic nationalism than
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the previous government
under Gowon, and although
it made the revised
1977 decree more explicit and
clear in terms of
declared

objectives
the structure of domestic
political economy has
proven to be illequipped and unsuited to the
tasks which face it.
Analysis of the
structure indicates the fact
that the state lacked
autonomy/and

distinctions between the private
and public interest seem
completely
ignored because politicians,
bureaucrats, and businessmen
P lay one
and sometimes complementary
roles.
Ambiguous roles confusingly
Played by domestic actors tended
to obscure the real nature
and objectives of the indigenization
scheme by forming convenient
alliances
with foreign capital which the
decree in the first place was
meant to
check and control.
The inevitable consequence of
this role conflict
was the introduction of considerable
ambiguity to current indigenization programs.

The first ambiguity derives on the
one hand from

radical economic nationalist interpretations
of policy objectives,

stressing reduced dependence, increased
self-reliance and an end to
foreign domination and exploitation.

On the other hand,

been more compromising interpretations
seeking to strike

there have
a

balance be-

tween foreign investment in certain sectors
and encouraging joint

ventures in others (Collins, 1973).

Despite official clarifications

by the Nigerian Head of State in his
1979/80 Budget Speech, ambiguities still

persist.

The Head of State made it clear that indigeniza-

tion exercises should be given

indigenization was not just

a

a

more political interpretation; that

matter of transferring shares and the

earning of dividends, but one of control, that is,
getting Nigerians
to determine their own economic future.
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The extent to which this
objective has been adhered
remains
to be seen.
The ambiguities inherent
in the interpretation
of indigenization schemes and what
they are supposed to
achieve only served
to further exacerbate an
already intractable and
confused program.
Although indigenization programs
were designed to reduce
foreign
dependence on the importation of
intermediary goods, and foster
control and self-reliance
within the domestic economy,
the economy continues to be heavily dependent
on foreign means of
production conferring as it were enormous control
over the economy by foreign
capital, cemented and supported by
the local bourgeoisie class.
A typical

comment on dependent goes like this:
All

our power plants, military hardware
and ammunition,
transport machinery, railway equipment,
iron and steel
products, electrical and electronic
goods, and many
cony con
sumer goods are
imported. 29
.

.

.

Government planners admit that the industrial
sector

is

indeed

dominated by "low technology enterprises"
and argue that this imbalance

is

only

a

"temporary and preliminary" stage.

But this argu-

ment was deemed tenuous by many and was not very
convincing.

For

example, the iron and steel complex which has been
on the drawing
board for over fifteen years (major complexes are
now completed) and
the other major industrial

projects, including petro-chemical plants,

remain stagnant because of the "weakness of the intermediate
industrial

either

sector", which ought to feed these projects.
a

projects.

temporary shutdown or
In either case,

execution usually

is

a

radical

The results are

reassessment of these

inefficiency and ineffectiveness to project

the outcome and costs have been known to be
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enormous and damaging.
The crucial question remains
on how prepared the level
of
industrialization now operable in
Nigeria will support the
need for

self-reliance and dependent development.

The answer is simple.

The

level

of industrialization in Nigeria
is not adequate to
support
calls for rapid industrialization
and indigenization of the
economy
without a corresponding input and
support from foreign agents of

development.

Foreign agents of development most
notably the multi-

national corporations, however, see
Nigeria's industrial inadequa-

cies and the failure of import-substitution
as an opportunity to
buy out import-substitution industries,
transforming them into

subsidiaries which can uniquely cater to
global sub-contracting
strategies of the multinational corporations.

See, for example,

Professor Biersteker's table classification.
(Displacement of indigenous Production, Distortion or Development?
1978)

Efforts such as

these on the part of multinational corporations'
work to sustain

dependent development and arguably to "neutralize"
indigenization
process.

Presently, the nation is groping its way out of classical

dependence and the minimal industrialization in the economy
seems to
serve foreign interest and net the interests of the economy as
whole.

There

is

a

indeed not much industrial manufacturing going on in

the country, prompting many observers to note that:

... the crucial question is how much industrialization and
how much manufacturing is actually taking place in the
country? Are we mistaking the cranes and caterpillars and
the bulldozers or the ever-increasing number of foreign cars
blocking our roads as industrial ization?30
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"The basic reason for the
failure of the strategy
of 1„ dustriali .
zation in Nigeria," argues
Richer, Joseph
has been the
,
of the embryonic capita,
ist Cass to play
its historical role
of
initiative, capital formation
and increased
production. 31
While this observation is
basically and marginally
true, it overlooks the historical
deprivation of local elites
from the mechanism of capital formation
and accumulation in
Nigeria. The fact
is that local capitalist
elites were never given the
"historical"
..

opportunity to accumulate capital
by the Colonial State.
Deprivation foreclosed any changes
of local capital accumulation
and
formation and forced local
elites into a strategy of
dependency
on the Colonial State for
capital.
It is this historical

deprivation of capital formation
and

accumulation imposed by the colonial
state on local entrepreneurs that recent indigenization
policies seek to correct.
It took the country almost
two decades to seek a more
equitable,

justifiable policy to redress the
structural imbalances inherited
from the colonial superstructure.

This,

including other factors

mentioned earlier, form the core basis
for Nigeria's politics of
transformation.
On the balance,

indigenization decrees wisely accommodated the

interests of local as well as foreign capital.

It has

strengthened

the "transnational component" of the local
bourgeoisie whose atti-

tudes toward capital accumulation, according to
several studies,
has undermined and deterred the rapid
industrialization of the

economy.

The findings of these studies apparently were unanimous:

:

.
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Displacement of Indigenous
Production
Distortion or Development?
(1978)
Thomas

J.

1

Multinational
Corporations

Biersteker
Buy out import-substitution
industries
and transform them into
subsidiaries
a. Export finished goods.
b. Establish sales
organization.
c. Buy off local manufacturers.
d. Establish a subsidiary.
Drive indigenous competitors
out of
business due to their competitive
advantages
a. Economics of scale,
finance,
marketing
b
Vertical integration.
C
Capital intensity of production.
d
Attractive wage scales.

First-order Consequence
Displacement of indigenous Production
(displacement of both enterprise and
entrepreneurs)

Reduction of economic
Reduction of political capabilities:
capabil ities:
Displacing entrepreneurs eliminates a
a. Benefits increasingly
strong group on behalf of reforming
abroad, worsening
institutions and neutralizing powerful
balance of payments
groups opposed to development efforts.
position.
b. Displacing entrepreneurs
harms the qua! ity of
local factors or production as well as the
possibility of selfsustained development.

Second-order consequence

Increase in the propensity for conflict
and hegemonial dominance maintenance:
a. Displacement is a highly visible and
much-resented process,
b. Displacement increases dependency on
the multinational corporation and reduces autonomy in decision making.

"Nigerian businessmen are all
interested in quick returns,
and hence
their reluctance to invest in
industry as contrasted
with trade.
It
has been shown also that
"many of the traditional
values associated
with an emergent capitalist
class," for example thrift,
austerity,
the need for savings and
investment, are "absent among
Nigerian consent: in place of austerity and painstaking
dedication to building
an enterprise, one finds
extravagant consumption." 31
These findings indicate that Nigeria
lacks the necessary aptitude for an industrial existence.

And indeed this argument may
be

controversially extended to other Third
World countries, which
inherently illogical since

a

is

handful of Third World nations-notably

those referred to as the "semi-periphery"
and "subimperial ists" or
the newly industrializing countries
(NICs) have achieved

industrial

progress.

a

remarkable

The obvious question then is: why has
Nigeria

lagged behind other NICS?, and why has
she disproved the "stag-

nationalist" thesis; and finally, why
the low level of industrialization?

is her

economy booming despite

The answers to these questions

are difficult but the knot may be untangled by
examining the nature
and structural

relationship between the triple

al

1

iance--the role of

the state machinery, foreign capital and local elites,

a

task which

was attempted in the earlier paragraphs.
In the final analysis,

the logic of transnational

relation-

ship will ultimately determine Nigeria's economic progress and the

means chosen to attain these goals.
national companies still retain

a

Despite indigenization, the multi-

significant control over their

operations with the local bourgeoisie engaging or offering

a

supportive
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role.

For instance, a
government panel
panei reoort,
« i
reports that only
one-third
of about 950 foreign-owned
businesses that were
supposed to become

fully Nigerian complied
with the law.

were reported by the panel.

Cases of "phony" takeovers

These were mostly
engineered by the

foreign owners, most of
them Indians, Syrians
or Lebanese, in
collaboration with some greedy,
unpatriotic and misguided
Nigerians
Local elites have, in the
words of Biersteker been
"penetrated" and
the results have quite
effectively neutralized the
state's objectives
Biersteker concludes that the
indigenization exercise has
failed its
objectives because transnational
corporations "are not yielding
managerial control." 32
It is certainly too early
to judge whether
indigenization de-

crees are a success or a failure.

Anything to the contrary is surely

engaging in premature prognosis
because the true nature of the
triple
alliance as they have emerged in
Nigeria is not well known. Any
empirical deduction or casual speculation
is doomed to failure and

inconclusive.

We do know, however, that the nexus
between the state

bureaucratic machinery, local middleman
and foreign capital

is

inti-

mate and reciprocal and characterized
by the "interchange of roles"
among actors which see class interest
as the cementing bond in the
relationship.

Although it has been argued that

a

"redistribution" of the

national wealth remains one major force driving
the wheels of indi-

genization program, the truth remains that

a

preponderant proportion

of the Nigerian populace remains desolately
poor.

But for the

wealthier middle and upper class, indigenization meant
access, granted

!
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and supported by the
government, to easy
wealth.

Nigerianization of the national
economy created
wealthy

..

Lagos mi

!

ionaires

„

whQ owe

^^^

a

new cadre 0 f

^

^

paternalistic disposition of
the federal military
government and, of
course, to the easy flow of
cheap money made largely
possible by the
sale of the nation's ample
oil reserves.
Thus Nigerianization became

major theme of

a

a

political

ruling class which sought
to increase its wealth
through commerce,
links with foreign capital and
the progressive exploitation
of the
urban and peasant population.

The political class represents
the

"fusion of elites" which form

a

critical component in the
Nigerianiza-

tion struggle and which has,
through this process, coalesced
into an

identifiable entity.

This critical component of
dominant-class forma-

tion was, in fact, necessary for
the comprehensive articulation of
the

premises on which indigenization exercises
came eventually to rest.
Indeed, without the fusion or the
formation of this dominant classa

group made up of diverse spectrum of
elites which included wealthy

businessmen, senior and high level politicians,
prominent and powerful
traditional rulers, the politics of transformation
represented con-

cretely by several programs including indigenization,
would not have
taken off.

As the process unfolded, elites became the main
bene-

ficiaries, and

a

remarkable outgrowth of this class formation became

evident— the consolidation of

a

vision of the ruling political class,

supported by previously antagonistic, competing interests.
case, dominant-class formation became

a

In

this

consequence of the exercise of

power by those who control
the
uie various nnHH«i
political and economic
organizzations.

Paradoxically, the losers in
the indigenization game
were
largely the poor, lower
classes of the society who
were left out of
the exercise because they
either do not possess the
ability to be
participants, or simply their
rights as citizens were
usurped by the
more powerful, dominant class.
For example, access to
the banks

which provided low interest
loans to many thousands of
middle-class
Nigerians, were virtually closed to
the poor who were considered
largely

a

credit risk.

Bank credit mostly depended
on personal con-

tacts and prestige and the middle
class were at an advantageous

position.

Through the purchase of shares made
only possible by the

decrees, they procured

a

guaranteed income and substantial finance

assets with negligible risks and efforts.
by the Capital

Although efforts were made

issues Commission to keep the prices of
shares on offer

as low as possible-in order to maximize
the number of Nigerians able
to

participate— those who participated gained substantially
because

stock prices quickly moved to

higher level after the exercise. 33

a

Thus indigenization of the economy meant very
little to those who

cannot participate and, as Sayre
tion provided

a

windfall for

It is only logical

a

P.

Schatz remarks,

"...

indigeniza-

sprinkling of fortunate Nigerians." 34

to argue that eventually the poor masses

of Nigeria will pay for the benefits and costs of indigenization--an

exercise which mostly eluded them.

As Nigeria travels through the

path of dependent capitalist development,

benefits enjoyed.

a

price will be paid, and

But progress will be achieved at the risk of inequality

)
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which

may in fact be

a

product of increasing
exploitation at an

earlier stage in dependent
development.
the level of inequality
will,

(Vengroff,

1

So far,

society.

therefore, be the level of
dependence.

35

977

ionization

The key factor in defining

have argued that the
unanticipated casualty of

I.

exercises are the poor, lower
strata of the Nigerian

Certainly, this outcome was
never envisioned by the
govern-

ment whose intention and goals
remain those of indigenous
control of
the economy.
"The immediate consequences of
indigenization exercises," writes Richard Joseph, "are
discernible" and visible.
For the multinational companies
it has meant their
domestication and legitimization within
Nigerian
society.
The holdings of their local
shareholders
have given these companies greater
security in their
operations without the concomitant danger
of lessened
control over their operations, or
challenge to the earnings of their preference shareholders
abroad.
For the
state it has meant the temporary
satisfaction of the
yearnings for economic sovereignty, but
without in
actual practice conferring on it much
more of an
influence oyer these companies that it can
exercise via
the available fiscal instruments or
direct government
participation.
(Teriba, 1975; Joseph, 1978). 36
_

Coddling the multinational companies by the
state machinery
and local capitalist interests meant that foreign
capital was secure

or at least shielded from threats of nationalization.
an advance signal

through

a

to foreign capital

It meant also

to further penetrate the economy

network of "middlemen" and through the forging of alliances

based on interests.

It meant exploitation,

development, and feverish capitalism.

subordination, dependent

It meant,

in the final

run, that

the government's policies have been as Biersteker apparently put it,

"neutralized."

Neutralization, however, in my opinion, does not cap-

ture the fundamental dynamism
of the indigenization
process.

Neutral-

ization implies ineffectiveness
and if anything, exercises
have been
on the whole effective.
Arguments could be raised,
however, on the
long run effect on the dependent
nature of the economy and on
whether
Nigeria won the battle in the short
run, but slated to lose the
war
in the long run.

The issue at stake is whether
government's policy

of control of economy and
redistribution of benefits has actually

been realized through the process of
indigenization.

difficult and controversial question.

This is

a

highly

It has not been at all made

clear whether the government intended
indigenization as

a

means of

reasserting economic control and sovereignty
over her economy, or

whether it is meant as
G.

0.

a

means of distributive justice.

Professor

Mwankwo takes the later position by arguing
that:

It is difficult to see how indigenization
can achieve
government's objectives of egal i tarianism. The opportunities go mostly to "those who have arrived" - the
established indigenous businessmen who are being'courted
by foreigners who want to team up with them in
order to
comply with the requirements of the Decree and senior
public servants and other executives wio have the necessary "contacts. "3/

The former position probably is defended by the local capitalist

elites who use the state to further their interests, but who also
form tight bonds with foreign capital.

nature of this alliance

is

As suggested earlier, the

yet not known.

Is

dialectical? antagonistic? mutual cooperation?
questions is not easy.

the relationship

The answer to these

Further research has to be done based on the

evolving structure of this alliance.

But at the moment, in the

history of this triple alliance, it is necessary to state that re-
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lationship between the actors
has been one of mutual
cooperation
based, of course, on the
coalescence of interest.
Furthermore, it is
necessary also to state that
the several roles played by
the actors
have not been properly defined
and have not, from experience,
been
solidified and established.

However, there is growing concern
that

this alliance may not, in the
long run, render productive
benefit to
the nation.
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VIII

THE WANING OF CULTURE
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Oswald Spengler, "Decline of
the West"
The above passage was taken
to buttress the argument
that
Nigerian society need not
systematically and wholesomely tread
the
path of western civilization and
"development."

The notion and view

that the nation should, has been
celebrated among highly informed

circles and among those who are less
informed.

The issue is not

whether the country should "develop;"
rather the issue

is

the nature

of development, including its advantages
and disadvantages to the
society.

Furthermore, questions of development strategy
has suffered

from the myopic treatment it receives from
policy-makers, who on most

occasions have excluded the possibilities of
alternative arrangements
or strategies, based largely on their vision
of historical

tend toward the aberration of concrete
experience of

a

forms which

situation, and

of historical possibilities which is a degenerate
reflection of the
latter.
In this chapter,

I

shall dwell not on development issues, but

on its impact on Nigerian culture 1

by the western "development"
328
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approach which the country adopts
at great costs to its
people and
to the resources of the
nation in general. However,
attempt will
be made at making a distinction
between what is called
"modernization" and development because
these two concepts or terms
have been

misused and partly understood
largely by those who make
frequent use
of them.
In addition, I analyze the
pervasive trend and impact of
American cultural values on

the Nigerian society-a process

term

I

"from Nigerianization to Americanization"
and argue that the desire
to mimic Americans on the things
they do and why they are done, only

contribute seriously to the degeneration,
progressive decadence and
decay of the indigenous Nigerian way of
life.
offered, of course, as

a

This argument is not

refutation of the inevitable impact of

historical progress on the society, rather, it
seeks to expose the

folly of mimicing an alien civilization whose
historical experiences
are concretely different from ours, and whose
material foundations for

progress and "civilization" are inherently asymmetric
and superior to
ours

Althouth the two systems profess the same ideological and
"philosophic intentions," there are tremendous underlying doctrinal
and resource differences.

The difference is not to be found

in

the

logic of doctrinaire formulation, but between doctrines "which live

their day and those which never live at all" or which live on

appropriate scale and magnitude.

In

each case,

a

a

more

sense of logical

proportion dictates policy and judgment and the necessity for choice.
A deviation from the imperative necessity for choice in formu-

lating and guiding

a

society's cultural values and "freedom" results
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in risking and
mortgaging that society's
future and subjecting it
to
the peri is of destruction
and decadence for
which history has a mple

examples.

There is no doubt that a society
progressively and systematically loses capacity for
cultural discipline and
self-guidance when it
allows itself to become the
victim of what Hans Morgenthau
calls
2
"cultural imperialism."
By this, I mean the
transnational ization of
broad cultural values held by
identifiable societal actors across
national boundaries based on the
"persuasiveness of

a

superior cul-

ture" whose promises, dynamism and
institutional arrangements may be

unhealthy for all and fatal for many
members of the society, yet

extravagantly beneficial to only
and cultural relation of

a

a

few.

I

mean also the structural

segment of the society's few elites whose

privilege and wealth derive from the dependent
nature and the external
linkages of the domestic economy.
is

In either case,

"independence"

compromised and society can be victim to external
and internal

interest group manipulations.

Hardly more than two decades ago when nationalists
proclaimed
Nigeria an independent nation, the nation's confidence
to remain so has fallen to a low ebb.

social

in her

ability

Despite the rapid economic and

"development" in the decades following independence, it dawned

on Nigerian society that the cost of this progress
was a subtle form

of dependence on external forces which is more sinister,
systematically

exploitative and manipulative than formal colonialism which despite
its ills, displayed some form of responsibility.

The new form of

imperialism dampens nationalist urge for agitation and self-conscious-
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ness because "penetrated"
elements of the society-the
elites have
been effectively and thoroughly
coopted and assimilated into
the

values of this supposedly "superior"
culture.

These national elites

in turn expend enormous efforts
at propagating this newly
embraced

culture down vertically to the
society's grassroots with

a

pretense

of bringing the good life closer
to them, but inwardly, the
"truthhas been that elites consciously
and forcefully seek legitimacy and

justification of this new culture based on
their ability to convince
grassroot society that the new culture is
superior to the traditional

way of life.

Initial

reaction to this new ideology has been indeed

comforting to the elites who see in their cultural
crusade

a

means of

protecting their chosen way of life with a concomitant
appeasement of
the grassroot society through stratified
inequality.

The emergence of the new culture has planted
in the social

a

deadly disease

fabric of the nation and has drastically eroded confi-

dence in large segments of the Nigerian society to mold and
control
their lifestyle in

within the society.

a

manner commensurate with the prevailing situation
Although it may be argued that several "socie-

ties" exist within the framework of Nigerian nationalism, it is

equally arguable, on the affirmative, that the pervasive impact of
this new culture has permeated the very foundations of these societies
The argument is not that cultural diffusion and what emerges is not

beneficial or detrimental to the growth of

a

dynamic culture; the

argument is that the process of diffusion carries with it hidden,
anathemic tendencies and elements which work to undermine and distort
the very bond which conveniently cement a society.

In other words,

the new culture tends to
break traditional values
and strive to

impose historical forms of alien
civilization without

rationality.

a

^

concomitant

The first order breeds cultural
anarchy and disinte-

gration, the second distortions
and mere illusory hopes.

exemplify the lack of confidence
in

Both order
'

a

nation's ability to shape its

future, and lead to its
eventual demise.

The demise of Nigeria's "First
Republic," military rule,
sudden burst of unexpected oil wealth,
all contributed to the disinte-

gration of the shaky social structure
which cemented the newly inde-

pendent Nigeria decades ago.

The nation has lost both the capacity

and the will to confront mounting
difficulties which threaten to over-

whelm her.

The same crisis of confidence grips the
capitalist system

of which Nigeria is

a

member.

In one

sense, the political crisis of

Nigeria's capitalism therefore, reflects

a

general crisis of western

culture, which it mimics, and which reveals itself
in

a

pervasive

despair and inability of understanding the course
of its modern
history or of subjecting it to rational direction.
From Nigerianization to Americanization
It is currently fashionable among many Nigerians and
especially

among informed "elite" circles to compare Nigeria to the United
States,
and to hold up the United States system as the appropriate model

national development.

for

This analogy is inherently faulty and may be

dangerous to the aspirations, expectations and fulfillment of what-

ever hopes the people of Nigeria hold.

Analogy of this sort fails

not only to take into careful consideration the differences in

historical experiences and development, but also the material and

technological

as^etri.s

and capabilities
inherent in the two

nations.

Comparisons of this sort
inevitably would be
unhealthy for
all and fatal to many,
once it ceased to be a
mere theory and was
adopted as a practical
scheme of life by the group
of personalities
effectively molding the future. 3
Such indeed is my opinion,
for Nigeria does not in
any way
represent a "microcosm" of the
American experience. The fact
is
that Nigeria is in its
embryonic stage of development
and does not in
any appreciable manner or
extent display the uniquely
"extensive

possibilities" characteristic of the
American system.

Extensive

possibilities may be characterized on
the one hand by the constraints
placed on a nation's development by

the logic of the limits to
growth

and hence of limited hopes, and
on the other hand by the wondrous

possibilities in material produced made possible
only through human
ingenuity and technological innovations
and breakthroughs.
Nigeria, in this period of development,
is not characterized
by extensive possibility, but may in
the future, with the attendant

problems of maintaining her civilization.

Such has been the case of

civilizations which she blindly emulates.

The evils and false hopes

of growth and civilization by comparison
must be debunked and de-

nounced by the older and younger generation as
well.

A well-founded

civilization must be able to draw from the stock of
indigenous
philosophical foundations and material resources which
should serve
the "expression of its own and only its own time."

Any strategy

deviating from this general principle breeds extravagance and
mortgages the welfare of future generations, concurrently encouraging
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expansive conization.

^imperialism

is

..

Expansive civilization
means 1mper1alism

civ11i2ation

adulterated," and in this

"phenomenal , 0 rm the destiny
of the West is now
irrevocably set."
In this stage of
Nigeria's growth, emulating
Western civilization wil! inevitably
force her into expansive
civilization which is

hl9My

inc

«

b '*

"1th her political and
ideological philosophy,

and the role she has
cautionsly but delicately
carved out to play in
Africa. The younger
generation hopefully would
denounce any strategy
aimed at expansive imperialistic
growth, no matter how compelling
and
attractive. They must formulate
ideas and cultivate values
which
negate expansive civilization
and which will form the
foundations for
a civilization inwardly
sustaining.
By adopting this strategy,
the

youth may not lose much but have
tremendous advantages over shaping
their future and that of the nation.
The conviction that the world
abounds with unlimited resources
and hence unlimited possibilities
and hopes should be discouraged.

The convictions of the unlimited

possibilities open to man in his environment
are fundamentally of
Western origin and should not be taken
seriously in those other areas

of the globe where possibilities are
limited and where hope is factor
of limited possibilities.

However, the doctrine of limited possibilities
may suffer at
the hands of a people who systematically are
burying the most precious

and aesthetic elements of their cultural heritage.

A closer study

and scrutiny of the system indicates that Nigerian
capitalism has

evolved

a

new political ideology— the ethics of consumption and
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ostentation which absolves
individuals of .oral
responsibility and
treats the, as benefactors
of historical
progress.

This new ideology
based on staunch faith in
capitalism, and supposedly
internally rewarding, has revived dependence
on external forces under
the guise of
transnational ization.

The Nigerian man has fallen
victim to cultural diffusion
which
has its primary origin in
the United States.
An appreciable segment
of the population has, through
transnational ization, been converted
from the economic man based on
traditional value and precedents
to
the psychological

ism."

In

man~»the final product of bourgeoisie
individual-

the process, he graduates into the
narcissistic man in

a

narcissistic society, eager to satisfy
his inner psychological demands
through pseudo-economic acquisitions.

Christopher Lasch, referring

to the American society which the
Nigerian man so emulates, writes

he is acquisitive in the sense that his
cravings
have no limits, he does not accumulate
goods and provisions
against the future, in the manner of the
acquisitive individualist of the nineteenth century political
economy, but
demands immediate gratification and lives in a
state of
restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire. 4
.

•

.

And so is the Nigerian man responding to the sudden
infusion of oil

wealth in the national economy, accumulates wealth not
as
against an uncertain, predatory future, but as

a

a

hedge

means of satisfying

the psychological demands made by a narcissistic society.

He is

constantly reminded of the painful outcome of failure, of poverty, and
the prestige and recognition that comes with the accumulation of

wealth.

He is constantly forced to display such wealth with the

assumption that it promotes ones standing in the community despite the

V
Possibility that such wealth may
be ill-gotten.

The narcissistic

society, of which Nigeria
is a good example,
does not ask probing
questions on the origin of wealth;
what matters above all,
is its

"

presence and the power that
goes with it.
Lasch describes such society
as one
.

.

.

that gives increasing
prominence and

encouragement
to narcissistic traits-cultural
devaluation of the Sast
C
n
n
thG P ° Verty f the
Prilling IdSo o es,
°
wMch ha S ? 0
lih6
P 0n realit* and abandoned the
attlLt In m 35
-I
bUt the P ° Verty of the narcissist's
'

\?

^nnerlife.S

^"

U

V

This observation is, of course,
true of the Nigerian man who
has repeatedly rejected the very
foundations on which his cultural

values are based for an alien culture
essentially externally cultivated.

In the process,

he underestimates the value of his
worth and

elevates those of other cultures.

The Nigerian man has enormous

confidence in things external to him, he
grossly distrusts his fellow
Nigerian and downplays his abilities for
meaningful internally

generated progress, he loves foreign-made goods
because "foreign is
better" and extolls the virtues of "americanization.

pseudo-consciousness, the Nigerian man
truction.

is

"

In

this path of

doomed to failure and des-

He resents the past and equates progress with the
future.

As Lasch correctly observes,

Having trivialized the past by equating it with outmoded styles of consumption, discarded fashions and
attitudes, people today resent anyone who draws on
the past in serious discussions of contemporary
conditions or attempts to use the past as a standard
by which to judge the present. 6
The Nigerian man believes that the future belongs to those who most

seriously and arduously follow the American footsteps.

Far from
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realizing the fundamental
historical differences, and
far from
judging critically the utility
of such a possibility and
peril it
offers, policy-makers
consciously force Nigeria's
future through the
path of arrested development
which, when spatially and
sporadically
achieved, was at great human,
economic and political cost to
the
nation.

The immediate concern is to
steer the country away from

traditional, stagnating values into
one of "modernization" and

development.

With varying degrees of interpretation,
modernization

and development represent the basic
premise for the drive of national

redemption, which, as

I

have earlier indicated, constitutes

ingredient for the politics of transformation.

On several

major

a

occasions,

this great transformation has floundered
through misinterpretations,

through equating development and modernization
and on the whole,

through the misplacement of priorities.
Rapid industrialization and "modernization"
are the two ele-

ments of rationalization advanced by those policy-makers
who would

wish Nigeria catapulted into

a

modern day America.

Caught in the

"industrial dilemma" of having to rely extensively on external

dependence on the importation of intermediary goods to feed her
industries, and having to produce them expensively domestically
when
this is possible, efforts at concretely formulating useful

strategies

for the growth and development of other sectoral economic activities

are either underutilized or simply neglected.
is

The inevitable result

the sectoral suboptimi zation of several linkages in the economy.

For example, agriculture which is the "mainstay of the economy" was

virtually ignored

in

preference to rapid industrialization.

"Per-
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formance of the export crops"
says the World Bank,
"was particularly
disappointing.'^ It was particularly
disappointing
the

^^

apart from the oil revenues
which account for roughly
90 percent of
Nigeria's foreign exchange,
the export of crops remains
the only
means through which the nation
can obtain hard currency.

Moreover,

Nigeria which once was able to
feed her ever-increasing
population
now depends on large consignments
of food importation to satisfy
her
needs.

As Richard Joseph observes,

the country which was once the

world's largest producer of palm oil
and groundnuts must now import
these commodities to satisfy its
domestic needs. 8

Clearly the issue or problem facing
Nigeria today

is one of

balancing her ambitious "accelerated
industrial development" with the
demands of other sectoral economic activity
without jeopardizing the
health of other equally pressing and essential
economic activities.
In

the final

analysis, one important question stands out-are

Nigerians not unwisely arresting and accelerating
their development?
Is

it not prudent to carefully stagger
development plans and strategy,

and avoid the perils and the unnecessary effects
of dependent develop-

ment?

A clearly defined government policy and objectives
would not

only visualize

a

continued and expanding role for foreign enterprise

as a complement to domestic capital,

but would also ensure that the

productive resources of the economy are largely exploited for the
economy's advantages.
Quite apart from the clarification of government policy and

objectives toward the "complementary role" of foreign capital

in

the

process, of industrialization, the need arises for policy-makers to
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delineate and differentiate
between the processes of
industrialization
and modernization- two key
development concepts never
before fully
analyzed and understood. The
myth of American life
based on modernization and fuelled by extensive
industrialization must not be
allowed to infuse 'transcendent
meaning into the lives of men.
Neither
should it offer messianic
illusion to a people whose
historical experience and material base seem
highly constraining.
Peter L. Berger
warns that "people hovering on
the edge of despair are always
open to

messianic myths" based on industrialization
and modernization which
in themselves are objects of
exploitation and oppression and can
de-

prive the individual of the security
which, however harsh they may
have been, traditional
In

institution provided for him.

other words, there

is

a

price to be paid by societies aspir-

ing to modernity and industry, and
"this new freedom is purchased at
a

high price, and again "with varying
degrees of brutality, physical

violence and exploitation, continue today as
stark realities in some
parts of the Third World now undergoing
It is

'the great transformation'." 9

indeed arguable that the desire for rapid
transformation may

exacerbate and not reduce inequal ity, exploitation and
dependent

development among nations in the international system.
Advanced industrial

nations have in fact engaged in cultural

imperialism because it

"softens up the enemy," and prepares the way for economic
penetration.

Secondly, by extolling the virtues of their "superior culture" aimed
at conquering the minds of men, advanced industrial nations capture

and entrap the less developed nations in
development..

If that is the case,

a

vicious circle of dependent

it is necessary to ask whether
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arrested dependent development
to development.

is

indeed the most appropriate
route

A nation could with the aid
of foreign capital

industrialize rapidly as Brazil did
some two decades ago and find
itself saddled with mounting
foreign debts which will eventually
make
a

mockery of development.

penalty of this approach.

Nigeria cannot afford the luxury
and
In

the final analysis, what matters
is

the rate of industrialization
pursued by

a

society and how this

process affects and impacts on other
sectoral economic activity and,
of course, how industrialization
justifies the need for modernization
It would be argued

then that industrialization and modernization
are

associated processes which tend to overlap, 10
and that the promises
of modernization may be fulfilled depending
on rapid industrialization which may be altogether impossible or extremely
difficult, given
the lack of capital, resources, and the required
attitudes and skills
in the society.

Foreign capital, especially the multinational corpor

ation, usually fills this vacuum for purposes of trade and
of course
profit.

Transnational ization of the culture, of which the multi-

nationals are main agents, not only seeks to transform the social
culture of Nigerians, but also has given the traditional pattern of
political discourse and activity

a

whole new interpretation.

Politics as Spectacle
The demise of what Nigerians call the First Republic (19601966) and the emergence of the "Second Republic" (1979-1983) ushered
in an era of degradation and degeneration of the traditional

form of

politics which fundamentally stresses nationalism and independence.
Today's politics and the manner in which it

is

conducted emphasizes

341

transnational ism and dependence.
The First Republic strove
to cultivate the

polities seen as

development.
reasons.

11

develops

of

condition of other, more
substantive types of
This remarkable effort
failed due to several
systemic
a

In fact,

the country contained
several elements of contra-

diction which eventually sowed
the seeds for the weakening
and
destruction of the First Republic.
The first of these contradictions
revealed itself in the division
of Nigeria into three regions
reflecting the strongholds of each
of the largest ethnic groups-the
Hausa in the North, the Igbo in
the East and the Yoruba in the
West-

while the Colonial government preached
one Nigeria.
as these intensified tribal

Divisions such

loyalty and competition.

Ekwueme Okoli

writes
sectional interest including regional
particularism
tends to grow in intensity, not because
of any absolute import
attributed to the tie itself, but because
of the existence
of competing loyalties of the same
general order without
the moderating influence of the
superordinate loyalty to an
all-embracing national entity.
In Nigeria, the centre never
had a chance to develop this superordinate
loyalty.
From
1947 to 1960, while the regions were growing
in power and
influence, no action was taken to create a central
power
base independent of the regions.
This situation arose at
this time because the centre was tightly
controlled by the
British Colonial Authority.
Its power and legitimacy depended on the authority of the imperial government.^
.

.

.

The Westminster or parliamentary form of government which
the

British imposed on Nigeria was never meant to work out harmoniously;
it was as Carl

J.

Friedrich suggested

a

mere "gadget" and "ensemble"

which never sought to take into serious consideration the multitribal and ethnic diversities which bedevil

the nation.

He writes

U2

the hope that one can employ
it [federalism!
merely as a gadget, a mechanism
for re olvinq aroL
antagonism and conflict, as in
Nigeria and elsewhere,
elsewhere
is doomed at the outset. 13
•

•

•

Echoing this observation, Sam
Ikoku argues that
not long after the granting
of independence the
international contradictions of the
political svstPmL
queathed by the British began to
work them
v
The burning issues were
self-determination for the ethnic
minorities, the unusual federal
structure, etc. 14
.

.

.

f

^

Therefore, systemic organization of
institutional political

structures which the British left
behind was contradictory

in toto,

and was never established to provide
meaningful approach to solving
the nation's problems in terms of
the development of politics.

Concomitant with the contradictory politics
of British colonial
legacy was

a

more sinister, tribally based political
development-the

emergence, within the larger tribes, of the
cult of personality, the

messianic myth cultivated by prominent nationalist
leaders (who

nonetheless have strong tribal backing and followers)
and celebrated

passionately by the tribes.
tion of tribal

The inevitable result was the substitu-

politics for national politics and the consequent

degradation of national politics.

As tribal

leaders seek support and

legitimacy mostly in their various regions, politics
degenerates into
a

spectacle where personalities and how they perform displace the

necessity to debate on the issues.

In

the rush to shed

his tribal

garb, the politician announces with characteristic confidence that
he is "detribal ized" while inwardly maintaining tribal

sympathies.

Detribalization therefore becomes the vehicle for propagating his
political ambition, and thus

"

Arffittt!Z orv^?
"

the

1

to

^

n
lonal1 st
self-assertion came. Hi's rlaht tn
leadership „as reinforced b?
he hy othes?
„
at he
was shorn of ethnic
reflexes eas?l5 »m! f
-articulate desires of

The major reasons for the
failure of the development
of politics in the First Republic
has been made clear.
The military regimes
of the late General Aguiyi
Ironsi and later of Genera,
Gowon sought
to "correct" the
"excesses" of the civilian
regime.
One major advantage of this interim military
rule was that Nigeria
bought time out
to reexamine and reassess
its political history and
ultimately its
future and destiny.
The military regime and the
"revolution" cleared
the national conscience of
the political aberration
which has over
the years tended to cloud the
judgment of Nigerian politicians.
The
extent of this clarification and
purge is not clear.
However, it

was the "beginnings of a national
revolution"-a revolution of the

conscience, hopes, aspirations and
visions of the politicians and

people of Nigeria.

In his

"presidential address" to the Nigerian

Economic Society in 1973 entitled "The
Nigerian Revolution, 19661976," Mr. A. A. Ayida contends that
the military regime ushered in
the "beginnings of a national revolution"
but that the revolution was

without

"vanguard" comprising of a "body of highly
dedicated men

a

and women with a clearly defined national
purpose and a sense of

mission.

1

The revolution which Mr. Ayida eloquently talks of
contains
a

prognostic allusion of the need for the development of
politics.

The lack of a clear necessity for the development
of the political
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thought and processes in Nigeria
as well as other African
countries
has confused the placement
of emphasis, in most cases,
on either
the politics of development
and the development of
politics.
It is
my contention that developing
the latter would remove
the severe
constraints and conflict which
presently characterize much of
the
African political history.

Herbert

J.

Spiro writes

56 3 P ec " l1ar1t of B1 ack Africa
that most
y
? "I** rS
stronger emphasis upon
9 enera11 ^ P la
nni
)l?
political

AfVc

1

"

^
than

upon economic development and that
many
of them have professed a belief in
and a commitment to
the primacy of politics. 17

This attitude toward the primacy of
politics by Black African leaders
is an anachronism of history.

Today, the emphasis is placed

unwisely on the politics of development which
negates the wisdom of
its earlier member Kwame Nkrumah.

The late Nkrumah has preached,

"Seek ye first the political kingdom: and all else
shall be added

unto thee." Does Nkrumah mean increased political
participation and
social mobilization, or "the generation of

a

greater volume of issues

for politics" and the conscientious treatment of these
issues in

clearly defined and constituted political forum?
Nkrumah really mean?

But what does

"The forging and popularizing of new goals,"

or rather, stagnating in old political myths and processes?

Spiro asks, which is

a

Herbert

better index of political development

the stability and consensus of indifference and stagnation, or the fluidity and discussions of ferment and of
the recognition of new possibilities for political action?
Each of these finds its advocates as an index of political
development J 8
.

.

.

a

J
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As a response to the needs
of political development,
the

Nigerian people have elected
to undergo the process
of the politics
of transformation, one that
takes into careful
considerations the
lessons and experiences of the
defunct First Republic. The
First

Republic was a political failure
and in 1979, Nigeria adopted
the
American system of Presidential
government instead. This choice
was
made with "characteristic pragmatism;" 19
however, it promises to
correct, as the First Republic did
not, the political

which threw the country into chaos and
instability.

"excesses"

Despite the

shortcomings of the Presidential system of
government -a system which
on the whole remains largely
incomprehensible to a large segment of

Nigerian politicians and populace, it should
be made clear that this
system of government offers Nigeria

a

chance for peace, stability

and cooperation among the various otherwise
conflicting ethnic

interests.

The creation of states was a timely advantage
to this

system of government and served to break up regional
identification
and loyalty which contributed largely to the demise
of the First

Republic since it was assumed that the "language of conflict
had been
cast predominantly in regional terms."

Thus the abolition of the

four regions in 1966 and the creation of states instead is
probably
i

rreversibl e.

2fi

Although the creation of states and the subsequent adoption
of the Presidential system of government represents a remarkable

achievement in the development of Nigerian politics, it created, as
did the First Republic, a disturbing spectre— the theaterization of

politics.

The Presidential

system of government seems to give rise
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among Nigerian politicians
to the overwhelming
desire to sell themselves rather than address the
pressing national issues for
which
the country is looking forward.

Politics became

a

spectacle-an

extravagant public display of
ill-gotten wealth-and voters
were somehow convinced that the candidate
with the largest display of
wealth is
the "right" candidate.
In the process, politics
inevitably degenerates into a spectacle and
politicians adopt pseudo-sel f-awareness

because the political game is transformed
and the stakes much higher.
The rhetoric of nation-building and
nationhood gives way to that of

acquisition of wealth and politicians
become distinguished not on the
basis of official performance, but rather
on their ability to mani-

pulate public opinion and thus win their
confidence.
The quality of the political process and
the productivity of

politics declines reflecting the inability of the
voters to identify
and present pressing issues, including
susceptibility to the nar-

cissistic wishes of the politicians.

The enslavement of the elector-

ate has led to several outbursts from concerned
citizens.

Writing

on the two decades Nigeria "spent as goalless, aimless"
nation, the

editors of Ra diance Magazine accuses the nation of drift,
complacency

_and decay.

It also accuses its leaders of doing "incalculable

damage" to the nation because "everyone, the executives, the businessmen,

the intellectuals,

the

'religious' men, each wants to make

fortune for himself from his responsibility to the nation." 21

a

Moral

decay in the nation's political and social institutions reflects an
inner, decadent force endemic within the Nigerian people which has

roots in the culture of narcissism. Christopher Lasch charges that

a

narcissistic society "worships
celebrity
spectacle for the older

foms of theater
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.

and subst1tutes

which encouraged identifica-

tion and emulation" as an
extension of one's self. 22

Ni g erian

politicians unwisely exploit
this feature of the Nigerian
character
and treat it as a means
to achieving ambitions
by incorporating it

within their strategic
calculations.
hen
; h ;„'t!!

0
1

t

? li

-

Lasch argues

Clans and administrators have
no other aim
'

0f SpeC1 fic P° licies or to
evaluate success or
fail^23
So it is with Nigerian
politicians who in the main lack the
necessary

and adequate intellectual
capabilities to grasp effectively and

master the intricacies of the new
system which they so sheepishly
emulate.

Credibility, as

a

result, is thus measured in terms of

prestige and the uncanny ability to
convince the voters of the candidate's worth and sincerity.
The conduct of politics as spectacle, as

a

feverish game for

mass consumption, necessarily distracts
politicians from real issues
and in place of selfless service to the
nation, breeds corruption.

Corruption
Political drama in Nigeria will not be complete
unless corruption is assigned a place; this place is by
design and by accident con-

spicuous.
to Nigeria.

Corruption is not

peculiar phenomenon attributable only

Developed as well as developing nations suffer from this

national malaise.
in Nigeria,

a

However,

I

am concerned with corruption as it is

its pervasive, corrosive impact on the social

how this social evil

fabric and

threatens the development of politics, the

^

politics of development and the
productivity of politics.

Much has been written and
voiced against corruption
in the
Nigerian press, but never on
their impact in terms
of three key concepts listed above.

discussed earlier the development
of politics in the
First
Republic and why it failed and
the subsequent emergence
of the
Second Republic.
The Second Republic is
precariously based on a
I

fragile foundation in that systemic
and institutional arrangements,
although based on the twin doctrines
of "checks and balances" and
"separation of powers," do not augur
well with the Nigerian version
of the Presidential system.
Dr. Onwumere notes that
"American
political parties are weak in terms of
controlling
the affairs of congressmen unlike
Nigerian parties
which tend to strongly control the
political behaviour of
their legislators. 24

There

is

a

strong tendency among Nigerian political
scientists as well

as several other branches of academia
to describe Nigerian parties

as corrupt and striving to protect the
interests of the parties at
the expense of the interests of the nation.

There is also the

critical appraisal that Nigerian political
parties are not fully

matured in the dynamics of the newly adopted political
system and
hence are apt to engage in conflicting relationships with
each other.

These observations are basically true and do not promote

atmosphere for political discourse and interaction.

a

sincere

When they do,

it is not a confirmation of political maturity, but the fulfillment

of the dictates of a system to which the parties and electorate have

individually pledged allegiance.

Thus essentially politics is seen
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not as the management of
allocation of resources or
the productivity
of politics, but as a struggle
for political hegemony
and dominance
of the State which largely
represents the instrument
with which
economic and political largesse is
wastefully distributed to party
faithfuls. The State and its
machinery, therefore, functions
more
as a reluctant agent of wealth
distribution and not as its developmerit

or creation.

Conceptualization

is

further complicated by the fact
that

parties are the embodiment of several

competitors such as

is

interest groups and not their

the case with American political

parties.

25

The party in power in Nigeria, 26
systematically doles out the spoils
of victory to its members commensurate
with the efforts made towards

victory and the amount contributed.

Thus contracts are awarded not

on proven capability to execute, but simply
on the basis of party

membership.

Monopoly of this means of resource allocation system-

ically excludes other rival parties and breeds
inefficiency and cor-

ruption.

It also introduces factionalism within the "ruling"
party

because struggle for contract awards are usually the case;
awards
of contract has never been settled peacefully and the
loser can

threaten to break away from the party.

Politicians who might other-

wise make good statesmen and legislators are lured into the "wrong"

party simply because of promises and anticipation of lucrative contracts.

Therefore, issues of national interest and concern are

ignored or suspended for the pursuit of sectional and personal gains.
Political behavior such as these make bad politics and bad politicians, and invariably is detrimental to the body politic and the
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development of politics.
There is also the moral
dimension to irreverent
political
behavior on the part of Nigerian
party system.
Political parties are
presumably organized in order
to gain control of the
government and
use the machinery of this
great institution for serving
the needs of
the people.
In Nigeria, the
perversion of this simple principle
i:s
widespread among the competing
political parties.
Parties do not

only struggle to gain control
of government, they also do
so to control

the means of economic production
which is, in most cases,

pre-

a

lude to dividing the spoils of
government among party bulwarks.

Practices such as these are anathemic
to democratic principle and

democratic order.

It should be noted, as William
C. Havard did,

the existence of parties in
ful

contrivance, it is

a

a

democratic society

is

more than

sine qua non of democratic order.

a

In

that

usefact,

this should be so because political
parties are institutions through

which the promise of the democratic ideal can
27
be fulfilled.

The

existence of political parties in themselves do not,
to any appreciable
extent, elevate democratic ideals to the realm of
grassroot practicality.

This observation is indeed pertinent to the Nigerian
exper-

ience and works to ensure the entrenchment of monolithic
interest
group party-politics.

Nigerian political parties are characterized

by remarkable asymmetry in strength, vision, and capability
and

asymmetry contributes to skewed performance

in

political processes

rendering as it were enormous advantages to the more powerful party.

Although as it

is

presently, no political party has demonstrated the

capacity to control both Houses of the National Assembly.

So far,

I
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have resisted identifying each
party by name and the
role each is
constrained to play in Nigerian
politics.
Cautious prudence dictates this posture and this will
remain so in the rest of
the analysis.

Asy^etry
advantages to

a

in functional

capabilities conferring undemocratic

single party is unfair, dangerous
and anathemic to

democratic principles and ideals.

It may lead to the emergence
of

authoritarian structures and tendencies,
which will not augur well to
the visions which Nigerian citizens
all share.
This tendency toward

authoritarianism and totalitarianism

is

gradually creeping its way

into Nigerian politics and will not
long manifest itself clearly.
The need for checks and balances in
the political system clearly

exists.

This is, of course, necessary to keep in
constant check any

excessive ambition toward dominance or control
by any one party.
The question is: How can this be done?

system

28

I

propose

a

two-party

with roughly equal electoral strength which would
provide

voters with "real" alternatives in polling booths,
and which promises
to remove the monopoly of a single "party function"
by a single poli-

tical

party which on the whole does not satisfy the demand for

effective choice and alternative.
ness of

a

two-party system over

a

The -advantages and the effective-

multi-party system

is an

arrange-

ment which has gained the backing of several informed and competent
Nigerian citizens.

The benefits of such an arrangement does not de-

rive from academic exercise.

It

is a

Under the two-party system, it

lesson derived from experience.
is

easier to reach an accord

between two parties--an advantage which has so far eluded Nigerian

political parties.

^

When accords are
reached
edcned

stability and durabnity
because each party
voters' consent, to withdraw
its

thai
they ado not> promise

'

is

agrees.

ready even without

Two-party syste. re-

duces voters'

"choice to a clear-cut
either/or proposition,
COm promises and reconciles a
broad range of potential^
disruptive
groups into a relatively
stable consensus." As
Havard observers
n

Sori tarian ptuvi?y
a

a

U

h

o? the

multi-party system in

Lo

dVan a9eS th
the
t
arty
systan has over

"

£"S

-

Responsibility and accountability
is thus placed on the
shoulders
of the majority party with
the minor party in opposition.
This

sort

of arrangement would clearly
assist in the development of
politics
and the productivity of
politics.
The politics of development suffers
largely from the lack of

adequate and clear identification of
actors and the lack of
sistent, coherent articulation of
what it
and how this development is executed.

is

a

con-

Nigerians are developing

The political class "as the

ruling elite" has demonstrated inability to
coherently and consistently

formulate policies which are in the nation's
interest.
the civil

Consequently,

service or the bureaucracy are thrust with
enormous responsi-

bility of first playing

a

second, of executing them.

significant role in policy formulation, and
Since the civil service is characterized

by the "existence of ethnic group consciousness"
which may "frustrate
the evolution of national goals" due to conflicting ethnic
loyalties

and bias, corruption is therefore

a

characteristic feature of the
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politics of development.
Professor Onitri and

A.

A.

Ayida observe that
when this

process is

or-grou^rwh^h'conrrollne^cMn^rroTr 6 " 15

ffl:s.a

rt1ci,laply where the

poiuica

the
'

"

^
-t

The resultant conflict between
the political ruling class
and
the bureaucrats, each with
interest to further and protect,
breeds
and entrenches solidaristic and
egoistic corruption. Although

"governmental corruption or improbity
is found in all forms of

bureaucracy and all periods of political
development," 31 it

is

only

necessary to point out that the success
or failure of the politics
of development depends to

a

considerable extent on the probity of

the ruling class and, of course, also on
the bureaucracy.

It also de-

pends, as Susan Rose-Ackerman points out,
on the "elimination of any

conflict of interest between law makers and
bureaucrats.

Since the

same individuals perform both tasks, they
can act to maximize personal

gain."

32

Conflict of interest is exacerbated by the tendency of the
political ruling class to see the issues of national development
as

primarily one of the intricacies of economic determinism.

Hence

little or no role is played by them while concurrently abdicating
the formulation, articulation and implementation of this role to the

bureaucrats.

Examples of this abdication of role can be found in
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recent state declarations and
interventions in the economy
such as
the 1972 and 1977
indenization decrees, where the
state apparatus
was given a decisive role to
play in its formulation
and implementation.
The "neutralization" or
-failure" of the program,
according
to Tom Biersteker, could
be traced to the collaborative
spirit and
arrangements between the bureaucrat
on the one hand, local
capital
and international

National

finance capital on the other. 33

"development" has solely been equated
with economic

criteria and "modernity" and has
eclipsed other primary criteria such
as the development of politics,

introducing as

disarray of emphasis and priority.

a

result confusion and

Joseph La Palombara points out

that

After the achievement of the overriding
political goal of
national independence, little if any
attention is paid to
the problem of political development;
almost no systematic
articulation takes place regarding the possible
characteristics of political "modernity".
at best a certain
amount of lip service is paid the matter of political
development; at worst, the whole area is demagogically
treated or submerged to the prior needs of goals of
effecting economic development. 34
.

.

Under these conditions, bureaucratic corruption emerges and
thrives
and a series of documentation on bureaucratic corruption in
Nigeria

abounds.

35

When bureaucrats and the ruling political class who are

ostensibly responsible for formulating, articulating and effecting
national goals and aspirations are"corrupt, the inevitable result
is

the underproduce vi ty of politics, aided and exacerbated by the

desire for ostentation.
The Cult of Ostentation and Stupefaction
"A Cornucopia of easily won

oil

revenues," writes Peter
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Kilby, "can also corrode
the social fabric

case when "petro-naira"
created

a

This was indeed the

new generation of
nouveau-riche

class whose only claim to
wealth is the systematic
looting and embezzlement of public treasury.
The term nouveau riche
is not limited
to the new breed of
politicians, top civil servants
and businessmen,
but also to a new generation
of middle-class Nigerians
including the
intellectuals and the professional
class, whose aspirations
range
from "owning properties" to
enjoying the "American" way of
life by

sometimes "being there."

When the government promulgated
its indi-

genization decrees, it offered the
way to easy and unearned riches
by the upper and middle classes.

Richard Joseph writes

he aS 1
nt P ro P ertied class desirous of
bigger
t
? r?
cars, f?!
flashier
clothes,
more lavish parties and burial
celebrations, greater means to satisfy
these desires have„
been transferred to them at the behest
of the government. 37
In

most cases, the profit accruing from these
businesses

plowed back into the business as

growth and development.

a

is not

means of generating and sustaining

Rather, it is spent on frivolous, lavish

and ostentatious consumption.

Today, the "great urge of many Niger-

ians, from manual workers to senior civil

servants and university

staff," laments Joseph, "is to inject themselves into

a

trading cir-

cuit, whether of cement, lace, or palm oil, and get their
'cut' of
the action."

38

Thus,

in

their bid to achieve quick success and

riches, relatively respectable professionals risk atrophising their

competence; this often has been the case.

Manual workers in

a

feverish struggle to measure up to the professionals and thus compete
effectively, don ill-fitting suits with oversized briefcases,

^

acquiring in the process the
language of business
"deals." The
bastardization of the business
culture was an outgrowth
of the oil
boo. which instilled in the
Nigerian

citizenry-poor and rich alike-

an inordinate ambition for
massive acquisition,

instant celebra-

tion and gratification, and
on the whole, conspicuous
comsumption.

The struggle for a piece of the
action pervades the entire
social fabric from the bricklayer
to the
top civil

servant, and from

the small

businesswoman in the village market
to captains of large
corporations.
Kilby observes that
',

a

™;
not

the tem Pt ati °n to privatize the
new wealth exercises
insignificant segment of the population.
Politicians
h ° Pe
Pontage oTifi'
.

^undr^l^jV-

*

^

Although the struggle to "privatize"
petro-naira by the various segments of the Nigerian populace has been
carried on through sheer
hard work and efforts, other means have
been actively sought-devious

and surreptitious in origin and with the
active connivance of politi-

cians and those who control the state machinery.
The role of the politician has been one of the
cult hero,

a

messianic figure whose success depends on his ability to
reach out
and touch the people; who would in turn pronounce him worthy
of their
votes.

He becomes a celebrity and invariably is forced to lead

double life.

a

Richard Sennett in The Fall of the Publi c Man_.(1977).

bemoans the dilemma of the public man--the age of civility became the
age of charisma, extroversion and false "intimacy."

judged as personalities and acted accordingly.

Politicians were

The traditional

vision of the pol i tician— the "cargo ship personality," the agent of
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earthly abundance and the
precursor of change-once
upheld and
cherished by voters, now
degenerates into theatre
and spectacle
The
politician's ability to win votes
and elections is thus
transformed
into a factor of charisma,
of prestige and of
mesmerism.
Voters,
therefore, are suddenly converted
into victims of
narcissism. And as
Lasch makes clear, "personal
magnetism, a quality which
supposedly
enabled a man to influence and
dominate others, became the
major
key to success." The politician
and political process
degenerates
into a form of spectacle and
success, in the eyes of the
politician,

'

has to be "ratified by publicity."

The politician, realizing his
worth, is tied precariously to
how he presents himself and not
necessarily the issues to the public.

In

attempts to "sell" his candidacy, he
indulges in the mastery of
"interpersonal relations" and not the conscien
ious mastery of the
issues.

Thus, the "true" politician degenerates
into

man," the "master of impressions."

a

"confidence

As a matter of solving the prob-

lems which face society, the politics
of spectacle has very little
to contribute and indeed has nothing
in common to a prescribed solu-

tion.

But in Nigerian politics, what really matters
and what comes to

dominate the aspirations of most voters

is

to see a candidate in an

ostentatious display of wealth and power--qual i ties which
are carefully calculated to manipulate and thus render neutral
opposition
forces.

This process goes to show how increasingly sophisticated

Nigerian politics are.

The editors of Radiance

,

a

Muslim magazine,

lament that "politics has been progressing towards sophistication

.

the perfection of trickery, manipulation of public mind and attitude

.

.

the
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to suit certain vested
interests.

1,39

The vulgarization of Nigerian
politics meant the distortions
of traditional values of life
as manifested in the
politics of
development; it also meant the
accommodation of "vested interests"
in
the form of alien demands of
the diffusion of alien
culture into

indigenous way of life.

The process of cultural
diffusion, it should

be pointed out, is not per
se detrimental or anathemic
to the growth

of a nation.

What seems objectionable, however,
is the frivolous,

"vulgarized," inimical impact this
acculturation will bring.

In

addition, the necessity for choice
of more appropriate cultural attributes and elements which are worth
emulating, are institutionally

scuttled, and those which present inimical
repercussions are condoned and even encouraged by those
whose habits find refuge in

ostentatious living.
The politics of development conducted under
pressure to ele-

vate the standard of living of the masses,
saw an advantage in alliance with foreign capital, especially the
multinational corporations.
The alliance between the state machinery and the
multinational cor-

poration forged

a

policy based on the ethic and culture of consumption

and suddenly it was understood that the worker might
be useful to

the capitalist as

a

consumer; that he needed to be imbued with

a

taste for higher things and lustful desires for the good things of
life.

The multinational corporations have products and

a

way of life

to sell, and saw in the state machinery a demonstrated willingness

to act as a partner.

Mass production of goods internally (where

possible) and the importation of luxury items became

a

strategy on

~rs
culture of

were the pu b ,ic-p 00r
and rich a!l ke

caption,

.

l

n

^

the proceS5

not of productivity
was born

^

.

became students who yearn
for enlightenment
in the culture of
consumption.
The virtues of consumption
were extolled; if
you do not
consume, you do not
"have" it
it.
tt am n + *to
This
This a
attempt
civilize the masses,
•

says Lasch, has now
given
rise to
y

a
a

cnr,-^
society dominated by
appearances

--the society of spectacle.
The provision of luxurious
materials of life displace
the
most essential and the
television which is a recent
transplant to
Nigeria and which has gained
the attention and confidence
of most
households, calls attention to
these products by way of
periodic
advertisements.
It extolls the advantages
of the American way of
life and promotes "consumption
as a way of life."
"When economic

necessity yields to the necessity
for limitless economic
development,"
writes Guy Debord, "the satisfaction
of basic and generally recognized human needs gives way to
an uninterrupted fabrication
of
40
pseudo-needs."
The use of video tapes, a luxurious
commodity

whose operation

becomes

a

is

hardly understood by many consumers

in

Nigeria

status symbol which must be owned by
an up-and-coming seg-

ment of the population.

Thus every progress-oriented person
desires

to own one, and the market is
flooded with cheap and shoddy products

designed to fulfill this burning need.

Businessmen who make endless

trips to "overs" (abroad) come home loaded
with pornographic movies

and other assorted "goodies" because "it

is

what the people wanted"

and not a means of promoting useful and
legitimate commerce.

This

"
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-asure of

value, declares the
nation's "Committee on
Ethica!
Revolution," p.ovides all
kinds of vices that
dull num an perception
fill! the mind with lustful
desires" and breeds
"moral decay."
The politics of develops
has educated the
.asses into "an

unappeasable appetite not only
for goods but for new
experiences
and personal fulfilment"
which indeed is frivolous
and unnecessary
for

a

healthy polity.

It upholds consumption
as a way of life and

substitutes the traditional
values of hard work, thrift
and delayed
gratification for the ethics of
leisure and pleasure. Not
only does
this new way of life dull
the senses into stupefaction,
it betrays
the promise of good future which
the politics of development
was

supposed to cultivate.

This new culture transforms us
into connois-

seurs of our own decadence by
extending aristocratic habits to
the
masses.
"The apparatus of mass promotion,"
writes Lasch, "attacks

ideologies based on the postponement of
gratification;" it allies
itself with the desire for lavishness,
ostentation and "popularity."
The apparatus of mass promotion dictates
to one on how his life

should be run and in the process turns the
victim into
always ready to serve his master.

a

zombie,

The mass media, exemplified by all

forms of advertising and by the television,
instructs you on how to

lead the "good life" and never made available the
means to this end.

The object, not entirely free from the profit motive,
"is to divert

people's attention from their problems, from the inequities of the
rul ing class.
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As politicians seek more
public exposure and as
the "pri-

vileged class" engage in
spending sprees designed
for theatrical
display and spectacle, a
narcissistic trait emerges,
reflecting the
poverty of the narcissist "inner
life," furnishing in
the process
"proof of that culture's bankruptcy."
As a reflection of
this bankruptcy, people are driven to
acquire wealth by all means;
corruption
abounds and life is made "cheap."
The talk of every city
gets its
loaded share of sex, money and
power; interpersonal relationships
degenerate into manipulative games
where the end product is sexual
conquest.

Traditional values which ought to
provide

future directives could be drawn

is

a

pool

where

devalued and in some cases re-

jected, implying deep-seated symptoms
of cultural crisis which

afflict us.
in a

The will and the ability to cling
to traditional values

rapidly "modernizing" world

is

rare indeed.

Only the wise and

prudent prevail, and only those who learn
from the past survive.
Thus the flight from our past would only
worsen our cultural drift
and predicament.

A judicious look into our past is not only
neces-

sary, but therapeutic.

It seems

and confusion, we might produce

to me,
a

then, that out of this turmoil

different kind of society, one

that is more complicated, more civilized and less dependent.
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PART FOUR

-

CONCLUSION

POLITICS OF TRANSFORMATION:

AN OVERVI

The politics of transformation
seeks to examine prevailing
ideologies by looking into the past
"while going beyond mere
survival
of that past" for the sole
purpose of "creation of new
forms and
modes" and the presentation of new
demands based on the satisfaction

of the new psychological man of
our times.

Thus the politics of

transformation and its process is both
psychological and historical;
very much

a

product of historical change and

In Nigeria,

a

matter of "sensibi 1 ity

the historical attempt to control

.

its destiny by

coming to grips with those concrete issues
which face her and which

threatens to overwhelm her, gave life and impetus
to the politics of

transformation.

The need for this type of politics arose
partly out

of the demands made by academic intellectuals
and those who run the

machinery of state, to the ruling political class who were
unable to
coherently and consistently articulate programs and policies on
which
the future of the nation depends.

Furthermore, concrete lessons of

experience derived, first, from history, and second from global
international relations made it necessary that Nigeria transform her

position in the international system with the objective of mastering
this new position.
The politics of transformation took several forms and can be

understood within the framework of four fundamental systemic changes.
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These systemic changes include
the indenization or
"Nigen'aniza Jon"
of the national economy;
the creation of new
politics; one which seeks
and hopes to "correct" the
political excesses of the
First Republic,
by transcending the systemic
difficulties and attitudes
left behind
by the British colonial regime;
Nigeria's entry into the
Organizati on
of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC); and finally, the
transnational 'zation and "modernization" of the
society.
It is indeed difficult to
measure whether indigenization

decrees of 1972 and alter 1977
designed to transfer the control
of
the economy to indigenous
enterprises
has been a success or not.

A

measure of success has been achieved,
however, much in the direction
of control needs to be achieved.
Although many fortunate Nigerians
now have

a

greater share in the growth of the economy,
evidence

indicates that Enterprise Decrees as

a

legislative instrument have

been flexible, making it much too easy for
foreign corporations to

circumvent.

Of nearly one thousand enterprises affected,
only about

one third fully complied by the middle of 1978.
Failures to comply fully can be traced to two major
points:
firstly, there is what could be termed structural failures;
while
the letter of the decree was in most cases adhered to, its spirit

that

of spread

businesses
among

a

-

-

of ownership or control of formerly foreign owned

has not been.

few capitalists.

Ownership has in fact been concentrated
Secondly, there has been downright evasion

and "dishonesty" on the part of foreigners who own businesses.

Those

foreigners include but are not limited to Lebanese, Syrians and some
Arabs.

The report of the
Indenization Panel appointed to
investigate
misdeeds of the decree found
that the m ain devices
used to circuit
its provisions included
application for naturalization,

"fronting,"
interpretational problems of
classification of enterprises,
lack of
adequate enforcement procedures
and frequent amendments
providing
for exemptions on "flimsy
grounds."
It is hoped that the
new military
government of General Buhari would
close certain loopholes inherent
in Enterprises Decrees and
study closely the new arrangements
by

multinational corporations designed to
keep the country in the path
of dependent growth and development.
This new arrangement is known as
"international

sub-contracting."

The term refers to a relationship whereby
transnational corporations,
in order to supply their markets in
advanced capitalist countries,

arrange to use Third World firms which they
control to produce entire
products, components and services.

With the failure of import-

substitution strategies of industrialization in the
country, international sub-contracting has been gaining momentum.

Since international

sub-contracting tends to produce those luxury goods and consumer
durables
which only the bourgeoisie can afford, production tends to
be

sector specific without any direct benefits to backward or forward
linkages within the economy.

Moreover, such economic activity does not

promote the transfer of useful technology or upgrading of labor skills
needed for sustained economic growth and development.

Thus Nigeria's

goal of diversified and self-generating industrialization had been

frustrated.

Policy to correct these structural ills will depend

considerably on careful screening of transnational corporations and
their corporate activities, including the national will to lessen

reliance on transnationa!
corporations for nationa!
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develops

and

industrialization.
It is necessary to
recognize however that
these corporations

can play important parts in
the transfer of
appropriate or choice
technology and skills, or as
contractors and suppliers of
needed goods
and services.
Conflict of interest when
marked, can be solved by

regulating the activities of
transnational corporations
through
screening of foreign investment
and the inflow of technology
proposals
on a case-by-case basis
to the use of concerted
policy instruments to
control and monitor the activities
of such corporations.
Developing

countries in turn should enact
explicit legislation taking

into

consideration the special characteristics
of transnational corporations.
The process should be one of mutual
adjustment.
We believe that the role of such
corporations will continue
to be of great importance, either as
a source of investment and

therefore of transfer of technology or services
or
of these functions.

a

combination

However, we point out that this could be
done

with greater domestic participation and control
and in some cases,

a

greater degree of selectivity regarding the extent of
foreign input.
Effective control, however, often continues to rest with
foreign
partners.

-

Most developing countries would like this situation changed

and several policies and legislations are geared towards surrendering

control albeit through political means.
The achievement of these goals and objectives seem difficult

indeed especially in

a

nation bedevilled by multiplicity of

interest and ethnic groups.

Thus, the politics of consensus was
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inevitable; the bureaucrats and
the civil service providing
the
necessary legitimacy and the
framework on which the
programs of
transformation may be concretely
formulated and executed.
The game of
consensus was primarily played by
the Military government
and top
level bureaucrats, who, at one
point in the history of Nigeria,
held
the key to Nigeria's demise or
survival as a nation.
This game was

Played remarkably well and peaceful
and has formed the background
on
which subsequent games are played.

Although the political basis for
transformation was carefully
laid out and constructed, it should
not be seen as
on those essential

a

measure of success

programs and policies which are in
general crucial

to the success of the need for
transformation.

It should be said however

that some policies have achieved some
measure of satisfaction while

others have not.
The success or failure of those policies are
better analyzed
if the state is understood to be the site of
class interaction, and if

the role of the state is said to be one of major,
selective inter-

vention in the nation's economic life.

Thus state institutions,

and politices, are consciously and deliberately organized
to reach out
and touch the civil society.
is

The extent to which this is actually so

indeed doubtful as pointed out earlier in this study.

However, the

logic of state intervention should not (at least in theory) be

regarded as the promotion of the interests of

a

single class; rather

it should be seen as a deliberate attempt at resolving certain systemic

contradictions including those presented by economic and social forces.
Taken on the merits of each, certain policies and programs

which embodies the spirit of transformation, could be judged successful;
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,

for others, it is simply too
early to call or determine.
the whole, essential

stand

a

However, on

policies, given the right
attitude and force,

chance for tremendous success and
achievement. For example,

indigenization decrees, which aim at
transferring economic control to
the indigenes from foreigners, is
promising, although several
strategies employed by some "penetrated"
Nigerians and their foreign

counterparts to throw out the spirit if not
the letter of these
policies are proving to have, according to Tom
Biersteker,

"neutralizing" effect.

a

This judgment, in my opinion, is premature.

The fact of the matter is that roles played by
various institutional

actors including those played by foreign interests, in
the indigenization process have not crystallized and have not been
clearly understood,
But it should be said however that local capital in
active connivance

with the state machinery are aiming to obtain

a

greater share of the

Nigerian economic pie from the multinational corporations who control
the major industrial processes in the country.

Concurrently, evidence points to the fact that an active

alliance exists between multinational corporations and segments of the
nation's bourgeoisie.

This alliance is primarily one of convenience

enjoyed by both partners.

On several

occasions, the state apparatus

has been involved in this triple alliance, creating, unfortunately,

the impression of the existence of a cabalistic arrangement, whose sole

purpose is advancing particular interests.
the average Nigerian is the loser.

In this sort of game,

The results of this arrangement

on the indigenization decrees is hard, at the moment, to tell or even

predict with any degree of accuracy due to the evolving nature of
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systemic alliances.

However, one thing is certain:

entrepreneurs (at least most of them)

controlling the economy; most want

a

Nigerian

are simply not interested
in

quick, significant portion
of the

fruits of the economy, they seem
to be content to playing
a secondary
role to foreign capital - the exact
opposite of what indigenization

policies dictate.

On the whole, Nigerian
businessmen and production

forces lack the necessary capital,
the technology and managerial

expertise to effect the much celebrated
industrialization process and
regime without the active participation
of foreign agents, such as the

multinationals.

These agents, in my opinion, have

a

long stay in

Nigeria.
The international oil industry is by no means
shielded from

political demands made by producer-state governments.
political nature will, in my opinion

Demands of

continue to be made on trans-

national companies until specific goals envisioned by
producer

governments individually or collectively, as in OPEC, is
accomplished.
Much has been written on OPEC; several theories and models
have been advanced in attempts to understand the organization's

behavior.

Political organizations, such as OPEC, defy academic

modelling not so much because of its institutional complexities

as

uncertainties behind its motives, goals and political aspirations.
We have concluded that OPEC is a cartel of a different sort, capable

of controlling the market but if it

is

to maintain its privileged

market position in the long run, it must either confront Non-OPEC
oil

producers through placing market barriers, or come to terms with them.
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Theories aimed at understanding
OPEC behavior within
the framework of international industry
has not been very
promising either
Games theories have been
used extensively to
understand problems of
this sort, but I do not think
that game theory is
relevant to
competitive behavior in the sense
that it has been able
to solve problems
of any consequence in the
international oil market.
However, game
theory is heuristically
important in deepening our
understanding and
its applicability in the affairs
of global oil

is

of some theoretical

value.

Within global oil industry,
significant and important changes
have taken place both in its structure
and mode of operation.

With

the emergence of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
the traditional

role played by international oil
companies was

virtually transformed from one of total
control of production and
pricing decisions to one of mere offtakers
or contractors of oil.
Oil

companies are in effect stripped of much of
their negotiation

capabilities.

The decline in the companies' control is
evidence by

the decreasing share of world trade and production
they handle.

International oil firms in the early 1970s accounted for
nearly

ninety percent of the non-communist trade in crude worldwide;
by
the close of the decade, this share of the market slipped
to less

than fifty percent.
This reduced role of the oil companies in world trade has
been as

a

result of the increased importance of oil producing host

governments who now assume an increasingly important role (through
their state owned oil companies) in marketing crude, totally

excluding the transnational oil
companies.

77

Direct intergovernmental

sales reached almost six million
barrels per day in 1979.

Policies

designed to exclude transnational
oil companies from
certain activities
in producing nations have
mostly based on political
considerations.
As such, this study has elaborately
stated why a government-to-government
negotiation is desirable and inevitable
in the global

We believe that this method will

satisfaction.

It is

oil

industry.

introduce stability, order and
mutual

in fact the sign of the
times

to come.

Such eventually may be the case in
Nigeria's oil industry.

Although elements of independence such
as the nation's oil corporation
(NNPC) are actively groomed to replace
the activities of the foreign

multinational oil companies,
a

a

closer study indicates that NNPC has

long ground to cover in order to achieve
these goals.

that the services of the multinationals

The odds are

will still be needed, but

not as before, be it in the form of production-sharing
contracts or

service contracts.

Nigeria is not yet matured, as Brazil and Indonesia

found out in their cases, that the creation of elements
of independence
do automatically abolish the crucial
in the international

oil

industry.

role played by multinationals

However, it is conceivable that

the major role presently played by these oil multinationals will in

time be downgraded with the emergence of government-to-government

approach in international oil negotiations.

Nigeria will, undoubtedly,

favor this approach which will consolidate her position within OPEC.
And as

a

response to those who have repeatedly called for the with-

drawal of the nation from the ranks of OPEC,

would mean

a

I

say that doing so

deliberate, catastrophic mistake and

I

argue that
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Nigeria should not.

A policy designed to
achieve withdrawal would

only exacerbate the economic
problems which today face the
nation.
It would also attenuate the
visions and hopes of those
Nigerians
who see her greatness tied to the
global transnationalization
process.
A major economic and cultural
crisis and catastrophe awaits

Nigeria if she does not systematically
and judiciously attenuate the
grand visions she entertains of her
future and exemplified in her

erratic policies of arrested economic
development.

Development

and "modernization" must be commensurate
to the capabilities devoted
to such goals.

Any policy which deviates carelessly from
this

simple fact, courts dependency and dependence
on foreign forces for
internal growth and development.

The flight from our past and the systematic
degradation of

our cultural heritage, made thinkable and worthy by our
overwhelming
urge and desire to be "Americanized," to fall victim to narcissism,

would only strengthen the transnational component of Nigerian

capitalism and would inevitably entrench the waning of our cultureThis

would render us vulnerable to the wishes of external interests.

When we understand the problems facing us, the rest is easy, and thus

out of this turmoil, we might produce

a

different kind of society,

more complicated, saner, more civilized and less dependent.
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APPENDIX

Indigenization Decrees:

Schedule and

Distribution of Enterprise Ownership

The Nigerian Enterprises Decree of 1972 and
later revised
in

1977 was an "imaginative and necessary" legislation
desianed

to ensure that the control

of the economy is gruadually transferred

to Nigerians while accommodating judiciously the
interests of

foreign forces of production.

order for Nigeria and

a

These decrees call for

a

new economic

"new deal" for Nigerians.

Enterprises have been classified according to levels of
capital and technology intensive characteristics and on this

basis,

"Nigerianization" exercises were implemented.

Schedule

I

enterprises which comprise low technology, low capital inputs
are to be wholly owned by Nigerians.

mostly of service industries

Schedule

II

comprised

such as banking and liaht manufacturing

should have not less that sixty percent indigenous equity interest:
and Schedule III embraces all other enterprises which do not fall

within Schedules

I

and II.

Schedule III enterprises are to have

forty percent Nigerian ownership or equity (see Diagram).

'

1

owned by

V

1

NEW SCHEDULE

(Enterprises to be

I

whoihA

Nlgerinr.sl

Cosmetics and perfumery manufacture.
Supermarkets and Departmental Stores
having a turnover of less than N2m. per

1.

2.

annum.
Distribution

3.

agencies

machinery

vehicles,

excluding

and

motor
equipment and

spare-parts.
4.
5.

Estate Agency.
Furniture making.

7.

Manufacture of suit-cases, brief-cases,
hand-bags, purses, wallets, portfolios and
shopping bags.
Passenger bus services of any kind.

8.

Poultry farming.

6.

9.

Printing of stationery

(when not associated

with printing of books),
10.

1 1

.

Slaughtering, storage, distribution and processing of meat.
Travel agencies.

12. Wholesale distribution (of local manufactures and other locally produced goods).
13. Commercial Transportation (wet and dry.

cargo and
14.

Rim

fuel).

Distribution (Including

cinema

films).

1 5.
Manufacturers' Representatives.
16. Indenting.

17.

Commision Agents.

PROPOSED SCHEDULE II
Enterprise* which for reasons of public
policy should be controllod by Nigerians in
equity and management terms. These
should be enterprises which, by their
nature, are of strategic importance to the
economy. In this connection, the Panes
recommends that Government sponsored
institutions and private Nigerian citizens
should have not laaa than 60% equity Interest In tha following areaa:

ADDITIONS TO EXISTING SCHEDULE
1.

and Departmental Stores
hiving a turnover of more than N2m. per

annum.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

—
—

Banking

Commercial
Development banking.
Insurance

all

Merchant

classes.

Production.

Fertilizer

9.

Pulp and Paper

mills.

10.

Plantation Sugar and Processing.

1 1

Salt Refinery

12.
13.

and

—
Mining and Quarrying.
Basic Iron and Steel manufacture.
Cement manufacture.
Petro-Chemica! Feed-stock industries.

8.

.

II

Supermarkets

and Packaging.

Construction Industry
Plantation Agriculture for tree crops, grains
and other cash crops.
,

1

4.

1

5.

Manufacturing industries.
Internal Air Transport (Schedule and Charter

1

6.

Oil Milling

Textile

Services).

and Crushing

Industries.

17. Distribution and Servicing of motor vehicles,

machinery

and

equipment,

tractors

and

spare parts thereof.
18. Lighterage.
1

9.

Wholesale distribution

of 'imported

goods.

PROPOSED SCHEDULE III
not coming within
or II above should have a minimum Nigerian participation of 40%.
Tha second stage of tha indlgenisation
schema shall com* into effect not later than
December 31, 1978. This will give time for
the efficient execution of tha schema. Tha
Ministries of Justice and Industries era
directed to ensure that all legislation,
reorganisation and strengthening of the
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board and
other preparatory work should be comAll

other

Schedules

enterprises

I

pleted forthwith.

<

—
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